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ABSTRACT 
Motivated by the global financial market turbulence in 2007-2011 and the gaps 
from the literature, this thesis presents an econometric assessment of different 
transmission mechanisms that propagated and amplified shocks from advanced 
economies to East Asia. The asset price channel is investigated with MS-VAR model 
and multivariate unconditional correlation tests. The recursive bivariate probit 
models are applied to test the liquidity shock transmission via the sudden stop in 
international lending. The second round effects are examined with partial 
adjustment models and system GMM estimation. The econometric procedure and 
testing approach bring about novel results from superior estimation techniques 
and handle several statistical problems such as heteroskedasticity, non-linearity, 
endogeneity, omitted variables, simultaneous equations and sample selection bias.  
The main finding of the thesis is that despite relatively sound fundamentals and 
limited exposure to structured credit products, East Asia could not totally decouple 
from the global financial crisis. Specifically, the asset price channels propagated 
volatility spillovers from the US and Europe to East Asian equity, foreign exchange 
and CDS markets. While international volatility spillovers were mainly caused by 
fundamental links, international behaviour during the shocks intensified the 
regional linkages and generated contagion effect. There was also contagion 
evidence associated with the sudden stop in international lending which facilitated 
the transmission of liquidity tensions in the interbank markets. Finally, contagion 
was magnified by the second round effects, defined as the feedback loops from the 
sudden changes in macro-financial conditions which caused adverse adjustment in 
bank performance. These findings have useful implications for international 
investors and policy authorities regarding to portfolio diversification and 
systematic risk containment.  
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1. CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Research Background  
1.1.1.1. Cross-border Financial Linkages: Benefits and Costs 
Cross-border financial linkages have increased dramatically over the past three 
decades and become more and more complex. This is a consequence of 
globalisation1, which offers investors a greater opportunity to seek higher rates of 
return and to diversify risks. The linkages have been dominated by some advanced 
economies (AEs) and financial centres, while emerging market economies (EMEs) 
still only account for a small part of the global financial network. According to the 
IMF (2011), more than 90% of claims issued by EMEs are held by AE residents, 
while shares held in EMEs are generally small, at 5% or less. However, the cross-
border financial linkages have intensified, underpinned by the exponential rise in 
trade and financial flows. As shown in Figure 1.1, trade openness, measured by the 
sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP and financial openness, 
measured by the sum of financial account assets and liabilities as a percentage of 
GDP, have expanded at an accelerated rate since the 1990s. This reflects the 
increased degree of financial integration, which is at least as high in developed 
countries as in emerging and developing ones. The increasing global linkages also 
lead to the complexity of the network; i.e., the thickening of the web of financial 
links among economies and asset classes (IMF, 2011).  
                                                          
1 Globalisation mentioned in this context refers to the worldwide movement toward economic and 
financial interconnectedness and integration, the process associated with increasing flows of trade, 
investment and communication across national frontiers (Michie, 2003).   
2 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical evidence has suggested key drivers of the financial network connection, 
including geographical, historical, economic and financial factors. In particular, 
stronger linkages occur in clusters of countries that are closer to each other and 
have similar legal systems and common languages (i.e. stronger regional linkages 
than global linkages). Higher exposures are also built up in countries that are 
larger, more developed and financially advanced. Innovation in financial 
instruments over the past decades has increased the complexity of financial links 
across countries and been testified by the global financial crisis of 2007-2011. 
Cross-border linkages and financial integration have generated several economic 
and financial benefits and costs from a financial stability perspective. 
 
Source: IMF-World Economic Outlook (WEO), IMF-Balance of Payments Statistics 
(BOPS) and author’s calculations 
Empirical evidence has suggested key drivers of the financial network connection, 
including geographical, historical, economic and financial factors. In particular, 
stronger linkages occur in clusters of countries that are closer to each other and 
have similar legal systems and common languages (i.e. stronger regional linkages 
than global linkages). Higher exposures are also built up in countries that are 
larger, more developed and financially advanced. Innovation in financial 
instruments over the past decades has increased the complexity of financial links 
Figure 1.1 – Global trade and financial linkages 
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across countries and been testified by the global financial crisis of 2007-2011. 
Cross-border linkages and financial integration have generated several economic 
and financial benefits and costs from a financial stability perspective. 
1.1.1.2. Benefits of Cross-border Financial Linkages 
Risk diversification: The key benefit of cross-border financial linkages is risk 
diversification at individual country level. It is well-known from the Markowitz 
(1952)’s portfolio theory that holding a combination of assets instead of investing 
in a single one helps to reduce the total variance of the asset portfolio. The gains 
from risk reduction depend on the correlation of asset returns. With financial 
liberalisation and integration, domestic investors can diversify their asset 
portfolios internationally by holding assets issued by firms and financial 
institutions around the world in addition to domestic ones. They therefore become 
less exposed to localised shock, contributing to a better sharing of an economy’s 
risk with other countries2.  
Domestic investment and growth enhancement: Another potential stability 
benefit of financial linkages is that they enable a country to access the world pool 
of resources (i.e. an individual country’s integration into the international capital 
market). This facilitates household consumption and domestic investment 
smoothing, improves growth rates and reduces macroeconomic volatility. This 
                                                          
2 It is also widely documented from the literature that investors fail to exploit diversification 
benefits, preferring to concentrate their investments in domestic assets. French and Poterba (1993) 
explain the lack of portfolio diversification in the model of investor preferences and behaviour. For 
example, investors may expect return in their domestic equity market higher than returns in other 
markets; on the other hand they may impute extra risk to foreign investments which they have less 
knowledge about. However, with the focus on analysing cross-border financial linkages and 
international contagion, the paradox of “equity home bias” will not be mentioned in details in this 
thesis. 
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effect is particularly important for EMEs, whose saving capacity is constrained by 
level of income. International capital inflows can supplement domestic savings, 
increase levels of physical capital per worker, help the recipient country raise its 
rate of economic growth and improve living standards (Agénor, 2003). Obstfeld 
(1995) develops a theoretical model demonstrating that global diversification and 
international risk sharing can yield substantial welfare gains through their positive 
effect on expected consumption growth3. The channel that links globalised 
diversification to growth reflects the shift in international portfolios from safe, but 
low yield capital to riskier, high-yield capital.  
In addition to this direct effect on growth, there is a potential indirect effect due to 
the interaction between competition and efficiency. Foreign entry into a domestic 
market (i.e. in the form of foreign direct investment, FDI) will tend to increase 
competition pressure in the host country via various channels. It is clear that the 
foreign influences increase the number of business entities in the market. Foreign 
institutions are usually more efficient in terms of technological know-how and 
managerial skills and experience. Competition may then force domestic 
institutions to become more efficient as well, hence enhancing stability. Extensive 
literature has suggested the link between competition and efficiency. Markusen 
and Venables (1999) demonstrate that cross-border linkages in the supplier 
industry that is induced by FDI help to reduce costs for both consumers and 
producers, raise profits and stimulate domestic investment. MacDougall (1960), 
Grossman and Helpman (1993), Borensztein et al. (1998) and Berthélemy and 
Demurger (2002) mention that FDI facilitates the transfer or diffusion of 
                                                          
3 However, Obstfeld (1995)’s model has some limitations for empirical application. For example, it 
assumes a single consumption good while ignoring the role of goods that do not enter international 
trade and the role of variation in exchange rates. Another drawback comes from the absence of 
capital-adjustment costs and related capital-gains effects.  
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managerial and technological know-how and improves the skills of the labour 
force via the “learning by doing” effect and on-job training. 
Banking system efficiency and financial stability: The diversification benefits 
and interaction between competition and efficiency appear to be even more 
apparent in the financial industry. First, foreign bank entrance and competition 
between banks generate a greater variety of financial services at a lower price; for 
example, lower lending rates for borrowers. A lower cost of investment will raise 
domestic borrowers’ profits and net worth and consequently reduce the likelihood 
of defaults. Second, the presence of foreign banks enables the application of more 
sophisticated banking techniques and highly advanced risk management systems 
that help to improve the quality of financial services and mitigate credit risk. Third, 
foreign bank penetration contributes to the stabilisation of domestic lending 
because it offers domestic firms multiple lending relationship opportunities. When 
domestic banks are lending-constrained due to idiosyncratic shock, domestic 
borrowers may substitute domestic lending with foreign-based financing. The 
same benefits can be obtained on banks’ liability side. Specifically, during financial 
turmoil depositors may shift their funds to foreign banks that are perceived to be 
sounder than domestically-owned ones, instead of transferring assets abroad 
through capital flight. Under these circumstances, cross-border linkages increase 
banking system efficiency and enhance financial stability. 
Improved macroeconomic disciplines: One additional stability benefit worth 
mentioning is enhanced macroeconomic disciplines (Agénor, 2003). Financial 
liberalisation accompanied by free flows of capital and the effect of foreign factors 
may stimulate better regulation, accounting standards, and financial and legal 
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structures. This will encourage countries to pursue more disciplined 
macroeconomic policies and thus reduce the frequency of policy mistakes. As 
mentioned in Obstfeld (1998), unsound policies (i.e. excessive government 
borrowing or inadequate bank regulation) may spark speculative capital outflows 
and higher domestic interest rates. Greater policy discipline translates into greater 
macroeconomic and financial stability, ensuring a more efficient allocation of 
resources and higher rates of economic growth.  
1.1.1.3. Costs of Cross-border Financial Linkages 
Despite extensive potential benefits, increased cross-border linkages have 
generated a great deal of concern about financial instability, such as domestic 
misallocation of capital flows that may hamper economic growth;  risks associated 
with foreign bank penetration; the high degree of capital flow volatility; and in 
particular the risks of cross-border contagion.  
Misallocation of capital flows: Although international capital inflows may 
stimulate domestic investment and raise economic growth, this effect may be quite 
limited or even become negative in the long-run if the cross-border capital flows 
are misallocated to unproductive investments. For example, in some catching-up 
countries, capital inflows are used to finance private consumption or excessive 
public deficits, or are invested in speculative and non-tradable sectors (e.g. in real 
estate). Large amounts of funds invested in weak productive sections may push up 
inflation and real exchange rates, leading to serial problems such as low real 
interest rates, growing external imbalances and associated large current account 
deficits, excessive credit and asset price distortions. Misallocation of capital flows 
usually arises in countries with weak banks (i.e. banks with low capital to risk-
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adjusted asset ratios) and poorly supervised financial systems (Agénor, 2003). 
Easier access to the capital market by the banking system may exacerbate the 
moral hazards problem; i.e., lenders may engage in riskier and more concentrated 
loan operations. This happened in East Asian economies in the 1990s, causing a 
serious banking and currency crisis in 1997-1998.   
Risks of foreign bank penetration: Although foreign-bank penetration generates 
potential efficiency and stability benefits, it may weaken the position of the 
domestic banking system. If domestic banks are burdened with bad debts, operate 
less efficiently or are technically disadvantaged, this makes them unable to cope 
with competitive pressures (De Haas and Lelyveld, 2002). Eichengreen and Mussa 
(1998) emphasise that foreign competition can raise the probability of a banking 
crisis as lower margins for domestic banks make them more vulnerable to loan 
losses. In addition, foreign banks usually concentrate their credit provisions on 
large and often multi-national firms with higher creditworthiness, leaving 
domestic banks with the remaining bad corporate credit risks and the retail 
market. The higher degree of credit rationing to small firms and household 
borrowers may bring about adverse effects on output, employment and outcome 
distribution. Another risk of foreign bank entrance is the concentration process 
arising from the pressure of mergers between local banks for them to remain 
competitive and the acquisition of domestic banks by foreign banks. This would 
make banks become “too big to fail” and is likely to increase the moral hazard 
problem and monopoly power.  
Capital flow volatility: Global integration with higher financial openness to cross-
border transactions increases the level of capital flow volatility because it leads not 
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only to domestic capital flight but also to large capital inflows which are highly 
susceptible to the sudden reversal in times of financial distress. During the past 
two decades, currency or financial crises accompanied by capital withdrawals have 
become more frequent and severe4. However, the effects of financial liberalisation 
on capital flow volatility are varied, depending on the form of capital flows and 
economic region (Broner and Ventura, 2010). For example, FDI is considered to be 
more stable and more difficult to liquidate than portfolio and other investment 
flows (Lipsey, 2001; Berger et al., 2004). Tong and Wei (2009) conduct a test of the 
effect of capital flow composition in 24 EMEs during the 1999-2009 period and 
find that the adjustments of international bank loans are sharper than portfolio 
investment and much sharper than that of FDI flows. The volatile level of capital 
movement is also higher for short-term liabilities, which are more prone to “cut 
and run” by international banks during a period of financial turmoil.  Additionally, 
the volatility in net capital flows is more severe in EMEs than in AEs because the 
change in external liabilities (i.e. a sudden stop in capital inflows) is relatively 
higher than adjustment in external assets (limited capital outflows) because EMEs 
are generally less interconnected and less flexible in offsetting the changes in both 
inward and outward linkages. They are therefore more vulnerable to the one-way 
risk of deleveraging.  
Cross-border contagion: The highest potential cost of financial interconnection 
and the associated capital flow volatility is the risk of cross-border contagion. 
Financial literature provides many approaches in defining contagion. Before going 
to detailed discussion of different theories explaining crises and contagion in 
                                                          
4 See Broner et al. (2010) for more evidence about capital flow volatility associated with financial 
crises during the past four decades.   
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Chapter 3, this section simply mentions the World Bank’s broadest definition of 
contagion as “the cross-country transmission of shocks or the general cross-
country spillover effect”. On one hand, cross-border financial linkages reduce 
investors’ exposures to domestic shocks. On the other hand, investors become 
more vulnerable to foreign shocks. In other words, financial linkages may facilitate 
shock propagation across countries through various transmission mechanisms. 
The most obvious channel is from direct exposure, i.e. overlapping claims that 
different countries/regions or banking sectors have on one another. A negative 
shock that hits one country will cause unexpected losses in others because their 
claims on the troubled country fall in value. If the loss is substantial enough, it will 
cause a crisis in the affected countries. Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. 
(2000) develop theoretical models to demonstrate that the possibility of contagion 
depends strongly on the completeness of the structure of interregional claims. For 
example, countries whose banking sectors had more exposure to structural credit 
products in the United States of America (US) experienced larger losses during the 
2007-2009 subprime mortgage crisis. In that case, European banks were major 
purchasers of asset-back securities and obtained dollar-funding in the US money 
markets (Bernanke et al., 2011). They therefore suffered more severe sub-prime 
losses than EMEs in Asia or Latin America. This affected their domestic lending and 
consequently led to the economic recession.  
Another financial channel which contributes to the spread of the financial crisis 
across countries arises through asset prices. Following a shock in one country, 
international investors may have to sell assets in other countries to meet margin 
calls, capital requirements or just to reduce risk exposure as dictated in the Value 
at Risk (VaR) model. By doing so, investors cause asset prices out of the crisis 
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country/region to fall and the original shock can spread across different markets. 
From standard portfolio theory, Schinasi and Smith (1999) prove that a shock to 
the asset-return pattern in one country usually leads to wealth allocation across 
countries. Banks from a common creditor country may also face a liquidity 
problem when they experience a marked deterioration in the quality of their loans 
in one country; they hence attempt to reduce the overall risk of their loan 
portfolios by reducing their exposures in other high-risk investments in EMEs. For 
example, at the height of the problem in the euro zone area, European banks 
tended to reduce their cross-border claims, or sell and scale-down non-core, 
nondomestic business in host economies, causing a rapid synchronised 
deleveraging effect in EMEs. 
A complex network as a consequence of cross-border linkages is also likely to give 
rise to information asymmetries and increase the potential for herding behaviour, 
flight to quality and a liquidity crunch (IMF, 2011). In the absence of complete 
information, an adverse shock in one country may serve as a “wake-up-call” for 
international investors and encourage them to re-evaluate the risk associated with 
their portfolios, triggering a broad-based pull-back from other countries, especially 
those with the same conditions as the crisis country. Investors could derive 
information not only from their own portfolio, but also from the actions of other 
investors, independently of their own private information signals. This may 
increase the potential for herding behaviour and liquidity crunches. Calvo and 
Mendoza (2000) explain the herding behaviour arising from the cost of gathering 
and processing country-specific information. Uninformed (or less informed) 
investors tend to observe and copy from informed investors who act early in 
adjusting their portfolios. If informed investors move to a bad equilibrium, then 
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less-informed and uninformed investors, by following the informed ones, cause 
another bad equilibrium. Bad equilibrium is characterised by a devaluation, a 
decline in asset prices, capital outflows and/or debt default.   
Switches between multiple equilibria may also arise due to changes in investors’ 
self-fulfilling expectations or a general increase in risk aversion. In the bank run 
model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), individual depositors decide either to hold 
funds or withdraw from a bank depending on the actions of other depositors. If the 
others run, then it is optimal for an individual to run too. In this framework, 
contagion occurs depending on whether investors coordinate in good or bad 
equilibrium. A shock in one market may also change investors’ risk perception (i.e. 
increased risk aversion), so that the equilibrium risk premium in all risky 
investments rises (Schinasi and Smith, 2001; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). For 
example, during the US subprime crisis, when globally investors were concerned 
about where the subprime related casualties might emerge, they de-risked their 
portfolios by selling down holdings in corporate bonds, equities, and property 
securities, opting instead for the safe haven of cash or treasury-related securities. 
This is known as the “flight to quality” effect.  
It is worth noting that cross-border linkages and financial integration are a double-
edge sword: on one hand they improve risk sharing by diversifying away localised 
shocks; on the other, they increase systematic risk and make the global financial 
network more fragile. Standard portfolio theory suggests that the net effect is 
positive; i.e., the overall volatility of an internationally diversified asset portfolio 
will be lower than a purely domestic one which justifies the rationale of financial 
linkages. However, the extreme turbulence in the world financial markets during 
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the past three decades, evidenced by the emerging market financial crises in the 
1990s and early 2000s, the damage to the US subprime credit market with its 
spillover effects on global financial markets between 2007 and 2009, and the rising 
problems in the euro zone area in 2010-2011, have raised a big concern that  
whether the financial instability risk/cost of cross-border financial linkages has 
been appropriately assessed. The global financial system seems currently to be in a 
state of shock and there is the possibility that the whole process of globalisation 
has been threatened by the current instability. Even countries that are not 
considered “systematic” ex ante in terms of economy size and financial openness 
could become the epicentre of systematic financial crises and financial linkages 
facilitate the transmission of shock across countries. Despite the importance of 
contagion risk in the context of financial integration and innovation, it is not yet 
fully understood what the transmission mechanisms are and little work has been 
done so far to stop it. Therefore, investigating cross-border financial linkages and 
crisis contagion is a matter of immediate concern to both the international policy 
community and international investors.   
1.1.2. The US Subprime Credit Crisis and Volatility Spillovers across the 
Global Financial Markets  
The 2007-2011 global financial crisis vividly illustrated how a localised shock 
originating from the US subprime mortgages propagated through multiple linkages 
across borders and asset classes, turning into a large –scale systematic crisis (IMF, 
2011). Considered by many economists as the largest financial bailout in US 
history since the 1930s, the US subprime mortgage credit crisis started in the 
summer of 2007. As pointed out by Olowski (2008), this was the consequence of a 
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series of factors: boom and bust in housing markets, associated with easy credit 
conditions; growth in asset securitisation and the development of new structured 
financial products; inaccurate credit risk assessment and asset valuation models 
and inadequate financial supervision and regulation. Together with the growth in 
the housing market, characterised by annual double-digit increases in typical US 
housing prices (estimated at 124% during the period 1997-2006), the large inflow 
of foreign funds, supported by low interest rates, contributed to creating housing 
and credit bubbles. In addition, the housing market was largely aided by the 
securitisation of mortgages as well as new financial structured products (for 
example, mortgage-backed securities - MBS5, collateralised debt obligations - CDO6 
and credit default swaps - CDS7), which derive their values from mortgage 
payments and housing prices. The securitisation not only increased the 
connectedness between financial institutions, both within and across countries, 
but also led to complex and hard to value assets on the balance sheets of these 
institutions. This brought about large uncertainty that affected the global financial 
network. Indeed, these financial structured products attracted institutions and 
investors around the world to invest in the US housing market. When housing 
prices began to decline and interest rates started to rise in 2006 and 2007, 
                                                          
5 MBS are debt obligations created from the pooling of mortgage loans, mostly in residential 
property. There are three parties involved in the structure of MBS. The sellers generate mortgage-
loans which are then purchased by issuers (banks, mortgage companies and other institutions) and 
assembled into pools by a governmental, quasi-governmental, or private entity. The issuers then 
issue securities that represent claims on the principal and interest payments made by borrowers on 
the loans in the pool. The third-parties, usually institutional investors, invest in MBS to obtain 
higher yields than government bonds, as well as an opportunity to diversify their portfolios.  
6 CDO is a debt security, which is collateralised by different types of debt obligations such as bonds 
and loans of different maturities and credit quality. 
7 CDS is an OTC contract that provides insurance against credit default. In this contract, the 
protection buyer makes a fixed payment, called CDS spreads, to the protection seller and in 
exchange receives compensation if a credit instrument (typically a bond or loan) goes into default. 
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mortgage loans exceed house values, which resulted in significant losses on this 
loan type and other refinancing activities. Customers’ wealth was drained and the 
financial strength of financial institutions was eroded. With the significant increase 
in default and foreclosure, the crisis started to expand from the housing market to 
the banking sector and then to other parts of financial markets (See Figure 1.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 - The US subprime crisis and its impact on financial markets 
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The problems showed up first in the US financial markets and then resulted in 
global market turmoil. Since the second half of 2007, the financial world has been a 
different place, beginning with the fact that many banks and financial institutions 
wrote down their holdings of subprime-related securities, estimated at US$ 1.5 
trillion of subprime MBS only to August 2008 (IMF, 2009). The banks’ big losses in 
toxic assets and bad loans as a consequence of the bursting of the housing bubble 
were estimated by the IMF at US$ 2.8 trillion from 2007-2010 (US$1 trillion of US 
banks’ losses and US$1.8 trillion from European banks). This in turn led to the 
failure and bail-out of several US and European banks, and over 100 mortgage 
lenders during 2007 and 2008. As turbulence in the US subprime mortgage market 
deepened in 2008, several financial institutions failed, were acquired under duress, 
or were subject to government takeover. They included Merrill Lynch, Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Countrywide Financial, 
Washington Mutual, Wachovia Mutual and AIG in the US; Northern Rock, Alliance 
and Leicester, Roskilde Bank, Fortis and Straumur Investment Bank, ABN-Amro, 
RBS in Europe. 
Money markets were subject to this bank-run, which made credit for banks less 
available and more expensive. The tension in inter-bank markets due to the 
liquidity squeeze and credit freeze intensified the financial crisis and brought the 
global financial system to the brink of collapse, forcing immediate and dramatic 
responses from the USA Federal Reserve and central banks in other countries. The 
TED spreads8 rose sharply from July 2007 and remained volatile for the following 
period of time until they reached an unprecedented level of 4.65% on October 10, 
                                                          
8 The TED spreads (the difference between 3-month LIBOR and the US 3-month Treasury bill rate) 
is commonly used as a measure for perceived counterparty risk between banks. 
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2008, breaking the previous record set after the Black Monday crash of 1987 
(Figure 1.3). While interbank markets across AEs showed signs of severe stress, 
there was clear evidence of increased global investors’ risk aversion and a flight to 
quality and liquidity, underscored by a strong demand for 10-year US Treasury 
bills as a ‘safe’ haven. The volatility spilled over into the equity markets. During the 
period from June 2007 to November 2008, the US lost an estimated average of 
more than a quarter of its collective net worth (IMF, 2009). The S&P 500 fell 45% 
from its 2007 high. On September 29, 2008, the S&P 500 fell 8.8%, which was its 
largest one-day percentage decline since Black Monday in 1987. 
The fall of Lehman Brothers on 15 September, 2008 exposed the interbank 
markets to an even higher level of counterparty and liquidity risk and set off an 
avalanche of world-wide deleveraging. Following this event, the sharp increase in 
default-risk premium and equity risk-premium caused a dramatic asset 
devaluation in stock markets in many parts of the world (Figure 1.3). As portfolio 
outflows and run-to- quality accelerated, sovereign spreads and the costs of 
insuring against sovereign default soared across a wide range of EMEs.  
Deleveraging in the form of capital outflow represents additional macroeconomic 
problems. Not only do countries have to deal with a domestic credit problem as a 
consequence of the sudden stop in capital inflow, but they also have to suffer 
downward pressure on foreign exchange rates. EMEs with large current account 
deficits and whose banks were more reliant on foreign wholesale funding were 
more affected and had to accept large depreciation if they had not built up enough 
foreign reserves or were unable to access IMF credit support. For example, Korea 
and Russia had to employ their foreign reserves, while Ukraine, Hungary, Pakistan 
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and Latvia received substantial financial support from the IMF in the last quarter 
of 2008 to cope with currency depreciation pressures arising from an unwinding 
of their portfolio position and severe strains on their banking sectors.  
Financial spillovers via foreign exchange, stock and real estate markets and money 
and debt markets have a negative impact on the real economy by lowering 
consumption and investment activity. Falling global demand and the drying up of 
trade finance dramatically eroded global trade flows. According to a report by the 
World Bank, the volume of world merchandise trade plunged by 9% in 2009. EMEs 
which were highly export-oriented suffered most; for instance, exports in 
Southeast Asia switched from double-digit growth to a double digit decline. 
Consequently, economic slowdowns spread into all regions across the world, with 
an estimated contraction of the global economy in 2009 of 1.7%, the first decline 
on record in world output according to the World Bank. The localised financial 
crisis turned into a deep global recession, which affected EMEs at least as much as 
AEs.  
Gallego et al. (2010) demonstrated three different financial transmission channels 
of the global financial crisis on EMEs: the direct channel, indirect channel and 
second-round effects (See the Appendix 1.1). The direct effect arises from a 
country/ region’s direct exposures to toxic assets. The indirect financial channels 
work via capital outflows and asset price depreciation in stock markets, foreign 
exchange markets and money and debt markets due to the deterioration of foreign 
investor sentiments toward EMEs. Second round effects relate to “feedback loops 
from a slump in economic activity which may negatively impact on financial 
institutions, inter alia, via deteriorating credit quality, rising non-performing loans 
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(NPL), declining profitability and increased problems retaining the necessary 
capitalisation” (Gallego et al., 2010, p.235). However, the depth and length of the 
crisis impact differed across countries and regions depending on the level of 
economic and financial integration, as well as the resilience of the economies. 
Figure 1.3 - Counterparty risk and sovereign credit risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Datastream and IMF-WEO  
1.2. Motivations and Research Questions  
Motivated by the turbulence in the global financial markets in 2007-2011 and the 
gaps from the literature, this thesis presents an econometric assessment of 
different transmission mechanisms that propagated and amplified shocks from 
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AEs to East Asian countries. Although considered to be a great success story in the 
history of economic development, East Asia was severely hit by two major financial 
crises in just over a decade. The first severe damage was associated with the 
regional currency crisis in 1997-1998, triggered by the weakness and imbalance in 
the Thai economy. This represented a new kind of financial crisis that challenged 
economic development models in the so-called “miracle economies” as well as 
imposing some limitations on the first and second-generation models of currency 
crises. The most striking feature of this event is cross-border spreading of a crisis, 
even with or without direct trade and financial linkages. Since then, the literature 
on international financial contagion has disseminated and become an essential 
part of the intellectual framework investigating financial crises. A decade after the 
1997-1998 crisis, East Asian countries implemented structural financial reform 
and experienced a remarkable recovery in economic development. Therefore, the 
region entered the global financial crisis with relatively strong macro 
fundamentals and a healthy financial position, especially in the banking sector in 
terms of capital adequacy and credit rating. In addition, the financial institutions in 
East Asia had very limited exposure to subprime-related instruments; the 
estimated subprime losses in the crisis were therefore insignificant. Under these 
circumstances, it might be expected that all the lessons learned from past crises 
and regional time-line policy responses helped the regional economy and financial 
markets to successfully decouple from the global economic and financial turmoil. 
Despite the fact that East Asia stayed resilient during 2007 and the first half of 
2008, the region financially gave in to the stream of negative news from the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. This fact raised a broad research 
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question that: What are the transmission mechanisms that propagated and 
amplified external shocks to East Asia and how these mechanisms worked? 
Investigating the current literature of financial crises and contagion channels, we 
identify the following gaps from which specific research questions have been built 
on and help give more convincing answers for the broad research question.  
First, a large body of empirical studies have tested for asset price volatility linkages 
and evidence of financial contagion across countries. The theoretical literature 
suggests that co-movements in asset prices may be linked to either “common 
shocks” and “interdependence” of fundamentals or “shift-contagion” caused by 
investor behaviour. While interdependence refers to the stable cross-market 
linkages, the shift contagion addresses the nonlinear nature of financial interaction. 
However, the empirical role for shift-contagion appears to be relatively limited. 
Moreover, a wide range of different methodologies has been used; each is subject 
to some specific statistical problems, making it difficult to assess the significance of 
asset price channels and the evidence for contagion. For example, Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) point out that the correlation coefficient tests of contagion via 
asset prices and returns are biased in the presence of heteroskedasticity. After 
adjusting for the heteroskedasticity problem, they find that there is no evidence of 
(shift) contagion, but only interdependence in several financial crisis episodes. 
However, Corsetti et al. (2005) argue that the result of “no contagion, only 
interdependence” is due to arbitrary and unrealistic restrictions on the variance of 
country-specific shocks. Taking this caveat into account, their empirical tests 
provide some evidence of contagion and some interdependence. In an effort to 
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seek more robust evidence of contagion in recent financial crises, the Research 
Question One (RQ1) is therefore articulated as follows.  
RQ1a - How do asset prices facilitate the transmission of volatility shock across 
borders?  
RQ1b - How do empirical estimates of asset price volatility linkages relate to 
theoretical assumptions as generally used in the literature on shift-contagion which 
is caused by investor behaviour?  
Second, regarding the limited role of investor behaviour, empirical evidence points 
to the existence of portfolio rebalancing effects caused by liquidity problems and 
capital constraints, and risk aversion effects (Moser, 2003). Many studies 
document that international banks are likely to cut back foreign loans after 
experiencing marked deterioration in loan quality in one country, causing cross-
border lending contagion. The more countries rely on external funding from the 
same creditors, the more vulnerable they are to sudden reversal of international 
lending flows. The gap in the literature of cross-border banking and contagion is 
that the majority of studies use gravity model and base regression to decide pull 
and push factors driving cross-border banking flows rather than directly testing 
how international banks transmit shock across countries via the sudden stop. This 
therefore provides the motivation for Research Question Two (RQ2):  
RQ2a – How can cross-border banking expose domestic financial markets to the risk 
of a sudden stop in international lending? 
RQ2b - Do international banks withdraw their exposures across the board or do they 
discriminate between countries, and if so, how? 
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RQ2c - Was the sudden stop in international lending linked to the tensions in host 
countries’ interbank markets? 
Third, the literature on the transmission of global shocks between economies 
mainly investigates the real effects via trade links, or the financial effects via co-
movement of asset prices and international capital flows. Limited attention has 
been paid to the potential second round effects, defined as the adverse feedback 
loops caused by the slumps in economic activity and deterioration in financial 
markets that may negatively impact the domestic banking sector. Even if a country 
has a sound banking system and remains resilient to external shocks, it may 
encounter a threat of traditional credit risk and contraction on bank lending 
prompted by macro-financial linkages. Another gap arises from the modelling 
approach of bank behaviour. While most literature focuses on adjustment in 
individual dimensions of bank behaviour, little research has been conducted on 
simultaneous adjustment in overall bank performance given each serves as an 
endogenous factor of the others. These gaps motivated the formation of Research 
Question Three (RQ3). 
RQ3a - How did domestic banks react to changes in macro-financial conditions 
during the global financial crisis and how can their reactions to those risks be 
modelled?  
RQ3b - Do bank behaviour adjustments magnify the impact of global shock?  
RQ3c - How do empirical estimates of bank reactions relate to the behavioural 
assumptions generally used in the theoretical literature? 
Although the real effect via trade links being straightforward and significant in 
East Asia during the global financial crisis, this thesis mainly focuses on financial 
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links and financial transmission mechanisms, given their complexity for 
appropriate anticipation and measurement relative to trade links. East Asian 
economies to be investigated in this study include Thailand (TL), Indonesia (ID), 
Malaysia (ML), Philippines (PH), Korea (KR), Singapore (SG) and Hong Kong (HK). 
They are considered as key players in Asia, who have contributed significantly to 
the remarkable economic growth since the 1990s and helped the region gain world 
admiration as ‘Miracle Asia’. They are also countries who have experienced 
substantial transformation in macro-financial developments but are still unable to 
totally decouple from financial crises.  
1.3. Research Contributions 
The essential contribution of this thesis is that it brings together empirical studies 
of financial transmission mechanisms and works on the aspects that have not yet 
been widely investigated by the literature of shock propagation; i.e. the joint 
effects of the sudden stop in international lending and its feedbacks to the 
interbank market tensions; the second round effects of contagion; and the 
simultaneous adjustments in overall bank performance. Moreover, the 
improvement in testing with the combination of different econometric techniques, 
increases the contribution of the research as it addresses several statistical 
problems and leads to novel empirical results from superior methodologies.  
Accordingly, in order to evaluate the asset price channel and the existence of shift 
contagion, the MS-VAR models and multivariate version of unconditional 
correlation tests are applied. The econometric procedure takes into account the 
endogeneity of variables, non-linear linkages, heteroskedasticity, simultaneous 
equations and sample selection bias. Those problems have not yet been handled 
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altogether in any single work on this topic. This, therefore, enhances the 
robustness of the research’s empirical results. 
With respect to the analysis of cross-border banking and contagion, this thesis 
appears to be the first to use the recursive bivariate probit model and the first to 
test the hypothesis of the sudden stop in international lending and the 
simultaneous effect of the sudden stop on the interbank market tensions in host 
countries. The base regression technique which has been widely used in the 
literature is subject to model uncertainties due to the nonlinear nature of 
international capital flows, as verified by low R2 in the estimated results in many 
empirical papers. In other words, it fails to capture the distribution of probabilities 
of extreme events. The econometric models applied in this study fit the nature of 
the data as well as the research objective and brings about new findings.   
Regarding to the assessment of the second round effects, the partially adjustment 
models and dynamic panel data techniques with system Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation is utilised to model the adjustment in four dimensions 
of bank performance, i.e. asset quality, profitability, capital buffers and lending 
behaviour. This study adds more value to the thesis because it bridges the gaps 
from the literature by focusing on microeconomic conditions and institutional 
factors in shock propagation across countries as well as modelling many 
dimensions of bank behaviour. Additionally, the econometric method is considered 
to be preeminent in handling omitted variables, endogeneity, fixed effects, 
persistent series and dynamic panel bias.  
Finally, the findings from this research have a lot of useful implications for central 
banks and financial regulators to contain the systematic risk and prevent the next 
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crisis from happening. Moreover, this will also underpin the rationale of portfolio 
diversification for international investors.  
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of the thesis is as follows.  
Chapter two reviews macro-financial strengths and vulnerabilities in East Asia, 
which provides the background to analyse regional responses to shock and 
contagion effects in the following chapters. It starts from East Asia economic 
conditions before the outbreak of the 1997-1998 crisis and clarify how financial 
liberalisation generated regional vulnerabilities. Next, the causes and 
consequences of the financial crisis in 1997-1998 is analysed, basing on theoretical 
models of currency crises and international financial contagion framework. 
Discussion on economic and financial reforms after the crisis follows. Despite the 
remarkable recovery and strong fundamentals, the region has still faced some 
challenges associated with globalisation and liberalisation which connect those 
countries to the rest of the world. This kind of cross-country linkages has created 
different transmission mechanisms to propagate global shocks to East Asia. 
Chapter three examines the first transmission mechanism, asset price volatility 
linkages, which address research questions 1a and 1b. The MS-VAR framework is 
used to model dynamic volatilities and volatility spillovers from the US and Europe 
to East Asian equity, foreign exchange and sovereign debt markets. Then, the 
multivariate version of unconditional correlation test is applied to evaluate 
whether this type of asset price linkages and volatility transmission is a 
consequence of interdependence or “shift-contagion” caused by investor behaviour. 
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The econometric testing is based on time series data of weekly stock returns, 
foreign exchange rates and changes in sovereign CDS spreads.  
Chapter four extends the empirical evidence on investor-based contagion, 
especially the role of international banks in cross-border shock transmission in 
loan provision. This chapter will seek convincing explanation for research 
questions 2a, 2b and 2c. Firstly, using Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
banking statistics, it characterises the evolution of cross-border banking activities 
in East Asia and the potential vulnerability to contagion. Then, the univariate and 
recursive bivariate probit models are employed to empirically test the hypothesis 
of the sudden stop in international lending and the links between the sudden stop 
and the interbank market tensions in host countries. We also quantify the marginal 
effects of global and country-specific risk factors on the probability of a sudden 
stop and liquidity shock transmission.    
Chapter five examines how the variability in macro-financial conditions can 
influence banks’ financial soundness and behaviour, which justifies the second 
round effects of the global financial crisis on East Asian economies. Applying 
partial adjustment model and system GMM estimation, this chapter provides an 
econometric analysis of bank behaviour in times of sudden change, capturing both 
the size and direction of balance sheet adjustments in interactions with shocks in 
the financial system and economy as well as international contagion effects. The 
estimation procedure is based on a panel of 174 commercial and investment banks 
and bank-owned companies from eight East Asian countries over a period from 
2003 to 2011. The findings help answer the research questions 3a, 3b and 3c.  
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In Chapter six, the main empirical findings are summarised and the policy 
implications discussed. The limitations of the work will be noted and areas for 
further research suggested. 
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2. CHAPTER TWO – MACRO - FINANCIAL STRENGTHS AND 
VULNERABILITIES IN EAST ASIA: FROM THE 1997-1998 
REGIONAL CRISIS TO THE 2007-2011 GLOBAL CRISIS 
 
2.1. East Asian Economic  Performance, Financial Liberalisation and the 
1997-1998 Financial Crisis 
2.1.1. East Asian Economic Performance and Financial Liberalisation 
before the 1997-1998 Financial Crisis: A Brief Review 
Referred to as one of the great success stories in the history of economic 
development, East Asia started its episode of rapid and sustained economic growth 
in the 1960s. Radelet et al. (1997) provide four reasons which explain the 
spectacular growth in East Asia relative to other countries/regions: (i) their 
economies had substantial potential for catching up as they entered the 1960s with 
low incomes9 and relatively well-educated workers; (ii) their geographical and 
structural characteristics were by-and-large favourable (i.e. they are located on the 
                                                          
9 In Radelet et al. (1997), the basic growth framework which is based on neoclassical growth 
models predicts conditional convergence of income, i.e. an initially low income (relatively to its own 
long-run potential level) country will grow faster than those that are already closer to the long-run 
potential level of income. The basic model is expressed as follows: 
( )    (   
 )       
  (The logarithm of the long-run steady-state level of output per worker,    
  
depends on policy and structural variables of time t denoted as   
 ). 
( ) 
    (  
 )
  
  [   (   
 )     (  
 )]  (The growth rate of output per worker, dlog(Qi )/dt  is 
proportional to the gap between long-run level and current level of output). 
( ) 
    (  
 )
  
        
      (  
 )                      
Equation (3) derived from (1) and (2) describes that current growth rate of output per worker is a 
function of structural and policy variables   
  and the current level of output,   
 . 
This model helps to explain why wealthier countries, with relatively large capital stocks and 
already operating near the world’s technological frontier, tend to grow more slowly than low-
income countries that are catching up with the leaders.  
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coast) ; (iii) the demographic transition following World War II worked in favour 
of more rapid growth (i.e. declining fertility rates, favourable trends in literacy and 
education and public health policies which raised life expectancy); and especially 
(iv) their economic policies with export-led growth strategies were thoroughly 
implemented via the establishment of export processing zones, duty exemption 
schemes, incentives packages for FDI, convertible currencies and macroeconomic 
stabilities. During the period from 1965 to 1990, the twenty three economies in 
East Asia grew faster than those of other regions. The achievement was 
attributable to the eight best-performers: Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, who experienced average growth rates of over 
5.5% per year in per capita terms between 1965 and 1990, while over the same 
period the growth in high-income economies was only 0.8% and that of all low and 
middle-income countries was merely 0.4% (Page, 1994). Table 2.1 shows 
information on the growth of GDP, exports and living standards in seven East Asian 
countries. It is indeed remarkable that some countries achieved double digit 
growth rates for both GDP and aggregate exports in the 1990s. Over the 16 year 
period from 1980 to 1996, the total exports of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Korea increased from US$ 68 billion to US$ 361 billion, raising the share of these 
four countries in total exports from 2.8% to 5.4%, and in total exports of EMEs 
from less than 11% to more than 22% (Dholakia, 1998).  
This sustained and rapid economic growth resulted in large-scale reductions in 
poverty and considerable improvement in living standards across countries, which 
earned the region the reputation as an “East Asian Miracle” (Page, 1994). By the 
mid-1990s, the region succeeded to a large extent in eradicating poverty, 
represented by a significant decline in poverty ratios, especially in Thailand, 
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Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea. Within the comparisons of growth rates and Gini 
coefficients, the World Bank (1997) demonstrated that the distribution of income 
was substantially more equal in all high-performing Asian countries and 
improvements in income distribution coincided with a period of rapid growth. 
Table 2.1 - Growth of GDP, exports and living standards in East Asian countries 
  HK SG KR ID ML TL PH 
Exports (annual %) 
 1980 12.27 22.95 8.15 5.53 3.17 7.71 39.82 
1990 8.26 12.92 4.45 3.36 17.82 13.39 1.86 
1992 17.68 7.22 12.21 13.71 12.6 13.81 4.28 
1995 10.01 22.06 24.39 7.72 18.96 15.44 12.04 
GDP (annual %) 
 1980 10.31 10.05 -1.49 8.72 7.44 5.11 5.15 
1990 3.9 12.11 9.16 9 9.01 12.17 3.04 
1992 6.09 7.03 5.88 7.22 8.89 8.08 0.34 
1995 2.29 7.28 9.17 8.4 9.83 9.24 4.68 
Per capita income ($US) 
 1980 5,691 4,913 1,674 517 1,802 681 689 
1995 23,428 22,922 11,467 1,013 4,287 2,816 1,070 
Poverty ratio (%) 
 1965 
  
40 60 49 57 
 1995   5 14 9 13  
Source: World Bank-World Development Indicators 
Furthermore, East Asia enjoyed a sustained development path with considerable 
macroeconomic stability. In the period from 1994 to 1996, many countries in the 
region displayed low inflation, fiscal surpluses or balances, limited public debt 
(except Thailand and Korea) and substantial foreign exchange reserves. The most 
notable feature of East Asian growth was a significantly high rate of investment. 
Gross domestic investment grew by over 15% per year in Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia and more than 7% in Korea between 1990 and 1996, while this figure in 
the US was 4.1% and in other high-income countries only 0.8% (Dholakia, 1998). 
To sustain such high levels of investment, the governments encouraged domestic 
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savings through a variety of interventionist schemes10. However, there was still 
significant gap between the domestic saving rate and aggregate investment rate as 
domestic savings lagged behind high investments. Therefore, East Asia countries 
had to turn to external resources (i.e. international capital inflows). The large scale 
of flows of capital was not only accelerated by the pursuance of financial market 
deregulation and liberalisation since the late 1980s but was also encouraged by a 
credible pegged exchange rate regime. Together with a trade openness-oriented 
policy, the ongoing financial integration process made these economies more 
closely linked with the rest of the world through cross-border financial 
transactions and the associated rapidly increasing capital mobility.  
In 1990, total net capital flows to EMEs were about US$ 50 billion, half of which 
went to Asia (Ito et al., 1999). While the majority of capital flows to China were in 
the form of direct investment, most of the flows to East Asia took the form of bank 
credit, mainly concentrated either in areas with high volatile returns (stocks and 
real estates) or in areas with substantial capacity. Figure 2.1 shows the net capital 
inflows in seven East Asian countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Korea and Thailand) during the period 1980-1996, highlighting the 
dominant proportion of banking flows, i.e. trade credit and loans. Lending by 
foreign banks accounted for 60% of the 1996 private capital flows to Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Korea, a major part of which were short-term 
credits. This made those economies become large borrowers in international 
                                                          
10 Governments in East Asia countries applied a variety of interventionist mechanisms to stimulate 
domestic savings: encouraging postal savings systems (Korea and Malaysia), forcing high private 
savings through mandatory provident fund contributions (Malaysia and Thailand), and stringent 
controls on consumer loans and high taxes on luxury consumption (Korea, Malaysia and Thailand) 
(Dholakia, 1998).  
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capital markets. Foreign banks were also provided greater freedom of entry in 
those countries.  
Figure 2.1 – Net capital inflows to East Asia 
 
Source: IMF-BOPS 
Notes: Net capital inflows refer to net incurrence of liabilities. A positive sign 
indicates an increase in liabilities, and a negative sign indicates a decrease in 
liabilities. Other flows consist of bank loans, trade credit and other investments. 
 
Figure 2.2 – Net capital flows to GDP in selected East Asian countries 
 
Source: Ito et al. (1999) 
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
$
U
D
 B
il 
FDI Portfolio Other
0
5
10
15
20
25
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
p
e
rc
e
n
t 
ID ML TL KR PH
33 | P a g e  
 
Relative to the size of recipient economies, Malaysia (1991-1993) and Thailand 
(1989-1995) received the largest net capital inflows, exceeding 10% of GDP11 
(Figure 2.2). Indonesia, Korea and Philippines also attracted increasing capital, 
although their size in ratio to GDP did not reach the levels of Malaysia and Thailand. 
In 1996 alone, total net capital flows into these five countries (Asian-5) amounted 
to a staggering US$ 70 billion (Claessens et al., 2000). Although capital flows are 
essential for sustaining economic growth in host countries, the high intensity of 
capital flows brings about severe macroeconomic problems, especially local 
currency appreciation, which will weaken a country’s price competitiveness and 
export industries. This kind of risk substantially threatened East Asian countries as 
most of them had current account deficits, especially Thailand and Malaysia 
(Figure 2.3). Moreover, many East Asian countries also revealed some structural 
weaknesses both at macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. One of the most 
serious challenges was that Thailand, Indonesia and Korea accumulated 
substantial short-term and foreign-currency denominated debts, exceeding 100% 
of official reserves (see Table 2.2). With large levels of foreign debt, mainly 
intermediated through the banking system to private sectors, domestic banks 
engaged in overlending and domestic firms engaged in overinvestment, departing 
from profit maximisation objectives (Dickinson and Mullineux, 2001). This was 
aided by the lack of effective risk management, prudential supervision and 
regulatory structures, which made the financial system even more fragile. These 
underlying fundamental problems triggered a downward expectation from private 
sectors, causing the sudden withdrawal of funds and precipitated a speculative 
                                                          
11 Capital inflows of this magnitude are difficult to manage (Khan and Reinhart, 1995; Folkerts-
Landau and Ito, 1995) 
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attack on the Thai baht, eventually pushing the regional economy into a dramatic 
financial meltdown with serious economic, social and political consequences. 
Figure 2.3 - Capital flows vs. current account deficits in East Asia 
 
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Table 2.2 – Ratio of short-term debt to official reserves (%) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
TL 58.3 67.8 69.5 89 96.4 119.4 110.3 
ID 130.7 139.7 158.5 145.6 147.4 175.6 167.2 
KR 72.9 81.6 69.5 60.2 123.1 142.5 195.4 
ML 19.3 18.8 21.0 25.4 24.2 30.4 40.8 
PH 216.2 109.2 98.5 85 80.3 67.9 67.9 
HK 23.4 21.7 18.2 17.2 16.4 16.4 22.2 
SG 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.8 2.6 
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB)-Key Indicators (2001). 
2.1.2.  The Financial Crisis of 1997-1998  
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 was a totally unanticipated event, which 
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limitations from the first and second generation models of currency crises12. In 
mid-summer 1997, a half century of regional economic progress came to a 
crashing halt (Jackson, 1999). The crisis originated in the increasing pressures on 
the Thai economy in the first half of 1997, including an unsustainable current 
account deficit; a significant appreciation of the real effective exchange rate; 
deteriorating fiscal balances; remarkably visible weakness in the financial sector 
which faced currency and maturity mismatches and financial companies with wide 
exposure to the real estate sector. Under these pressures, the Thai baht was floated 
on July 2, 1997 and the crisis was quickly spread over the East Asian region, then 
on to other EMEs (Russia and Brazil) and even had some effects on developed 
markets in Europe and North America (Claessens and Forbes, 2004). Between June 
1997 and the end of the year, the average currency depreciation in the twelve 
largest EMEs was as high as 39%, while in the four hardest hit countries (Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea), the average increase in dollar rates was more than 
80%. Although the crisis started from some fundamental weaknesses and financial 
sector problems in Thailand, it was the cross-border financial linkages that 
exacerbated it and exposed the region to full-fledged financial panic. Following 
Thailand, Indonesia and Korea had to enter an IMF rescue package, and even other 
East Asian countries that did not need recourse to IMF assistance faced severe 
downturn and recession. It became quite apparent that East Asian economies were 
                                                          
12 The first generation models built up from the founding work of Krugman (1979) and Flood and 
Garber (1984) identify a speculative attack arising from the run on foreign reserves, and the 
exchange rate crisis is in fact punishment for inappropriate macroeconomic policies, such as 
exchange rate commitment and budget deficit monetisation. 
The second-generation models are based on the potential non-linearity in the policy reaction 
function, which happens when governments react to the changes in private behaviour or when they 
face an explicit trade-off between fixed exchange rate policy and other objectives. In this 
circumstance, crises could be driven by self-fulfilling expectations as the costs of defending fixed 
exchange rates may themselves depend on anticipations that the currency peg will be maintained. 
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inextricably linked to each other and the speed of contagion was totally 
unexpected.   
In fact, the crisis phenomenon was believed to be a consequence of insufficient 
institutional development during the “miracle” boom, as well as the inevitable 
outcome of financial liberalisation associated with the massive cross-border 
capital inflows (Corbett et al., 1999). The crisis included several interlinked 
phenomena, which can be disentangled by in-depth analysis guided by 
conventional theories of currency crises and the literature on international 
financial contagion.  
The third generation model was a good response to Asian crisis, which joined the 
monetary crisis and the fragility of the financial sector and contagion effects from 
other countries. One strand of third generation models focuses on moral-hazard 
problems associated with governments’ guarantees for financial sectors’ liabilities 
(Mackinon and Pill, 1996; Dooley, 1997; Krugman, 1998; Corsetti et al., 1998). 
Under this framework, the Thai crisis was viewed as an “insurance crisis” arising 
from disequilibria caused by moral hazard problems. Like Thailand, other East 
Asian countries experienced massive international capital inflows in the 1990s, 
which were translated into rising domestic credit as a consequence of explicit and 
implicit public guarantees on investments. Given the frangibility of financial 
sectors caused by the lack of transparency, inadequate disclosure and supervisory 
standards, and poorly managed financial liberalisation, the guarantees and “crony 
capitalism”, led banks to engage in moral-hazard lending, overindebtedness and 
the excessively raising of NPL. Implicit government guarantees also encouraged 
firms to make excessively risky investments departing from profit maximisation 
37 | P a g e  
 
objectives. Moreover, much of the bank lending was poured into non-tradable 
assets (for example, real estate), creating a financial bubble preceding the crisis. 
When the bubble burst because of low and declining returns on investment, banks’ 
collateral, which were already subject to sharp value falls, generated further asset 
sales and a consequent collapse in asset prices. This in turn resulted in financial 
health deterioration in banking and corporate sectors. Therefore, there were 
always interactions between banking problems, asset price damage and currency 
crisis. In Krugman (1998), moral hazard and asset prices were main contributors 
to expose Asia to speculative attacks. 
The alternative strand of third generation models explained Asian financial crisis 
arising from the self-fulfilling panic on domestic private liquidity (especially in 
Thailand and Indonesia). Chang and Velasco (1998) extended the Diamond-Dybvig 
(1983) models of bank run to emphasize on the illiquidity of the domestic financial 
system as a centre of problem in an open economy with unrestricted capital 
markets. As the credit channel is especially important in bank-dominated financial 
system in Asia, international capital inflows with a significant proportion of short-
term borrowings were intermediated by domestic banks into less liquid long-term 
lending to firms. This increased currency and maturity mismatches in banks’ 
balance sheets. When the banking sector got into trouble, the currency became 
vulnerable. Hence, the beginning of the banking crisis was triggered by the self-
fulfilling expectations of creditors before the Thai baht crisis. More specifically, the 
crisis hit when speculators anticipated the reversal of capital inflows in the near 
future because the private sector would be unable to service its debts. As capital 
inflows were supporting the pegged exchange rates, once they stopped the 
government would run out of foreign reserves. The currency crisis was effectively 
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that of the first generation currency crisis model, but driven by the unsustainable 
banking sectors which created the adverse expectations of capital flows.  
The severity and deepening of East Asian financial turmoil were exacerbated by 
financial contagion. First, there were monsoonal effects of common shock (Baig 
and Goldfajn, 1998). The depreciation of the Japan yen vis a vis the US dollar since 
mid-1995 and some deterioration in terms of trade (as manufactured exports 
began to be commoditised in the context of excess worldwide supply) led to the 
overvaluation of domestic currencies in East Asian countries. Not only did the Asia-
5 have significant trade relationships with Japan and US (Table 2.3), with Japan in 
particular accounting for one-third of total imports to Thailand, but East Asia 
products competed directly with Japanese products in global (mostly US) markets. 
The depreciation of the yen deteriorated East Asian export competitiveness, which 
contributed to export slowdown and consequently worsened their current 
accounts. Together with these external shocks, the intra-regional trade linkage 
structures contributed competitiveness deterioration, currency depreciation and 
spillover effects.  
Table 2.3 - Export share of the Asia-5 in 1997 (as percentage of total exports) 
 TL ML PH ID KR US JP 
TL  4.6 1.2 2 1.8 19.8 15 
ML 3.7  1.3 1.5 3.2 18.3 12.4 
PH 2.4 3  0.4 1.8 34.7 16.1 
ID 1.7 2.4 1.4  7.1 16.3 24.7 
KR 2 3.1 1.6 2.9  16.6 10.6 
Source: Baig and Goldfain (1998) 
Almost immediately after the Thai baht lost roughly 15% of its value against the 
U.S. dollar on July 2, 1997, the values of other East Asian currencies fell 
precipitously. The Philippine peso was allowed to freely float on July 11; the 
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Malaysia ringgit peg was abandoned on July 14; the Indonesian rupiah was to float 
on August 14 and the Korea exchange rate band was officially abandoned on 
December 4 and moved to a floating system in mid-December. The Sigapore dollar 
did not escape unscathed either, although it held its value better than other 
currencies. In Hong Kong, the monetary authorities had to raise interest rates to 
defend its currency board after the Hong Kong dollar was tested in late October, 
leading to sharp fall in the Hang Seng index. This generated a shock wave around 
global financial markets and depressed stock prices in both Europe and the US on 
October 27, with reverberating effects again on East Asia.  
The simultaneous falls in exchange rates and asset prices (Figure 2.4) reflected the 
massive capital outflows. This was shown by the stylised facts that after peaking at 
a tremendous US$ 96 billion of capital inflows in 1996, 1997 saw a reversal of 
US$ 105 billion, equivalent to 11% of the combined GDP of the Asia-5. This 
represented “the most significant geo-financial adjustment in the relatively new 
era of globally integrated capital markets” (Makin, 1999, p.408). As the financial 
linkages in the region were substantial through bank loans, there was a significant 
share of capital reversals relating to the recalling of loans and the cutting off of 
credit lines in the region from its common lender, Japanese banks. International 
banks from the US and Europe also considered rebalancing the overall risks of 
their portfolios by reversing bank credits from the region, causing the 
transmission of shocks. The cut and run of international investors was also a 
consequence of the transmission of information about the financial health of 
financial and corporate sectors in economies with a similar structure and the panic 
reactions of international investors (Radelet and Sachs, 1997, 1999, 2000;  
Krugman , 1999). When the crisis started in Thailand, investors looked more 
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critically at vulnerabilities elsewhere in the region and discovered the same 
problems of financial health and short-term external debts in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Korea. The new information amplified their concerns and when investors lost 
confidence, they decided to pull their investments out of these countries.  
The crisis continued to have global effects when Russia decided to devaluate the 
ruble, and was then forced to reschedule its domestic government debts on August 
17, 1998. As a number of highly leveraged investors, including hedge funds, who 
traded the assets in Russia incurred large losses, the Russian crisis was felt in 
EMEs. Following this event, Latin America financial markets encountered severe 
stress in September and October. In January 1999, Brazil imposed a forced 
devaluation on the real, while other Latin American countries such as Mexico, 
Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador also suffered direct or indirect 
effects. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York had to organize a private rescue, 
accompanied by a reduction in US interest rates, to help avoid a systemic global 
crisis. 
Figure 2.4 - Exchange rate indices (monthly average) and Stock price indices  
 
 
 
Source: Datastream 
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2.2. Macro-Financial Strengths and Vulnerabilities before the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2007-2011 
2.2.1. Macroeconomic and Financial Developments 
A decade after the financial crisis of 1997-1998, East Asian economies showed a 
buoyant recovery thanks to prudent macroeconomic policies and efficient financial 
reforms. At the beginning of the crisis, immediate measures were taken by central 
banks, including direct intervention through the sale of US dollars on the exchange 
market, the widening of the trading band for national currencies against the US 
dollar, the raising of short-term interest rates and the curbing of forward foreign 
exchange transactions. However, these measures could not restore confidence in 
local currencies. After the crisis, the Asia-5 were forced to abandon their exchange 
rate pegs and adopted a managed floating exchange rate system. Exchange rates 
are now determined by market forces. One of the most important reforms was 
financial restructuring as this was the root of the fundamental weakness which 
caused the crisis. Financial reform focused on restructuring financial institutions in 
compliance with the Basel capital adequacy requirement, closing problem banks 
and financial companies, reducing NPL, encouraging mergers and acquisitions, 
establishing the Best Practice Guidelines, and strengthening bank regulation and 
supervision. Realising the adverse effects of short-term capital flows on the 
banking system, stock and exchange markets, East Asian countries paid attention 
to regulating and monitoring short-term capital movements, discouraging massive 
inflows of hot money, and relying more on foreign direct investments and long-
term foreign loans to meet private financial requirements.  
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2.2.1.1. Macroeconomic Developments 
Ten years after confronting the reforms needed to rebound from the crisis, East 
Asian experienced relative macroeconomic stability. Economic growth recovered 
from a deep decline in 1998, with average 5-6% annual GDP growth between 1999 
and 2006 (see Figure 2.5). Compared to the period before the regional financial 
crisis of 1990-1996, GDP growth had slipped by an average 2.5% per year in the 
Asian-5 (Wang, 2008).  The slower rates of real GDP growth in the post-crisis 
period were partly due to the sluggish recovery in fixed investments, which were 
around 5-20% below 1997 levels (Khor and Kit, 2009).  
Figure 2.5 – Annual GDP growth rates in ASEAN-4 and NIEs-3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF-WEO 
Table 2.4 provides evidence about the decline in investment rates (gross-fixed 
capital formation to GDP) in all the crisis-hit countries. However, the lower rates of 
investments may not necessarily be bad. Instead, it reflects a reasonable 
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remained strong throughout East Asia, at around 7.4%, despite the US-led global 
slowdown. Real per capita incomes significantly exceeded pre-crisis levels, around 
75% higher in emerging East Asia (World Bank, 2007).  
Table 2.4 - Gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratios 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2005/1995 
TL 40.4 41.6 22.0 29.0 -30.3 
ID 28.3 31.9 19.9 23.6 -26 
ML 33.0 43.5 25.6 20.0 -54 
KR 36.9 37.0 28.2 -30.1 -18.6 
PH 23.1 21.6 21.2 14.9 -31 
SG 32.9 33.7 30.6 22.3 -33.8 
HK 26.1 34.8 26.4 20.9 -40 
Source: Bhaskaran (2009) 
Figure 2.6 – The growth of exports of goods and services 
 
Source: IMF-WEO 
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15.5% in 1995 to 17.9% in 2005. Including China, East Asian trade accounted for 
around 40% of the total increase in world trade over the period. This export-
oriented strategy is key to understanding economic growth in the region. There 
was also a structural shift from lower-end products to a more diversified export 
base.   
One of the prominent records in macroeconomic performance in East Asia after the 
1997 crisis are the shifts in current accounts from deficits to surpluses and the 
large build-up of foreign exchange reserves. The regional current account reached 
7.1% of GDP in 2006 (World Bank, 2007). Reserves were even far exceeding the 
proposed optimal levels for precautionary purposes, i.e. reserves stood well above 
the 100% ratio recommended by the Greenspan-Guidotti rule for reserve 
management13. By mid-2007, reserves levels exceeded 100% of short-term 
external debts in most economies. However, large balance of payment surpluses 
and reserve accumulation may yield the potential adverse impact of exchange rate 
appreciation on competitiveness, exports and employment. By intervening in 
foreign exchange markets, most economies in the region have resisted upward 
pressure on exchange rates. For example, Malaysia (and China) widened the band 
for their currencies in 2005 and other countries have gradually moved towards 
greater exchange rate flexibility.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 See Jeane and Ranciere (2006) regarding the optimal level of international reserves for EMEs. 
45 | P a g e  
 
Figure 2.7 – Macroeconomic performance in East Asia  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ADB statistics 
Additionally, the government fiscal positions were healthy and there was declining 
trends in government debts as a percentage of GDP. Indeed, some countries such 
as Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Thailand were enjoying budget surpluses by 
2007. The 2000s also saw successful monetary policy manipulation in terms of 
bringing inflation under control. Central banks in many East Asian countries 
focused clearly on maintaining price stability and some adopted formal inflation 
targeting regimes. Core inflation behaved well, and even headline inflation was low 
and stable in Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. In Indonesia, there was a 
significant drop in inflation from 13% in 2006 to 6% in 2007. Additionally, the 
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region as a whole experienced a general narrowing of the dispersion of private 
sector inflation forecasts and inflation expectation stability, even during the crisis 
(Filardo et al., 2009). Price stability helped weaken the pass-through effects of 
exchange rates to domestic prices and allowed central banks to pursue greater 
exchange rate flexibility. Figure 2.7 provides some stylised facts concerning the 
macroeconomic condition in East Asia countries from 2000 to 2007, which imply a 
relatively robust performance in many aspects before the breakout of the global 
financial crisis in 2007.  
2.2.1.2. Financial Reforms and Developments 
The financial sector has undergone dramatic restructuring since the 1997 crisis, 
which has brought about substantial changes in the size, diversity, efficiency and 
stability of capital markets and banking systems. According to the World Bank 
(2007), total assets of East Asian financial systems reached US$ 9.6 trillion in 2005, 
over one fifth the size of US markets and almost half of that of Japan. Stock markets 
in seven East Asian countries have been booming since 2001, both in market 
capitalisation and asset prices. As shown in Figure 2.8, stock market capitalisation 
as a ratio to GDP doubled or tripled in most countries during the period 2001 to 
2007, except for Singapore and Malaysia, who saw less significant increases. The 
growth was most spectacular in Hong Kong, which made it into the global top ten 
countries in terms of market capitalisation. By the end of 2007, the average stock 
market capitalisation in Asia-5 was about 126% of GDP, which is quite comparable 
to that of AEs. Market liquidity also increased substantially, with an overall dollar 
turnover rising by 150% during 2002-2006. New capital raised through initial 
public offerings, IPO and secondary share offerings also reported a major jump, 
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rising to US$ 86.2 billion between January and November 2007. Accompanied with 
sizable expanded markets, price performance was no less impressive. Over the 
period 2001-2007, stock prices rose over 100% on average. Data on 
price/earnings (P/E) ratios (Table 2.5) indicate that East Asian equity markets 
were not overpriced. The rise in stock prices reflected a solid increase in corporate 
profits rather than pure speculation.  The stability of P/E ratios indicates the 
strong performance of East Asian corporates over the period and these trends 
continued in 2007 and the second half of 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Datastream and ADB statistics 
Table 2.5 – Stock market development in East Asia 
  New Capital Raised by Shares Price/Earnings Ratios 
  Jan - Nov, 2007 (in $US billion) 2002 -2006 
  Total IPOs Secondary 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
HK 61.0 31.8 29.2 15.6 19.0 18.7 15.6 17.4 
SG 8.8 4.5 4.3 21.2 24.9 16.6 15.4 19.4 
KR 6.5 3.1 3.4 15.2 10.1 15.8 11 11.4 
ID 4.5 1.5 3.0 33.1 10.8 9.7 12.5 14.7 
ML 2.1 0.3 1.8 14.9 31.7 20.0 15.2 24.2 
PH 1.9 0.4 1.5 14.4 19.2 18.3 14.8 14.6 
TL 1.4 0.3 1.1 7.0 7.0 9.4 9.4 8.1 
Total 86.2 41.9 44.3           
Source: Pakravan (2008) 
Stock price indices 
Jan-01 = 100 
TL
KR
PH
ML
ID
SG
HK
Figure 2.8 - Stock market capitalisation and price indices, 2001-2007 
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Surging asset prices increase investors’ nominal wealth, boost consumer 
confidence and higher spending, and improve firms’ and banks’ balance sheets, 
which will in turn lower external finance premiums (EFP) and encourage 
corporate investment via the so-called “financial accelerator effect”. Empirical 
research shows that the wealth effect of asset prices plays a significant role in 
emerging Asia (Kuralbayeva et al., 2006). However, booming asset prices also 
bring about challenges of financial and economic volatility, thus threatening 
macroeconomic stability. In general, East Asian equities markets were assessed to 
be relatively stable compared with those of other regions, but there was cross-
country heterogeneity. SG’s was considered the most stable market, followed by 
Hong Kong and Malaysia, while Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Korea were 
assessed to be the least stable (World Bank, 2007)14.  
Bond market development was prioritised and various national and regional 
initiatives (e.g. Asian Bond Market Initiative-ABMI and Asian Bond Fund-ABF) 
were implemented to remove impediments to the issuance and trading of local 
currency bonds. Bonds outstanding for the region as a whole saw a sizeable 
growth from US$ 0.4 trillion in 1997 to US$ 1.5 trillion in 2006, albeit with 
considerable variation across countries. The Korea bond market is relatively large, 
representing around 112% of GDP. The Malaysia market has been growing for 
years thanks to significant improvements in its regulatory framework, insurance 
process and market transparency. However, the Philippine bond market has yet to 
blossom. 
                                                          
14 According the World Bank (2007), cross-country analysis suggested that in the sample of 100 
economies worldwide, SG’s securities market fell in the highest (most stable) quartile, followed by 
HK and ML in the second-highest quartile. ID, PH, TL and KR fell in the bottom quartile.  
49 | P a g e  
 
Much of the growth in bond markets was accounted for by government bonds 
(largely to restructure the banking system), while corporate bonds remain quite a 
small proportion of the overall market (Table 2.6). Corporate bonds have been led 
by high-quality borrowers such as quasi-government entities. Lower-quality 
borrowers (i.e. those with credit ratings below single –A) have been unable to 
access the domestic markets, instead relying on banks and foreign currency bond 
markets. The key reason for small and underdeveloped corporate bond markets in 
most of the countries in the region is the lack of liquidity in the secondary markets 
and the difficulties in pricing the default risks of potential issuers. For example, in 
Philippines corporate bonds are over-the-counter (OTC) or privately negotiated 
between sellers and buyers. There is no available information about trading 
volumes, turnover, settlement, pricing or distribution. The absence of transparency, 
legal issues and creditworthiness of issuers also impede bond market development. 
Moreover, in emerging East Asia, heavy reliance on FDI financing as well as high 
repatriation risks associated with stringent capital controls and uncertain exists 
leave limited room for domestic bonds to thrive. They are also the main reason for 
restricted foreign participation in East Asian local currency bond markets. Table 
2.7 reveals sharp increases in US holdings of East Asian bonds over the period 
2001-2006. However, it is much smaller than that of Latin America15 and emerging 
Europe16, averaging 0.35% (for emerging Asia in general), compared to 2.03% and 
0.71%, respectively.  
 
 
                                                          
15 Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuala 
16 Emerging Europe: Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Turkey and Slovakia 
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Table 2.6 - Bond markets in East Asian countries 
Countrie
s 
Bonds 
outstanding Value traded Turnover ratio  
(% of GDP) ($US billion, in 2005) (%, in 2005) 
1997 2006 
Governme
nt 
Corporat
e 
Governme
nt 
Corporat
e 
HK 26 35 542.4 7.59  34.7  n.a. 
SG 24.7 66 130.5 5.83  3.2 n.a. 
ID 1.9 21 27.7 0.9 0.6 0.2 
ML 57 93 84.3 38.1 1.8 0.8 
PH 22.4 38 46.43  0  n.a.  0  
KR 25.2 112 952.2 382.2 3.3 1.0 
TL 7.1 51 70.1 5.6 2 0.3 
Source: Ghosh (2006) 
Table 2.7 - US participation in EME local currency bond markets 
  In $US billion Percentage of Total 
  2001 2006 2001 2006 
HK 0.07 0.25 0.29 0.65 
SG 0.04 2.48 0.13 4.42 
KR 0.25 2.32 0.06 0.25 
ID 0.01 1.08 0.01 2.04 
ML 0.02 1.06 0.02 0.9 
PH 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.14 
TL 0.03 0.58 0.08 0.55 
Emerging Asia 0.06 2.77 0.06 0.35 
Emerging LA 0.46 10.73 0.15 2.03 
Emerging Europe 0.74 4.74 1.37 0.71 
Source: Burger et al. (2008, 2010). 
Overall, the depth and breadth of East Asian securities markets have improved 
greatly during the decade following the 1997-1998 crisis, driving the markets 
more closely to international standards in terms of disclosures and regulations, 
and especially to their opening up for foreign investors. Market development has 
also been manifested by a significant increase in trading volume, market players 
and especially a broadening of the types of instruments available, including Islamic 
51 | P a g e  
 
securities, asset-backed securities and various derivatives17. This has allowed 
domestic borrowers a greater diversification of funding sources, contributing to a 
reduction in currency and liquidity risks and an enhancement of the overall risk-
bearing capacity of the economies.  
However impressive the growth in securities markets, the banking sector has still 
dominated the East Asian financial system, accounting for more than 60% of total 
financial sector assets. Together with improvement and development in capital 
markets, the banking system has experienced significant structural changes in 
capitalisation, operational efficiency and risk management. Consolidation and 
privatisation took place in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, which resulted in a 
significant decline in the number of banks; a remarkable increase in foreign 
ownership and a marked rise in banks’ assets and liabilities. For example, the 
number of commercial banks declined from 238 in 1997 to 134 in 2004 in 
Indonesia, from 51 to 24 in Philippine, and from 36 to 25 in Malaysia. Foreign 
ownership increased from 9% in 1997 to 31% in 2004 in Indonesia; from 12% to 
21% in Korea, and from 16% to 26% in Malaysia. In Thailand and Philippine, 
foreign ownership was relatively small, at around 10% at the end 2004. Banks 
extended fee-based services in new areas (i.e. securities and insurance), formed 
strategic alliances with other financial institutions and even outsourced their non-
core operational functions to achieve greater operational efficiency.  
                                                          
17 Prior to the global financial crisis, derivative markets and structured credit markets based on 
mortgages and consumer finance assets began to develop in East Asian as a way to ease market 
access for lower-quality borrowers. However, the markets are small and illiquid compared to those 
of the US and Europe. Only a few segments function well. For example, Korea has a large bond 
futures market, and Hong Kong and Singapore have large foreign exchange swap markets. Only in 
Australia and Japan are all kinds of derivatives widely traded.  
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In five of the crisis-affected countries, NPL were dealt with and declined from an 
average of 30% in 1998 to an average of 6% in 2006 due to a combination of write-
offs, debt restructuring and recoveries. NPL ratio was lowest in Korea, standing at 
around 1.3% between 2003 and 2008, as Korea transferred a sizable proportion of 
NPL to the centralised asset management company KAMCO initially after the 1997 
crisis and to specialist asset-management companies from the US in recent years. 
Bank profitability as measured by return on equity (ROE) saw impressive 
improvement, reflecting a steady growth in lending, a widening of net interest 
margins and an increase in non-interest income. The most remarkable record in 
profitability belongs to Indonesian banking sectors, which was at an average of 28% 
in the period 2003-2008, rising from the negative levels of 1998.  
Table 2.8 - Indicators of banking system soundness for the period 2003-2008 
Country  Capital 
Adequacy (CRa)  
Asset quality 
(NPLb)  
Earnings 
(ROEc)  
Liquidity 
(Loan/Deposit)  
HK 14.75 1.80 19.06 79.80 
SG 15.51 3.53 11.66 80.13 
KR 12.03 1.38 13.24 98 
TL 13.81 9.55 11.48 85.67 
ID 19.73 5.43 28.23 76.11 
PH 17.11 9.88 9.23 70.44 
ML 13.53 9.61 16.98 78.4 
Memorandum 
(a) Basel III: an adequately capitalised bank must have a CR of at least 
10% 
(b) At the peak of the 1997 East Asian crisis, NPL ratio was 32.5% in 
ID, 35% in KR, 30% ML, 20% in the PH, and 33% in TL (Laeven 
and Valencia, 2008).  
(c) ROE (2003-2008) of US banks = 12.86, Australian banks = 21.36 
Source: Calculated by author based on IMF-FSI data 
Improved asset quality and profitability enabled banks to strengthen their capital 
base. The average reported capital adequacy exceeded 10% of total risk-weighted 
assets, therefore they were considered as well-capitalised banks under the Basel 
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III Capital Adequacy Framework. The traditional banking model remained 
dominant, with loan-to-deposit ratios of less than 100% in most economies, 
implying relatively low reliance of the region on wholesale funding. Additionally, a 
majority of commercial banks reported high ratios of short-term assets to 
liabilities. Table 2.8 shows various indicators based on the standard supervisory 
framework of banking crisis CAMEL, which suggests the overall soundness of the 
East Asian banking system during the period 2003-2008. 
In general, the recovery from the 1997 crisis has by most accounts been very 
impressive. Once again, East Asia (including China) has been considered as the 
fastest-growing region in the world, which accounts for close to half of global 
growth. These economies entered the global financial crisis with such strong and 
sound economic and financial positions that the international financial community 
expressed the belief about Asia decoupling myths from the problems in the US and 
Europe as the crisis intensified.  
2.2.2. East Asian Vulnerabilities to the Contagion Effects of the Global 
Financial Crisis  
Despite the remarkable recovery and the underlying strengths of macro-financial 
fundamentals at the onset of the global economic and financial crisis, East Asia 
remained vulnerable, mainly because of deeper international integration and 
extensive trade and financial linkages with the rest of the world. The role of 
exports in the economy has increased over times, restrictions in foreign 
ownerships have been easing and capital accounts become more liberalised.  
The past decade saw the surging trade flows in the region. As shown in Figure 2.9, 
trade openness measured by exports and imports over GDP rose in major 
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economies such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and Korea. The region had 
strong external dependency and the importance of exports reached an 
unprecedented level with the export to GDP ratio nearly 50% in 2006, compared 
with the world average of 25%. Although the trade openness process was 
accompanied by a significant increase in export markets’ diversification, the US 
remained the region’s single largest market, having absorbed on average 15% of 
the region’s total exports in 2003-2007. The euro-zone comes second, accounting 
for around a 14% share. This made East Asia reliant on the US18 and AEs in Europe 
for its growth.  
Beside the rapid growth in inter-regional trade, there was also considerably 
booming intraregional trade19. Within seven East Asian economies to be analysed, 
intra-regional exports accounted for 29% of GDP, while this figure was quite small 
in Latin America (7%) and emerging Europe (9%), according to IMF (2009). 
Although a higher share of intra-regional trade helps cushion East Asia’s exports 
against the downturn in AEs, it contributes to stronger interdependence between 
economies in the region and exposes them to competitive devaluation risks. In 
addition, emerging East Asia has pursued managed-floating exchange rates instead 
of flexible exchange rates, and relied largely on (partially) sterilised intervention20 
                                                          
18 The HK Monetary Authority (2007) estimated that a 10% decline in the US imports could lead to 
a 2.9% decline in total export of NIEs and a 3% decline in total exports of ASEAN, reflecting the 
vulnerability of East Asian to the fluctuation of US demands. 
19 During the period 1990-2006, intra-regional trade rose by 8.5 times, compared to 3 times in 
trade flows outside emerging Asia (IMF, 2007).  
20 Sterilised foreign exchange intervention involves the exchange of foreign and domestic 
currencies and monetary operations (open-market sales and purchases of securities) to equalise 
the effects of foreign exchange transactions on the domestic monetary base. Many Asian countries 
issued debts with different maturities to sterilise the monetary impact of foreign exchange 
intervention. However, sterilisation was rarely complete, as central banks tolerated downward 
pressure on interest rates given the environment of low inflation and large excess capacity.  
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to keep their currency competitive. This increases East Asian vulnerabilities to 
external demand shocks.  
 
  
Sources: IMF, IFS 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Trade openness = the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP; ROW = 
rest of the world 
Source: Calculated by author based on data from the IMF-Direction of Trade 
Statistics. 
 
Together with the deeper integration with international trade, cross-border 
financial activities also expanded in East Asia over the last ten years. Based on the 
measures suggested by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), the aggregate level of de 
facto financial integration in emerging Asia doubled in 2007, compared with that of 
1985. The surge in asset prices encouraged by policy changes in favour of greater 
exchange rate flexibility and capital account openness attracted large capital 
inflows to the region. The gross private capital flows in emerging Asia in general 
accounted for 15% of GDP in 2007, around 5% points higher than the level before 
the 1997-1998 crisis. Not only did international investors increase their holdings 
of East Asian assets, but local investors also started to increase their foreign 
investments and diversify their holdings into riskier and more sophisticated equity, 
Figure 2.9 - Integration with international trade 
ROW: 
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Composition of East Asian's 
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credit and currency derivatives. As a result, there was an upward trend in all 
components of both capital inflows and outflows.  
Figure 2.10 -International capital flows in East Asia (in $US billion) 
 
Source: IMF-IFS 
Figure 2.10 shows that gross foreign capital inflows into the seven East Asian 
countries rose substantially during the period 2000-2007 and reached nearly 
US$ 185 billion in Q4, 2007. A large proportion of these inflows were in portfolio 
investment and in banking flows, which were considered more volatile and more 
prone to the sudden stop during the financial crisis. The stock of portfolios held by 
international investors (mostly from AEs) in East Asia was about 25% of GDP in 
these economies at the end of 2007. The portfolio flows were especially large in 
Korea, where equities holdings by non-resident investors were almost one-half of 
market capitalisation (McCauley, 2010), making this country highly susceptible to 
changes in global market sentiments and the consequent deleveraging effects. US 
investors had the largest presence in East Asian stock markets, accounting for a 
significant share of the total value of stocks held by foreign investors: 50% in 
Korea, 43% in Singapore, 38% in Indonesia, 36% in Hong Kong, 34% in Thailand, 
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and 33% in Malaysia (Shirai, 2009). The 2000s also saw an unprecedented 
accumulation of US assets by East Asian residents (Figures 2.11 and 2.12), which 
exposed them to losses resulting from declines in asset prices in the run-up to the 
US subprime crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: US Department of Treasury 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: US Department of Treasury 
Like portfolio flows, cross-border banking flows have resumed since 2002 after 
experiencing a substantial unwinding during the 1997 crisis. Despite the fact that 
Figure 2.12 – East Asian holding of US equities (US$ billion) 
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Figure 2.11 - US holdings of East Asian equities 
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the amount of external assets and liabilities of banking sectors in East Asian 
countries remained relatively small compared to those of AEs, they were large in 
terms of GDP, especially in the two financial centres of Hong Kong and Singapore. 
While portfolio flows come mainly from US investors, cross-border banking flows 
have been increasingly dominated by European banks, accounting for more than 
half of the aggregate flows. Nearly 80% of cross-border banking flows to East Asian 
countries is in the form of international bank lending, which has become a crucial 
source of funding to finance the credit expansion and rapid economic growth in 
several countries. Especially in Korea, banks more and more rely on wholesale 
funding. At the end of the first quarter of 2007, the country’s short-term external 
debts rose to a record level of US$ 129.8 billion, exceeding the previous peak in 
1997 (Khor and Kit, 2009). The build-up of international loans prior to the global 
financial crisis drove East Asian challenges to cross-border shock transmission in 
loan provision by multinational active banks. Moreover, the structure of loan flows 
with a high concentration in banks from three AEs: the US, UK and Japan, and 
similarity in credit structure among East Asian countries increases the regional 
vulnerabilities to wake-up call effects and common lender effects.  
2.3. The Impacts of the Global Financial Crisis on East Asian 
Contrary to the initial hope about East Asian decoupling, the region has been 
severely affected by shocks and contagion from the global economic and financial 
market turmoil of 2007-2009. The effects have occurred in both real economies 
and financial markets through different transmission channels, which may interact 
and feedback on each other.  
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2.3.1. Impact on Real Economies 
East Asian real economic development was badly affected by the contraction in 
real GDP growth across the region between Q3, 2008 and Q3, 2009, averaging -
3.4%. Apart from Indonesia, which saw moderate adjustment in GDP growth rate, 
nearly all countries fell into outright recession, with negative year-on-year growth 
up to the first half of 2009 (Table 2.9). The regional economic slowdown was 
comparable to that experienced during the 1997-1998 crisis (see Appendix 2.1). 
Trade channels appeared to be the most prominent transmission mechanism of 
real impact, in that export volumes were significantly down in the second half of 
2008, reflecting the evaporation of import demand in AEs (notably from the US 
and Europe). By December 2008, aggregate exports had contracted by 18% year-
on-year and the peak-to-trough decline was 47% on an unweighted basis. Imports 
also tumbled across the region, with a similar or even a slightly higher rate, 
compared to those of exports. This contributed to a further small rise in East Asia’s 
trade balance. For countries highly open to trade like Hong Kong and Singapore, 
the effects of the fall in trade were particularly severe (Figure 2.13). Thailand, 
Malaysia and Korea were also very open (located further to the right of Figure 2.13) 
and hence suffered significant declines in growth relative to trend21. The shrinking 
demand for East Asian exports was aggravated by the drying up of trade finance 
through the disappearance of letter of credits as the global US dollar liquidity 
shortage intensified.  
                                                          
21 Growth relative to trend is measured as percentage point difference between the realised rate of 
growth during Q4, 2008 and Q1, 2009 and trend growth. Trend growth is the average annualised 
growth rate during 2006 and 2007 of smoother GDP using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
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Table 2.9 - Real GDP growth rates (year on year % change) 
  Q1-08 Q2-08 Q3-08 Q4-08 Q1-09 Q2-09 Q3-09 
HK 7.04 4.00 0.94 -2.68 -7.76 -3.08 -1.69 
SG 8.08 3.19 -0.29 -3.67 -8.85 -2.04 1.93 
ID 6.22 6.30 6.25 5.28 4.52 4.14 4.27 
ML 7.60 6.62 5.13 0.33 -5.76 -3.74 -1.13 
PH -6.38 -6.39 -5.87 -7.76 0.96 1.63 0.52 
KR 5.52 4.36 3.28 -3.33 -4.19 -2.07 1.04 
TL 6.32 5.21 3.05 -4.13 -7.05 -5.15 -2.80 
Source: IMF, IFS 
Figure 2.13 - Trade openness and GDP growth (Q4, 2008 - Q1, 2009) 
 
Notes: TW: Taiwan, AUS: Australia, NZ: New Zealand, IN: India, CH: China 
Source: Bernanke (2009) 
The huge fall in exports also generated large knock-on effects on domestic demand, 
with the plunge in exports leading to factory closures and rising job losses. 
Negative consumer and business sentiments discouraged household spending and 
corporate investment. As a result, the composition of GDP growth showed major 
adjustments in domestic demand in a number of countries. Consumption 
experienced the fastest deterioration in Korea, while private capital investment 
also fell sharply in Singapore, Thailand and Korea. The fears of deep and prolonged 
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recession prompted East Asian governments to introduce aggressive fiscal 
stimulus packages, amounting to US$ 84 billion in Korea, US$ 45 billion in Thailand, 
US$ 18.1 billion in Malaysia, US$ 13.8 billion in Singapore, US$ 6.5 billion in 
Philippines and US$ 6.3 billion in Indonesia during end-2008 and 2009. The largest 
stimulus packages were launched in Japan and China, reaching nearly 13% of GDP.   
2.3.2. Impact on financial markets 
While the real transmission mechanisms through trade volumes were 
straightforward, the financial contagion channels (which are the main focus of this 
study) appeared to be more challenging, as financial linkages are much more 
complicated. The vulnerabilities depended on financial openness and reliance on 
funding markets, as well as various country-specific risk factors. Financial 
transmission channels were activated via the direct effect of toxic assets and the 
indirect effect via asset prices, money and debt markets, and the second round 
effects on the banking sector (Gallego et al., 2010). Direct effects which related to 
the losses associated with the adverse changes in prices of toxic assets were fairly 
negligible in East Asia compared with the global scale of the problem22. This was 
due to the relatively limited exposure of the region to structured credit products 
and subprime lending. For example, banks in Indonesia and Malaysia had virtually 
no direct exposure; banks in Philippines and Thailand dealt with structured credit 
products but on a small scale and banks in Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea 
reported more exposure in CDO and asset-backed securities, but less than 5% of 
total assets. Several factors can help explain the small direct exposure to US 
subprime mortgage-related products. First, deposit-taking banks are still dominant 
                                                          
22 Total write-downs and credit losses in Asia (excluding JP) on the whole represented only 3% of 
the global total amount of US$ 2.9 trillion (Kawai, 2009). 
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in East Asia, while the number of specialised financial intermediaries and complex 
financial products is relatively small. The East Asian financial system is still at a 
premature stage of the overall securitisation process. Second, booming local 
lending business is more promising for profitability purposes than engaging in 
foreign structured products and competition pressure is not as intensive as that of 
mature markets in the US and Europe. Third, those stylised facts reflected the 
cautious post-1997 crisis attitude of regulators, who have insisted that local banks 
should have sufficient risk-management capacity before investing in complex 
structured products. Therefore, damage to the US subprime credit market did not 
pose a significant direct threat to East Asian financial systems. However, the 
indirect transmission channels via asset prices, reversal of capital flows, and 
pressure in money and debt markets due to the deterioration in the global 
investors’ risk appetites have proved to be extremely severe.  
2.3.2.1. Asset Prices  
Asset prices and international capital flows played an essential role in transmitting 
the global shock to East Asia. Given the close financial linkages with AEs, the region 
was extremely sensitive to the fall in equity and bond prices in the US and the 
knock-on effects of such losses via increased risk aversion amongst international 
investors. Despite the fact that East Asian asset prices were rather resilient in 2007, 
financially they gave in to the stream of negative news from the US in mid-
September 2008. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers led to the collapse of global 
risk appetites and the consequent substantial liquidation of East Asian assets and 
large capital outflows, causing a sharp decline in equity markets, a widening of 
sovereign bond and CDS spreads, a depreciation of regional exchange rates, and a 
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decline in offshore bank lending. Outflows only from equity markets in Asian EMEs 
were estimated to have reached about US$ 70 billion in 2008. Following the 
reversal in capital flows, equity indices fell an average of almost 40% in two 
months. Over the crisis period as a whole (July 2007 to August 2009), the decline 
in East Asian equity markets was -17%, with the largest reduction occurring in 
Singapore (-27%), Thailand and Philippines (-21%). Booms in property markets 
also came to an abrupt end, with house prices declining across countries, notably 
in Hong Kong (20%) in 2009. Even in China, house prices fell for the first time 
since 2005, forcing the government to take measures to revive the property 
market. House price falls could affect consumption due to a decline in household 
wealth and the devaluation of collateral for securing credit.  
In debt markets, sovereign bond spreads and sovereign CDS spreads peaked in the 
region. In emerging Asia, Indonesia showed the most dramatic rise in the Emerging 
Market Bond Index (EMBI+) spread, leaping from 168 basis points in July 2007 to 
more than 928 basis points in December 2008. Sovereign CDS spreads also rose at 
an unprecedented level in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ collapse: 100 basis 
points in Hong Kong and Singapore, 500 basis points in Korea and Philippines and 
885 basis points in Indonesia. CDS spreads tended to increase more in those 
countries which had experienced a crisis or default or had higher capital mobility 
(Kim et al., 2010). 
The reversal of capital flows and carry trade was accompanied by rapid exchange 
rate depreciations. The Korean won experienced the largest fall, depreciating by 40% 
against the US dollar from the beginning of 2008 through to its trough in March of 
that year. The Indonesian rupiah fell 22% over the same period. The Malaysian 
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ringgit, Philippine peso and Thai baht fell in the range of 4 - 15% against the US 
dollar. On foreign exchange turnover, foreign exchange transactions across two 
major Asian foreign exchange markets declined sharply, by around 15.3% in Japan 
and 22.5% in Singapore. A continual rise in risk aversion led to shrinkage in 
foreign exchange swap transactions. Moreover, a further squeeze in the foreign 
exchange markets also reflected tightened trade financing in the wake of lower 
growth prospects.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Datastream and author’s calculations 
Figure 2.14 illustrates the adverse effects on asset prices of different market 
segments, which contributed to an increase in East Asian financial stress indices 
Figure 2.14 - Sharp financial market deterioration 
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(FSI) during the crisis period (see Appendix 2.2). The emerging market financial 
stress indices (EM-FSI) introduced by Balakrishnan et al. (2011) seek to combine 
equity, debt and exchange rate pressure into a single index. As shown in Appendix 
2.2, EM-FSI across the seven East Asian countries peaked from Q4-2008 to Q2-
2009, with the main contributors coming from stock market returns and high 
sovereign spreads. The level of East Asian financial stress was even higher than 
that of other EMEs and was considered as high as its own level at the height of the 
1997-1998 crisis (Goldstein and Xie, 2009). Generally speaking, international 
capital flows and asset prices played essential roles in transmitting the global 
shocks to East Asia. This will be analysed in chapter three of the thesis. 
2.3.2.2. International Lending and Transmission of Interbank Market 
Tensions 
One of the salient features of the global financial crisis was the severe liquidity 
shortages in US-dollar denominated funding, which led to disruption in the 
international money markets. Multinational active banks responded to these 
difficulties by reducing cross-border claims, scaling back their activities and 
increasing the cost of borrowing in various EMEs, including East Asia. In the last 
quarter of 2008, foreign claims from BIS reporting banks to East Asia dropped by 
roughly 12%, with the US and UK-headquarter banks accounting for half of the 
decline. The most remarkable reversals came from international lending flows, 
which became negative in a number of countries between Q4 2008 to Q2 2009, 
intensifying the already existing funding difficulties (Figure 2.15). The sharpest 
reduction in cross-border banking flows happened in the financial centres of Hong 
Kong and Singapore. However, a number of factors helped these countries to buffer 
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financial markets against vulnerabilities, such as persistent current account 
surpluses, high sovereign rating, and especially the active repatriation of funds 
invested abroad by domestic investors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BIS, locational banking statistics 
Figure 2.16 - Interbank market tensions and widening TED spreads 
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Figure 2.15 - External loans of reporting banks vis à vis East Asian countries 
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The drying up of global liquidity had particularly serious repercussions for Korea, 
as this country strongly relied on the wholesale funding market, which accounted 
for about one-third of Korean bank funding. Other low rated economies in the 
region were also badly affected, especially in private sector companies with high 
levels of external debt. With respect to the curtailment of offshore credit, low-
grade borrowers from Indonesia and Philippines lost access to markets, while 
high-grade borrowers with large external financing requirements faced much 
higher funding costs. This contributed to the transmission of interbank market 
tension from AEs to a number of East Asian countries, characterised by the 
widening of TED spreads, which mirrored those of the US (Figure 2.16). Domestic 
banks had to either seek to borrow US dollars from local sources or to sell local 
currency assets. Although cross-border banking flows rebounded in 2010, East 
Asia remained vulnerable to the deleveraging process of European banks at the 
height of the debt crisis in the euro-zone area. Many leveraged corporations still 
faced substantial refinancing or rollover risks. Swap lines with central banks and 
massive liquidity injections were introduced to reduce deleveraging pressures and 
support investor risk appetites. The role of international lending flows in 
transmission of interbank market tensions will be empirically tested in chapter 
four. 
2.3.2.3. Second-round Effects on Banking Sector 
As analysed in section 2.2.1.2, the East Asian banking sector entered the global 
financial crisis in a strong position due to the structural reforms and conservative 
regulatory regime developed in the 2000s, in light of the lessons learned during 
the 1997-1998 financial crisis. Indicators of capital adequacy, asset quality, 
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earnings and liquidity during the period 2003-2008 were relatively sound. 
However, due to the mounting pressure in regional macroeconomic and financial 
market conditions in 2008 and 2009, rating agencies expected the substantial 
pressure on loan quality to be the biggest threat faced by the East Asian banking 
sector.                                                                                                                                     
Specifically, banks would face traditional credit risks from the slump in economic 
activities, as well as a general loss of confidence and heightened risk aversion in 
financial markets. This would therefore lead to an increase in NPL, higher 
provisions, lower profitability and considerable erosion of banks’ capital, which 
may have negative implications for further lending. Towards the end 2009, some 
major banks across the region reported a slightly pick-up in NPL ratio and 
declining profitability indicators. Stress testing of the East Asian banking system 
conducted by Pomerleano (2009)23 estimated the prospective capital shortfalls 
faced by the region and suggested banks should raise additional funding to offset 
bad-loan losses and increase Tier 1 ratios. Despite various measures introduced by 
central banks to facilitate the supply of credit and avoid a credit crunch that could 
exacerbate a recession (e.g. local currency liquidity support, capital injections and 
credit guarantees scheme to SME loans), real domestic credit growth still 
decelerated in Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Indonesia, while it moderated in 
other countries. This gave rise to concern about the adverse feedback loops 
between the real and financial sectors, referred as the second-round effects of the 
                                                          
23 Pomerleano (2009) calculated the projected capital shortfall for the banking system in the East 
Asia and Pacific regions based on the following assumptions: a leverage ratio of Tier 1 capital to 
assets of 5%, NPL of 8% of assets, and 100% coverage ratio of reserves to NPL. The author found 
that the prospective capital shortfalls could be as high as US$758 billion and the largest estimated 
Tier 1 shortfalls are as follow: Korea (US$44.5 billion), China (US$109.1 billion), and Japan 
(US$518.8 billion). 
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global crisis on EMEs. An in-depth analysis of bank behaviour under uncertainties 
and evidence of the second round effects will be made in chapter five of the thesis.  
2.4. Conclusions 
Despite having been referred to as a miracle of historical economic development, 
East Asia was severely hit by two major financial crises in just over a decade. This 
chapter has examined the macro-financial strengths and vulnerabilities of East 
Asia from the 1997-1998 regional financial crisis to the global financial crisis in 
2007-2011. In contrast to the former crisis, which originated from a regional 
fundamental weakness and fragile financial sectors, East Asia entered the global 
financial crisis in a relatively strong economic and financial position. It seemed 
that the lessons learned from the past crisis had served Asia well to stay resilient 
from to the global turmoil. However, the wild swings in East Asian financial 
markets shattered the decoupling myths surrounding those economies. There 
were some important financial channels through which external shocks were 
transmitted to the region’s financial markets - with significant impact and feedback 
on the regional economies as a whole. At the height of the global financial crisis, 
East Asia, among other EMEs, experienced peak-to-trough changes in exports, 
equities prices, sovereign debt spreads and interbank-market tensions, and spikes 
in total FSI, but with considerable variations across countries. The macroeconomic 
story shows that the real impact is fairly straightforward. Countries which are 
most open to trade appear to be most vulnerable to external shock. However, the 
financial story appears to be more complicated, as vulnerabilities and the 
contagion effect depend on various special factors.  
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3. CHAPTER THREE - ASSET PRICES, VOLATILITY LINKAGES 
AND FINANCIAL CONTAGION: ANALYSIS USING THE 
MARKOV SWITCHING VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE (MS-VAR) 
FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The liberalisation of capital markets around the world has allowed free 
movements of information and capital flows, driving international asset prices and 
volatility linkages. The literature on the historical financial crises during the past 
decades has suggested the important role of asset prices in the transmission of 
idiosyncratic shock across countries (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). This has 
been confirmed by the stylised facts of the global financial markets when several 
equity price indices in AEs as well as EMEs fell sharply immediately after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the US subprime crisis was 
quickly transmitted around the world, causing global financial market turmoil in 
2008-2009. Even the resilient financial markets of Asia were not immune from 
volatility spillovers, which affected many financial market segments such as equity, 
debt and foreign exchange markets. Although testing for cross-market correlations 
and volatility linkages has a long history in asset pricing, the literature has gained 
momentum since the seminal work of King and Wadhwani (1990), who showed 
the stock markets’ volatility spillovers during the American stock market crash in 
October 1987. The findings have important implications since cross market 
linkages have intensified during extreme events such as financial crises, as the 
changes in asset price or return volatilities in one market usually cause 
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movements of asset prices/returns or their volatilities across a cluster of national 
markets, despite very different economic circumstances. In this way, financial 
stress has rapidly spread between countries and regions.  
This chapter investigates empirically volatility linkages in assets prices and 
financial contagion from the US and Europe to East Asia countries during the 2007-
2009 global financial crisis and the subsequent European debt crisis. Theoretical 
and empirical studies have used many approaches to defining and measuring 
financial contagion24, some of which focus on fundamental causes, while the others 
are based on investor behaviour. Following the literature on volatility spillovers 
and the crisis-contingent theories, financial contagion is modelled as the structural 
change in the transmission mechanisms, specifically an increase in cross-market 
linkages after a volatility shock in one country. This is also termed as “shift-
contagion” by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). This approach has useful implications 
for both international investors and policymakers in terms of portfolio 
diversification and risk management. The increase in market integration and 
occurrence of shift-contagion diminishes the benefits of risk diversification in 
international financial portfolios, which in turn affect optimal asset allocation and 
global hedging policies. Moreover, the excessive co-movements of assets prices 
and returns may propagate country-specific shocks to economies with even very 
strong fundamentals. Therefore, authorities should pay attention to regulatory 
developments in terms of capital requirements and controls.   
The shift in cross market linkages conveys an important theoretical assumption 
that the underlying distribution of asset prices and returns yields multiple 
                                                          
24 See Claessens and Forbes (2004), Dungey et al. (2005) and Cheung et al. (2009) for literature 
survey on the theoretical and empirical framework of the contagion of financial crises. 
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equilibria, which is consistent with the generation models of financial crises. Using 
Markov-Switching Vector Autoregression (MS-VAR) models, we not only address 
the analysis of financial interconnection, but also convey the idea of multiple 
equilibria, in that there is a jump between different regimes for asset price linkages 
among markets following a shock in one country. MS-VAR also helps to identify 
endogenously the crisis period by allowing the presence of sudden switches in 
variance, and by the estimation of the probabilities of a shift between different 
regimes. This framework enables us to measure how crisis-prone East Asian 
financial markets are. Moreover, the correlations are conditional on each regime; 
hence, in order to facilitate the test of a shift-contagion, we apply Dungey et al.’s 
(2005) multivariate version of the Forbes and Rigobon’s (2002) unconditional 
correlation tests based on the breakpoint time endogenously identified by the MS-
VAR system.  
This work analyses the proxies for general stress in the equity market, foreign 
exchange market and sovereign debt market, as these three financial market 
segments have been generally considered to be more related to global risk premia 
and capital flows, implying susceptibility to global financial conditions. Therefore, 
the fall in stock price and returns, pressure on exchange rates and increasing 
sovereign spreads and the associated volatility increase might not only indicate the 
depth of the crisis, but also gauge the diffusion of idiosyncratic shock among 
countries and regions.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 provides the theoretical 
framework and empirical evidence of dynamic interdependences of international 
financial markets and financial contagion. In section 3.3, the econometric 
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methodologies to test financial asset price volatility linkages and evidence for 
contagion effect are discussed. Data description and preliminary analysis are 
presented in section 3.4, while section 3.5 will provide some discussion on 
empirical results. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.  
3.2. International Financial Contagion and Asset Price Volatility Linkages: 
Theoretical and Empirical Frameworks  
3.2.1. Financial Contagion and Contagion Transmission Channels 
The term “contagion” is usually used in epidemiology to explain the spread of 
medical disease by direct or indirect contact. As cited in Moser (2003), many 
economists also use this term to express different meanings, such as the spread of 
wage increases secured by labour unions to non-union firms or sectors (Ulman, 
1955); the spread of business fluctuations across economies (Mack and Zarnowitz, 
1958) and the spread of speculative trading across individuals (Murchison, 1933; 
White, 1940). The East Asian crisis in 1997-1998 sparked the widespread use of 
the term “contagion” to refer to the spread of financial market turmoil across 
countries. Since then, a vast number of studies have attempted to explain the 
theory with different approaches and through a number of phenomena. These 
theories can be conceptually divided into two categories (Forbes and Rigobon, 
2001, 2002; Claessens and Forbes, 2004), with an emphasis either on direct 
fundamental linkages or indirect linkages via changes in investor behaviour.  
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3.2.1.1. Fundamental-Based Contagion and Non-Crisis-Contingent Theories 
The first strand of theoretical literature explains the fundamental causes of crisis 
propagation, such as common shocks25, trade links and direct financial links. This 
is, therefore, termed as “fundamentals-based contagion” by Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000), “spillovers” by Masson (1998) or “interdependence” by Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002).  
Common shock: A common shock or global shock, such as a slowdown in world 
aggregate demand, a shift in international interest rates, changes in commodity 
prices or bilateral exchange rates between major world economies can 
simultaneously affect the fundamentals of several economies, which thereafter 
leads to the co-movements of asset prices and/or capital flows in the affected 
countries. For example, a rise in the US interest rate adversely affects the funding 
of EMEs by increasing their debt serving costs and eroding their credit worthiness, 
potentially triggering crises in one and/or some of them (Moser, 2003). 
Unanticipated drops in export prices may weaken corporate sector balance sheets 
and hence the financial sector balance sheets in export-oriented economies. Shifts 
in exchange rates between major currencies generate adverse effects on price 
competitiveness and export growth.  Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Chuhan et al. 
(1998) identify movements in capital flows to Latin America that were associated 
with swings in interest rates in the US. Corsetti et al. (1999) explain the 1995-1996 
strengthening of the US dollar versus the yen and the long-lasting slowdown in 
Japanese economic growth as an important factor contributing to the weakening of 
exports of several East Asian countries and leading to the subsequent financial 
crisis in 1997-1998.  
                                                          
25 Masson (1998) proposes the term “monsoonal effects” rather than contagion for common shock. 
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Trade links: International trade can transmit shocks from one country to another 
through income effects and price competitiveness. If a country undergoes a 
financial crisis, it will suffer an economic slowdown and income deterioration, 
leading to a fall in its import demand. This will directly affect firms that export 
products to that country. Trade links also magnify shock propagation through 
competitive devaluation. When two countries are trading partners or compete 
with each other in a third foreign market, a financial shock that causes exchange 
rate depreciation in one country will deteriorate the other country’s export 
competitiveness. As a result, the second country is likely to devaluate its currency 
to re-balance the external sectors. Gerlach and Smets (1995) advance this theory in 
explaining the 1992 EME crisis. They present a model showing that a forced 
depreciation of one country’s currency has effects on prices and income for its 
trading partners by producing trade deficits and gradual declines in international 
reserves. This makes the collapse of the exchange rate in the first country speed up 
the collapse of the rate in the second economy. Corsetti et al. (2000) indicate that 
“competitive devaluation can cause larger currency depreciations than are 
required by the initial deterioration in fundamentals” (p.23). Glick and Rose (1999) 
prove the importance of international trade associated with cross-country 
correlations in exchange market pressure in five different currencies crises in 
1971, 1973, 1992, 1994 and 1997. 
Direct financial linkages: Another fundamental cause of financial contagion 
relates to direct financial linkages. The global integration and the expansion of 
large complex financial institutions that engage in interbank contracts, syndicated 
loan insurance, equity and bonds and OTC derivatives make economies become 
more and more integrated through international financial systems. This type of 
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interconnectedness increases liquidity spillovers (e.g. difficulties in rolling over 
liabilities) not only in the banking sector but also in non-banking sectors. For 
example, during the crisis in 1997, Thai firms faced a limitation to engagement in 
FDI, and provided bank lending and other forms of investments to other East Asian 
countries. In the context of the US subprime mortgage credit crisis, direct financial 
contagion relates to the large losses and greater degree of financial distress in 
European banks who held large amounts of US MBS and were highly dependent on 
dollar funding. The case of Northern Rock is also an illustrative example about how 
a medium-sized institution faced with a liquidity squeeze can trigger negative 
network externalities. Chan-Lau et al. (2009) model spillovers and contagion of 
credit and funding shocks from direct interbank linkages in the network of several 
financial institutions. The model is based on the balance sheet effect given the 
balance sheet identity of a financial institution being expressed as follows: 
(   ) ∑                  ∑      
  
 
where     : loan from bank i to bank j; ai: bank i’s other assets; ki: capital;     deposit; 
bi: long-term and short-term borrowings; and       bank i borrow from bank j. A 
credit shock is triggered by the default of institution h on its debt from bank i, 
given the default rate   and loss given the default        The loss is absorbed by 
bank i’s capital, which will then lead to the new balance sheet identity after the 
shock:  
(   ) ∑               (        )        ∑      
  
 
77 | P a g e  
 
If bank i’s capital is insufficient to absorb the loss (          )  the default of h 
will cause the failure of bank i  and may trigger further failures of other financial 
institutions in the interbank network through domino effects.  
On the contrary, if the default of institution h causes the loss of funding for bank i, 
it may lead to a fire sale of bank i’s assets. Assuming that bank i is able to replace 
only a fraction (   ) of the loss of funding from bank h and it is forced to sell 
assets worth (   )      in book value terms. The funding-shortfall-induced loss, 
        is absorbed by bank capital , the new balance sheet identity is recognised as 
follows: 
(   ) ∑         (   )      (         )        ∑      
  
       
This scenario is illustrated as credit-and-funding shock in which the failure of an 
institution causes a liquidity squeeze to the others funded by the defaulting one. 
Therefore, an institution’s vulnerability not only stems from its direct credit 
exposure to other institutions but also from its inability to roll over part of its 
funding from interbank market that forces it to sell assets at discount  to restore its 
balance sheet identity. Figure 3.1 illustrates the balance sheet effects from two 
different scenarios: credit shocks and funding shocks. In the network of interbank 
exposures, these kinds of shocks will be transmitted throughout various financial 
institutions via domino effects and cause various rounds of financial contagion (see 
Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3-1 - Credit shock and credit-and-funding shock analysis 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chan-Lau et al. (2009) 
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Figure 3-2 - Network approach: systematic interbank exposures and contagion 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chan-Lau et al. (2009) 
Fundamental-based contagion relates to the broad definition of the World Bank. 
Accordingly, contagion is defined as the cross-country transmission of shocks or 
general cross-country spillover effects. The theoretical explanations of 
fundamental-based contagion have been classified as non-crisis contingent 
theories, which assume that there is no significant difference in the transmission 
mechanism before or after financial crises (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). Instead, 
any large cross-market correlation after a shock is just a continuation of linkages 
that existed before the crisis. Therefore, this form of market co-movement is 
considered as normal interdependence rather than contagion. Shock propagation 
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through fundamentals reflects an optimal response of one country to speed up 
adjustment to the new equilibrium caused by external shocks (Moser, 2003).  
However, common shock, trade links or direct financial linkages cannot fully 
explain some contagious financial crises in EMEs (for example, the 1998 Russia 
crisis), where the fundamental relationships between affected countries are quite 
limited. There should be other transmission mechanisms driving the co-movement 
of financial markets during the time of stress beyond fundamental links.   
3.2.1.2. Investor-based Contagion, Shift-Contagion and Crisis-Contingent 
Theories 
The second strand of literature focuses on investor-based contagion or “pure 
contagion” (Masson, 1999; Kumar and Persaud, 2002) introducing shock 
propagation unrelated to fundamentals but generated by the change in behaviours 
of trading agents in financial markets. The actions of international investors will 
increase the volatility linkages and the corresponding cross-border contagion. 
Different theories explain investor-based contagion from different perspectives, 
and can be classified into the three following groups: (i) multiple equilibria and 
changes in self-fulfilling expectations; (ii) liquidity problems and portfolio 
rebalancing and (iii) information asymmetries and herding behaviour (Dornbusch 
et al., 2000).   
Multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling crises  
The most common explanation for pure contagion is associated with theories of 
multiple equilibria arising as a result of changes in investors’ self-fulfilling 
expectations (Masson, 1999).  In this framework, a crisis in one country causes 
another country to jump to a bad equilibrium, characterised by devaluation, a 
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sharp fall in asset prices, capital outflows and/or debt default. As explained by the 
macroeconomic feedback models, an adverse expectation of an event (i.e. 
devaluation or default) can be triggered by a set of macroeconomic fundamentals 
such as a fall in foreign reserves to a threshold level (in first generation models) or 
increasing interest rates (second generation models). This may feedback in an 
adverse way on prospects for the economy, making the possibility of the 
occurrence of that event more likely. For example, devaluation expectations will 
raise inflation expectations and wage demands, increasing the likelihood of the 
government’s decision to devalue in order to avoid unemployment. Higher interest 
rates induce private agents’ expectation of devaluation, increasing the authorities’ 
willingness to allow for devaluation because they find it is too costly to maintain an 
exchange rate peg as the increasing interest rates will raise bank funding costs and 
dampen economic activities.  
Another illustration for multiple equilibria is related to the bank run model of 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), in which a large number of customers suddenly 
withdraw their deposits from a bank if they believe that it is or might become 
insolvent. In other words, individual depositors need to form an expectation about 
the behaviours of other depositors: if the others run, then it is optimal for an 
individual to run too. The bank run will exhaust a bank’s liquid assets, which 
encourages further withdrawals and leads to bank bankruptcy. Sachs (1984) 
applied this model in the area of international lending to describe creditors’ 
collective actions or panics: “if each bank believes that all other banks will stop 
lending, all banks will stop lending” (Sachs, 1984, p.32). Generally speaking, 
contagion occurrence depends on whether investors coordinate in good (no-run) 
or bad (run) equilibrium.  
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However, these sorts of multiple equilibria models were developed only for 
countries in isolation, which has not provided a clear link to shock propagation 
across borders. Masson (1998) proposes a two-country model to explain contagion 
as an event when one country jumps to a “bad” equilibrium following a crisis in 
another emerging country. The model can be mathematically summarised as 
follows.  
First, based on balance of payments models, the probability of a country’s 
devaluation (  ) occurs when its foreign reserves    fall below the critical level  . 
Changes in reserves depend on a country’s trade balance, T and its indebtedness D, 
paying interest rate     then: 
(   )             ( 
     )  
(   )      [     ( 
     )        ]  
where   is the extent of the expected devaluation in percentage terms. 
Second, the model introduces the interaction between two EMEs (a and b), taking 
into account monsoonal and spillover effects. Assuming that country a’s trade 
balance depends on the logarithm of the real exchange rate (RER), which gives 
weight x on country b, y on the US and         on the rest of the world. 
Nominal exchange rates for a, b and the rest of the world are   
    
     (dollar price 
of local currency). Trade balance and the real exchange rates can be expressed in 
the following equations: 
(   )   
         
    
    
(   )    
    
     
      
An equivalent equation exists for country b. 
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The assessment of the probability of devaluation in country a (  
 ) now becomes 
more complicated, as it depends on the probability of devaluation in country b (  
 ) 
such that:  
(   )  
  (    
 )   [   (  
     
     )    
  (     
  )     
   
  ]    
    ,   (  
     
        )    
  (     
  )  
   
     - 
Equation 3.8 explains three channels of crisis contagion. The first channel works 
via monsoonal effects in the form of changes in the international interest rate r* or 
the dollar-yen rate St. The second channel, the spillover effects, is subject to 
changes in the initial level of the exchange rate of country b. The third potential 
mechanism is the expectation of devaluation in country b (  
 ), which will have a 
direct effect on the possibility for self-fulfilling expectation  
 , and it can feedback 
onto itself through an equation analogous to equation 3.8 for b.  
In conclusion, Masson’s (1999) model puts forward a pure form of contagion 
unexplained by fundamental links only (monsoonal effects and spillover effects). 
Although the values of composite fundamentals can be used to identify a country’s 
vulnerability to multiple equilibria, as jumps between equilibria are triggered by 
stochastic events, the existence of contagion makes the early warning crises 
difficult and unpredictable. 
Liquidity problems and portfolio rebalancing 
A crisis in one country may make international investors sell off assets in several 
markets (especially in EMEs) to rebalance their portfolios. By doing so, investors 
cause asset prices out of crisis country/region to fall and the original shock can 
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spread across borders. There are different motivations behind the behaviour of 
liquidation and rebalancing across markets. First, liquidation arises due to 
correlated liquidity shocks. Investors who anticipate greater redemption in the 
near future may need to obtain cash by selling part of their holdings in other 
countries. Second, a negative shock in one economy may lead to a deterioration in 
the value of leveraged investors’ (i.e. hedge funds’) collateral, leading them to 
liquidate assets in unaffected economies to meet margin calls. Banks from a 
common creditor country can also face liquidity problems when they experience a 
marked deterioration in the quality of their loans in one country, hence they 
attempt to reduce the overall risk of their loan portfolios by reducing their 
exposure in other high-risk investments in EMEs.  
Portfolio rebalancing can also result from the cross-market hedging of 
macroeconomic risks. It is widely explained by standard portfolio theory that 
international investors decide how much to invest in a risky foreign country by 
weighting the expected return against the associated risks. If a structural-
uncertainty parameter of an economy changes, investor portfolios shift to reflect 
the new equilibrium prices of risk. In other words, a wealth shock may make 
investors re-examine the riskiness of their portfolio and bring about a movement 
toward less risky investments. Schinasi and Smith (1999) theoretically prove that 
investors under a loss constraints rule (i.e. VaR) will find it optimal to reduce 
investments in many risky assets when there is an adverse shock affecting a single 
asset return pattern in one country or when return on the leveraged portfolio is 
less than the cost of funding.  Kodres and Pritsker (2002) develop a multiple asset 
rational expectation model of asset prices and explain cross-market rebalancing. 
They suggest that contagion of financial crises occurs when investors optimally 
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rebalance their portfolio exposures to macroeconomic risks through other 
countries’ markets after they are hit by idiosyncratic shock in one country.   
Information asymmetries and herding behaviour 
The third group of theories explaining investor-based contagion focuses on 
herding behaviour in the presence of inefficient market and information 
asymmetries. In the absence of a perfect market and information, investors do not 
have a complete picture of a country’s fundamentals and its true state of 
vulnerabilities. They, therefore make their investment decisions based on the 
actions of other investors, causing herding behaviour or financial panic. Such a 
phenomenon is often explained by information cascade models. Two basic 
assumptions for an information cascade are: (i) the cascade model relies on the 
significant difference in private information across agents, and (ii) the cascade 
model relies on significant transaction costs in order to generate sequential 
behaviour. Calvo and Mendoza (2000) present a model of herding behaviour and 
contagion effects in securities markets with three different groups of investors: 
informed investors, uninformed investors and less-informed investors. Given the 
fixed cost of gathering and processing country-specific information, less-informed 
and uninformed investors will obtain cost-effective benefits by observing and 
copying informed investors who act early in adjusting their portfolios. If informed 
investors move to a bad equilibrium, then uninformed investors, by following 
informed ones cause another bad equilibrium. Another explanation for herd 
behaviour relates to reputation cost. As fund managers are evaluated based on the 
performance of their portfolio relative to that of a specific index, they will find it 
less costly to follow the herd (Claessens and Forbes, 2004).  
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In conclusion, financial contagion caused by fundamental channels can in principle 
be predicted and manageable, while it is more challenging to predict and quantify 
investor-based contagion in a world of multiple equilibria, imperfect markets and 
information asymmetries. These kinds of investor behaviour do not exist during 
stable periods, but occur after an initial shock elsewhere, causing shifts in 
transmission mechanisms and the jumps in financial asset price distribution. In 
other words, the change in asset prices of the affected markets (relative to the 
change in prices in the market where the crisis originated) is exacerbated during 
the shifts between multiple equilibria. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) term this as 
“shift-contagion” and categorise the theories explaining the shifts as crisis-
contingent theories. More specifically, crisis-contingent theories are those that 
explain why transmission mechanisms change during a crisis and contagion occurs 
only when there is a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a negative 
shock in an individual country (or group of countries). However, it is challenging to 
distinguish both conceptually and empirically whether investor behaviours are 
caused by reactions to the fundamentals of an economy at risk or to their 
predictions of herding behaviour. In fact, both these types of fundamental-based 
and investor-based contagions interact with each other to amplify financial inter-
market dependences and facilitate shock propagation across countries. As financial 
integration continues to increase around the world, there is no way to fully isolate 
countries from a crisis elsewhere. This implies that countries should ensure that 
both their fundamentals are sound and are widely perceived to be sound by the 
global investors.  
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3.2.2. Empirical Tests and Evidence of Financial Contagion 
While the theoretical explanation of financial contagion and its transmission 
mechanism is extensive, the empirical literature testing for the existence of 
contagion is even more diversified. A large number of methodologies have been 
developed, each subject to some specific statistical problems (e.g. 
heteroskedasticity, non-linearity, simultaneous equations, endogeneity, and 
arbitrary choice of crisis window), causing variability of results. This also leads to 
the difficulty in assessing evidence for contagion and its significant transmission of 
crises across countries. Depending on how contagion is specifically defined, 
empirical tests can be classified into following groups: (i) tests based on 
conditional probability of crisis and its transmission mechanism, (ii) tests 
measuring change in volatility and volatility spillovers, (iii) cross-country 
correlation and correlation breakdown tests, and (iv) multiple equilibria testing 
with the Hamilton switching model.   
3.2.2.1. Conditional Probability of Crisis  
The first group investigates fundamental-based contagion and aims to test the 
importance of several fundamental transmission mechanisms as well as their 
contributions to the probability of the occurrence of a crisis. Probability models 
such as probit and logit models are the most common methods to test contagion 
without assuming any structural break in cross-market linkages. The general form 
of probability model is expressed in equation 3.9. 
(   )            (            )              
In this model,            is a dummy variable (taking the value of one for the crisis 
period in economy i or extreme value of financial stress factor and zero 
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otherwise);               is a variable (or a set of variables) measuring the intensity 
of the transmission mechanisms between the identified “ground zero” economy 
and economy i, with A corresponding the coefficient matrix. The significance of A 
captures the significant transmission channels to be investigated.       is a set of 
fundamentals and       is a random error term. 
The seminal study of conditional probabilities in examining contagion is made by 
Eichengreen et al., (1996). They construct a binary crisis dummy variable from the 
exchange market pressure index (EMPI), which indicates whether or not a 
particular currency is experiencing extreme pressure. The EMPI 26  captures 
exchange rate depreciations, declines in international reserves and short-term 
interest rates. The extreme value of this index is the sample mean above its 1.5 
standard deviation27. By estimating the probit model on a panel of 20 industrial 
countries for the period 1959-1993, they find that the occurrence of a currency 
crisis in one country raises the likelihood of a speculative attack on other countries 
by about 8%, and trade links appear to be a significant transmission channel after 
controlling for macroeconomic and other fundamental independent variables. This 
technique is then applied by Glick and Rose (1999) to examine five episodes of 
currency crisis for a set of 161 countries. They also add more evidence about the 
importance of trade links in shock propagation. Camamanza et al. (2004) use a 
panel probit regression in 41 EMEs to study the observed regional concentration 
of currency crises in the 1990s (Mexican, Asian, and Russian). The empirical 
                                                          
26 The EMPI is expressed as follows: 
                                   
where ei,t denotes exchange rate; ii,t is short-term interest rate; ri,t denotes international reserves; 
and       are weights. 
27 Currency crisis is defined as an extreme value of the EMPI such that: 
          {
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results reveal that financial links to crisis country through a common creditor 
substantially raise the possibility of contagion, while trade links via devaluation 
are only relevant for countries with weak account balances. Using the same 
methodology as Camamanza et al. (2004), Haile and Bozo (2008) test the effects of 
four crisis transmission channels simultaneously: trade, finance, macro-similarity 
and neighbourhood effect channels. They find that the probability of a currency 
crisis in one country is significantly increased given a crisis elsewhere. Among the 
four channels to be considered, the test results reveal the importance of trade links 
and neighbourhood effects. A very similar approach to the probit model is the 
Bayesian averaging of binary model, which is utilised in Dasgupta et al. (2011) to 
study the directions of contagion in EME currency crises in 1992, 1994, 1997 and 
1998. They find persuasive evidence to support the role of trade competition, 
financial links and institutional similarity to the “ground-zero” country as key 
factors driving contagion effects. General results from the probability model 
suggest the dominance of trade links and confirm that contagion tends to be 
regional rather than global, as trade relationships are relatively intra-regional than 
inter-regional.  
One of the attractive advantages of this methodology is that it can estimate the 
probability of spreads of financial crises and identify channels through which 
contagion occurs. However, this approach has several shortcomings. First, the ad 
hoc selection of fundamental variables may decrease the possibility of predicting 
future crises using this analysis. Second, contagion is investigated only under a 
crisis situation with a relatively small data sample, although it should be possible 
to conduct spillover effect analysis for non-crisis periods. Moreover, the loss of 
sample information from constructing crisis dummy variables may generate 
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inefficient estimated parameters and reduce the power of the contagion test 
(Dungey et al., 2005).  
3.2.2.2. Tests Measuring Volatility Spillovers 
The second group of empirical studies identifies contagion as volatility spillovers 
from one market to another market and uses an ARCH or GARCH framework to 
estimate variance-covariance transmission mechanism. Specifically, the test 
examines whether conditional variances of financial variables are related to each 
other across asset classes and/or across countries. Multivariate GARCH models 
rather than univariate ones are widely in use. The model can be seen as an 
approximation to the data-generating process as follows:  
(    )                      (    ) 
    
                
       
where    ,       -
  is a vector of asset prices or returns for different countries; 
A is a vector of constants;    ,       - is a (k x 1) vector of global factors with n x 
k matrix of factor loads B.   ,       -
  is a (1 x n) vector of country-specific 
shocks, which has a covariance matrix  , and C, D and E are matrices of estimable 
parameters in BEKK model. The BEKK representation measures not only the 
degree of innovation from market i to j but also the persistence in conditional 
volatility in each market.  
Hamao et al. (1990) apply this approach to measure price changes and price 
volatility effects in international stock markets after the 1987 stock market crash. 
They find that unexpected changes in foreign market indices affect the conditional 
mean of the domestic market and justify volatility spillovers from the US and UK to 
JP. Edwards (1998) uses an augmented GARCH model on short term nominal 
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interest rates to analyse the transmission of volatility across LA during the 1990s. 
The results show evidence of volatility contagion from Mexico to Argentina, but 
not from Mexico to Chile. Fleming and Lopez (1999) investigate US Treasury yield 
volatility spillovers across the three trading centres. The estimated GARCH 
parameters indicate that yield volatility in Tokyo and London is associated with 
cross-market spillover effects, while volatility in the US is characterised only by 
country-specific autocorrelation. Within asymmetric multivariate GARCH 
modelling framework, Maghrebi et al. (2006) examine the dynamic relationship 
between stock market volatility and foreign exchange rate fluctuation in Asia-
Pacific countries. Their empirical results show evidence of volatility persistence 
and volatility linkages between stock market and currency market. 
Chancharoenchai and Dibooglu (2006) also use multivariate GARCH model with 
BEKK specifications to investigate volatility spillovers in six Southeast Asian stock 
markets around the time of the 1997 financial crisis. They stress the significant 
foreign influences on time-varying risk premium and volatility interactions in 
Asian markets. Using the same methodologies, Azis et al. (2003) measure the 
transmission of volatility shock to Asia’s local bond markets during the Lehman 
and Eurozone crises. They show not only the volatility persistence of own-markets 
but also shock spillovers from the US and European high-yield corporate bond 
markets to those of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, China and India. 
One of the advantages of GARCH models is that they tackle the problem of 
autoregressive and heteroskedastic dynamics and allow testing for contagion in 
the first and second moments of price changes. However, in line with conditional 
probability approach, GARCH models do not assume any kind of structural break in 
the data generating process caused by the crisis. Neither do authors using these 
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testing approach control for fundamentals and thus do not distinguish between 
fundamental-based contagion and pure contagion.  
3.2.2.3. Correlation Breakdown Tests  
a. Unconditional Correlation Tests 
Different from the two methodologies discussed above, correlation breakdown 
tests deal with the structural changes in cross-market linkages. Under this 
approach, one estimates the correlation coefficients of returns between assets 
across regimes and a significant increase in correlation in crisis periods compared 
to non-crisis periods is considered evidence for contagion. This test is not only the 
most common and straightforward one in testing for shift-contagion, but also 
provides a very important implication for the effectiveness of international 
diversification. King and Wadhwani (1990) are the first to apply this approach by 
analysing the changes in correlations of stock market returns in the US, UK and 
Japan after the 1987 stock market crash. They find some evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the contagion coefficients increased during and immediately after 
the crash in response to the rise in volatility. Their results suggest that there is a 
transmission mechanism which cannot be explained by a fully-revealing 
fundamental model. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) find a significant increase in the co-
movement of weekly equity returns and Brady bonds for Asian and Latin America 
markets after the Mexican crisis. Bajn and Goldfajn (1998) find that the cross-
country correlations of currencies and sovereign spreads of five East Asian 
countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Philippines) significantly 
increased during the period from July 1997 to May 1998 compared to other 
periods. Bazdresch and Wener (2000) use the correlation test along with other 
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econometric techniques to measure the contagion suffered by Mexico in the time of 
the Asian and Russia crises from 1997 to 1999. Their results confirm the evidence 
of contagion in the sovereign debt and stock markets.  
However, the traditional correlation breakdown tests are subject to the 
heteroskedasticity problem, since correlation coefficients between asset returns 
are affected by their volatilities, which are extremely high during the crisis (Forbes 
and Rigobon, 2002; Rigobon, 2003). Hence, testing contagion without handling this 
issue could generate spurious results. In order to tackle this problem, Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) introduce an adjustment for the correlation coefficient during the 
crisis period. The adjusted correlation        
  is given by:  
 (    )       
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where          is the correlation between the asset returns of country 1 (country of 
origin of crisis) and country 2 during the crisis period;                          are the 
standard deviations of asset returns in country 1 in the crisis period and non-crisis 
period, respectively. To test for contagion from one market to another market, the 
null hypothesis is:            
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                  is correlation of asset returns between two countries during non-
crisis period. The Forbes and Rigobon’s test statistic (FR) is: 
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  (with         and             are the respective 
sample sizes of crisis and non-crisis periods).  
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By analysing the daily stock market returns and short term interest rates of 
different industrial economies and EMEs in three financial crisis episodes 
(American stock market crash in 1987, Mexican crisis in 1994 and Asian crisis in 
1997), Forbes and Rigobon (2002) find that after the correlations are adjusted for 
the increased volatility, the hypothesis of correlation breakdown is rejected in 
most of the cases. In line with Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Boschi (2005) estimates 
instantaneous correlation coefficients corrected for heteroskedasticity for Latin 
American countries following the Argentinian crisis, but find no evidence of shift-
contagion. This leads to much criticism of many empirical works testing contagion 
without adjustment for heteroskedasticity, which may suggest the presence of 
contagion but in fact the transmission mechanism was fairly stable in most of the 
financial crises in the 1990s. Although cross-market linkages are surprisingly high 
in many parts of the world, they are simply a continuation of the strong linkages 
which existed in the stable period, interpretable as interdependence among 
economies. Therefore, shocks are mostly transmitted through non-crisis 
contingent channels, while a few studies support crisis-contingent theories.  
Although being widely applied in the empirical literature on contagion, the Forbes 
and Rigobon adjusted correlation (unconditional correlation) has received some 
criticism. According to Corsetti et al. (2005), the increase in variance of the crisis 
market may be caused by both idiosyncratic component and the non-observable 
variables. Without capturing those effects, the measure of adjusted coefficients is 
biased. They, therefore introduce the corrected correlation to solve this problem 
by weighting the increasing factor for each component of shocks.  Their empirical 
tests provide some evidence of contagion and some interdependence. However, 
this study prefers the measure suggested by Forbes and Rigobon since our support 
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is consistent with their arguments that it is possible to identify the country which 
generates the crisis and the ones which receive it. Moreover, if there are common 
unobservable shocks, they have to be homoscedastic or their contribution to the 
increasing variance should be negligible comparing to that of the idiosyncratic 
shocks. Another caveat in the Forbes and Rigobon’s approach is that this 
methodology is only suitable for bivariate testing. There is also problem with 
sample selection bias caused by an a priori identification of the crisis period. 
However, it is not always easy to have a clear and appropriate classification of 
crisis state against stable state. Moreover, Forbes and Rigobon defined non-crisis 
period as the total sample period, which leads to overlapping data and small crisis 
sample size, making the test’s assumption becomes unrealistic. This study while 
applies the unconditional correlation test will try to handle those statistical issues.  
Multivariate version of unconditional correlation test 
Dungey et al. (2005) propose a multivariate version of the Forbes and Rigobon test 
in a regression framework scaling the asset returns and correcting for endogeneity 
bias. This test is equivalent to the Chow test for a structural break in the regression 
slope. For the bivariate version, the test can be conducted based on the following 
pooled regression equation across the entire sample: 
 (    )   
  
 
            
           (
  
 
            
)    (
  
 
            
)       
where y1, y2 represent asset prices/returns of crisis country and affected country 
for whole period;    is a disturbance term;     is a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 for the crisis period and 0 otherwise. The parameter            
               
captures the effect of contagion. Forbes and Rigobon’s contagion test can now be 
implemented by estimating equation 3.12 with OLS and performing a one-sided t-
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test of          The difference between Forbes and Rigobon’s approach and 
Dungey et al.’s is that the standard errors of the former are based on a small 
sample asymptotic adjustment, while the latter uses least squares standard errors 
or a robust estimator. Mandilaras and Bird (2010) apply this approach in testing 
contagion effects of the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary 
System. They find some evidence of the shifts in cross market linkages between 
Denmark, Ireland and Belgium. 
Rigobon (2002) suggests an alternative multivariate test of contagion that is also 
robust to the presence heteroskedasticity and omitted variables: the DCC test. This 
test is based on the comparison between covariance matrix (DCC) across non-
crisis and crisis periods. The DCC statistics is defined as follows: 
    
  ̂        ̂           
 ̂   
 
where  ̂           ̂           are  variance/covariance matrices of asset returns in 
crisis and non-crisis regimes; and  ̂    is an estimate of the pertinent standard 
error of the statistic.  The problem of omitted variables is modelled as the 
unobservable common shock. The test is implemented under the null hypothesis of 
no change in covariance structure of asset returns across sample period, resulting 
DCC = 0. If DCC is positive (DCC>0), the null hypothesis of no contagion is rejected. 
However, like previous correlation tests, it is necessary to know the exact crisis 
window or clear classification of high volatility period. If the window is not well-
defined, the test may lose its power. Moreover, according to Billio et al. (2002), this 
test is unable to cope with some types of heteroskedasticity and fails to capture the 
direction of changes (i.e. decrease in correlation or loss of interdependence).  
97 | P a g e  
 
b. Nonlinearities Model of VAR 
A similar approach to the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) correlation test is that of 
Favero and Giavazzi (2002), who use the VAR model to control for the 
interdependence of asset returns and to identify unexpected shocks transmitted 
across countries by the distribution of residuals. The residuals that contribute to 
non-normality and heteroscedasticity in the data are controlled by dummy 
variables associated with “unusual” residuals for each country and the significance 
of these dummies gives a signal of unexpected shock from one country’s returns to 
another, which is considered to be contagion. The dummy variable is constructed 
as follows:      {
   |    |     
           
 
where      is the residual in a VAR(p) and    is the standard deviation of the 
residual     .  
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) share the same view as Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in 
terms of modelling non-linearities in shock propagation. However, Forbes and 
Rigobon use a single parameter to represent contagion, whereas Favero and 
Giavazzi assign different parameters to each dummy variable. Favero and 
Giavazzi’s approach allows for the full-information estimation of a model for 
interdependence. Studying the propagation of devaluation expectations among 
seven European countries over the period 1988–1992, their empirical results 
indicate that a number of country-specific shocks that affected other European 
markets are significantly non-linear. However, such non-linearities sometimes 
imply a change in sign, for example a widening spread in interest rates in one 
country is associated with a closing spread in another, which explains the “flight to 
quality” phenomenon during the financial crisis. However, like the testing 
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approach based on conditional probability of crisis, the construction of binary 
dummies amounts to a loss of sample information and results in inefficient 
parameter estimates. In addition, the result of contagion from using this 
methodology is found to be spurious due to weak instruments. By comparing 
alternative tests of contagion, Dungey et al (2005) find that the Favero and 
Giavazzi’s (2002) test tends to reject the null hypothesis of no contagion too easily. 
3.2.2.4. Multiple Equilibria Testing with Hamilton Switching Models 
The theoretical arguments for currency crises and financial contagion stress the 
existence of multiple equilibria caused by the change in investors’ expectations and 
hence their behaviour during a crisis. These changes reveal a very important 
implication that the underlying distribution of asset returns should in general be 
multimodal. In other words, the underlying asset return models yield two or more 
equilibria. In the N-equilibria case, these properties can be captured by a mixture 
of distributions:  
(    )  (    )  ∑     
 
   (    )  
where  (    ) is the probability density of asset return     ;    are weights of 
individual densities  (    ) in the mixture such that ∑     
 
   . 
The jumps between multiple equilibria may lead to the discontinuities in data-
generating process implied in “shift-contagion” and crisis-contingent theories. One 
approach for testing multiple equilibria is based on the Markov switching (MS) 
model developed by Hamilton (1988) 28. The model specifies a number of regimes 
                                                          
28 The MS model was developed by Hamilton (1988) in studies of the term structure of interest 
rates and Hamilton (1989) in studies of business cycle. This model was then applied to many 
economic phenomena: for example, the dynamics of floating of the exchange rates (Kaminsky and 
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for relevant financial variables and estimates the probabilities of switching from 
one regime to another. Jeanne and Masson (2000) demonstrate in their study of 
currency crises that the MS model performs significantly better in tracking 
episodes of speculation, interpretable as self-fulfilling jumps in the beliefs of 
foreign exchange market participants. Ismail and Rahman (2009) also evaluate the 
potential of the MS model in their study of the relationship between US and Asian 
stock markets and find evidence to support the pre-eminence of non-linear MS-
VAR over linear VAR in modelling asset return interactions across countries. Using 
MS Error Correction Models, Billio et al. (2005) analyse the contagion effects in the 
period of the Hong Kong stock market crash in 1997. The empirical results reveal 
evidence of contagion defined as a break that produces non-linearities in the 
linkages among financial markets. Within an MS-VAR framework, Guo et al. (2011) 
investigate contagion effects between the stock market, real estate market, CDS 
market, and energy market in the US. The MS specifications show the presence of 
contagion effects from these markets, characterised by nonlinearity with two 
distinct regimes. The regime-dependent impulse response functions reveal that all 
financial markets respond more significantly to economic shocks when high 
volatile regime is dominant. Lopes and Nunes (2012) also apply MS-VAR model 
with time-varying transition probabilities to examine the case of Portuguese 
escudo and the Spanish peseta during the European Monetary System crisis. Their 
findings confirm that there are the shifts in volatility and an improvement in 
correlations when the two countries go into crisis regime.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
Peruga, 1990; Van Norden, 1996) and currency crises (Jeanne, 1997; Martinez-Peria, 1998; Piard, 
1997; Psaradaskis et al., 1998). 
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Although MS approach in testing contagion has a drawback in that the number of 
regimes is arbitrary fixed, empirical studies that employ the MS model can 
potentially overcome several drawbacks from other methodologies in testing 
contagion. First, the MS model is able to cope with theoretical arguments in terms 
of economic fundamentals associated with multiple equilibria and non-linearity in 
links between financial markets. Second, it takes into account several time-series 
properties of asset returns, such as non-normality and fat-tailedness, time-varying 
volatility or heteroskedasticity. Third, this model does not require an a priori 
breakdown of the sample data into crisis and non-crisis periods as the correlation 
test does; instead, crisis periods are endogenously determined. This feature is 
especially important when analysing the contagion effect in the context of the 
2007-2008 global financial market turmoil, since it is difficult to decide the cut-off 
point of a crisis29. Finally, like the probit model, this methodology can provide an 
explicit measure of the probability of a crisis, and specifically enables us to 
calculate the probability of a shift between different regimes, as well as the 
duration of the shift.  
In conclusion, the review of theoretical and empirical literature on financial 
contagion provides some important implications: 
- As it is challenging to have a clear distinction between fundamental-based (or 
spillover effects) and investor-based contagion, and both these types of contagion 
interact with each other to amplify shocks, we are primarily interested in shift-
                                                          
29 Various studies propose different breakpoint times for the US subprime credit crisis. For example, 
Goodhart (2008) and Abbassi and Schnabel (2009) define August 9, 2007 as the beginning of the 
crisis. Kato (2008) stresses Lehman Brother’s collapse on September 15, 2008 as the time the crisis 
spread all over the world. Many public releases (i.e. VOA) refer to the bail out of Bear Stearns on 16 
March 2008 the start of the year’s slide into financial crisis.  
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contagion testing approach. This approach helps to avoid direct measurement and 
differentiation between various transmission channels while still provides 
evidence to support or to be against certain theories of transmission (Forbes and 
Rigobon, 2002). 
- The literature on currency crises and investor-based contagion implies the role of 
multiple equilibria and non-linearity in international shock propagation. Moreover, 
during periods of crises, financial markets exhibit a common characteristic of 
extremely high volatility in asset returns. Integrating these features in asset pricing 
and contagion modelling, we hypothesise that there is a simultaneous rise in asset 
return volatility in different markets, associated with the jumps between different 
volatility regimes and the consequent changes in cross-market linkages in times of 
financial turmoil.  
- Empirical evidence of financial contagion appears to be very sensitive to the data 
sets and testing methods which are subject to a series of problems such as 
heteroskedasticity, simultaneous equations, omitted variables, non-linearity, time 
series and cross-sectional clustering (Paas and Kuusk, 2012). We try to 
accommodate all these statistical concerns in our empirical methodologies.  
3.3. Empirical methodologies 
In order to accommodate the theoretical and empirical implications discussed in 
the literature review, we employ two-step econometric assessment of financial 
contagion. First, the dynamic co-movement of financial asset prices and return 
volatility is explored to identify the extent to which East Asian financial markets 
become integrated with each other and with the mature markets of the US and 
Europe. Given the various advantages of the MS approach which captures both the 
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theoretical assumption of multiple equilibria and empirical application of volatility 
linkages and spillover effects during financial stress, we integrate MS specifications 
with VAR models (MS-VAR framework) to assess the potential dynamic behaviour 
of East Asian financial markets in which asset price and return volatilities are 
expected to be subject to regime shifts following financial shocks in the US and 
Europe. Second, the analysis of shift-contagion is given by employing the Dungey et 
al. (2005) multivariate version of Forbes and Rigobon’s (2002) unconditional 
correlation test to understand whether there are significant shifts in cross-market 
linkages after an initial shock in one country. This may help identify the driving 
forces behind the asset price volatility adjustments either from fundamental-based 
or investor-based contagion (shift-contagion).  
Specifically, this chapter aims at testing the hypothesis of volatility spillovers and 
financial contagion as a situation in which:  
(1) A switch in regimes (from low volatility to high volatility) of crisis-originator 
markets (US and Europe) leads to a change in regime (from low volatility to 
high volatility) in the dominated markets of East Asia (with a lag).  
(2) The contemporaneous correlations between US, European and East Asian asset 
prices and returns increase significantly when these countries switch to a high 
volatility regime (crisis regime) from a  low volatility one (stable regime). 
The econometric testing will help answer the following research questions:  
RQ1a - How do asset prices facilitate the transmission of volatility shock across 
borders? 
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RQ1b - How do empirical estimates of asset price volatility linkages relate to 
theoretical assumptions as generally used in the literature on shift-contagion which 
is caused by investor behaviour?  
3.3.1. Markov-Switching Vector Autoregressions (MS-VAR) 
MS-VAR was originally expanded from the Hamilton (1989) Markov-switching 
autoregressive model (MS-AR) by Krolzig (1997). The general idea behind the MS-
VAR model is that the observed time series yt depends upon the unobservable 
regime variable st, which represents the probability of being in a different state of 
the world. In an MS-VAR model, all the parameters of the vector autoregression 
can be specified to be conditioned on the state    of the Markov chain. Let M denote 
the number of feasible regimes, so that    *     +  In the most generalisation of 
the mean-adjusted VAR(p) model, MS-VAR process of M regimes can be expressed 
as follows:   
(    )     (  )    (  )(      (    ))       (  )(      (    ))     
           (   (  )) 
 (  )  (
  
 (  )     (  )
   
   (  )    
 (  )
) 
where: 
 1 ,...,t t nty y y  is an n dimensional time series vector of variables which are, in 
this study, financial asset returns of the US, Europe and East Asian countries; 
 (  ) is the vector of regime-dependent means; 
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   (  )     (  ) are the matrices containing the pth autoregressive parameters in 
the state   ;  
    is a zero-mean white noise process with a variance-covariance matrix (  ), 
which is assumed to be Gaussian:          (   (  ))    
The hidden Markov chain: the general assumption from the MS model is that the 
unobservable realisation of regime    is generated by a discrete time, discrete state 
Markov stochastic process.  
      (           )    ∑                   *     +
 
   
 
where     is the transition probability from one regime to another.  For M regimes, 
these transition probabilities can be collected in a (MˣM) transition matrix denoted 
as P. Each element (    )  in P represents the probability that event i will be 
followed by event j.  
  [
          
          
    
          
] 
where                                 
Transition probabilities also contain important information about the expected 
duration (Dj ) the system will stay in a certain regime (j), such that: 
 (  )  ∑    ,   -
 
     
      ,           - 
       ,                  - 
       ,                         - 
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   (     )       (     )       
 (     )    
 
     
  
The data generating process: there are two components of MS-VAR models: (1) 
the Gaussian VAR model as the conditional data generating process; (2) the 
Markov chain as the regime generating process. 
Following Krolzig (1997), denoting    the unobserved state of the system  such 
that:   [
 (    )
 
 (    )
], where the indicator function  (    ) is defined as   
 (    )  {
         
           
 with       .30 
The mean shift function is  (  )  ∑    (    )
 
       , where   
,       -  
The conditional expectation  ,  -, which represents the probability distribution of 
st can be expressed as follows: 
 ,  -  [
   (    )
 
   (    )
]  [
   (     )
 
   (     )
] 
where    is the m-th column of the identity matrix.  
Let  (          ) denote the conditional probability density function of yt  for given 
states   and lagged endogenous variables      (    
      
      
    
        
 )
 
  
As the error term    in equation (3.14) is assumed to follow the normal 
distribution, the conditional density of yt for a given regime  t is normal as in the 
VAR model, thus:  
                                                          
30 According to Krolzig (1997), it is useful to define the parameter shifts more clearly by 
formulating the system as a single equation by introducing dummy variables. 
106 | P a g e  
 
                 ( ̅     ) 
where the conditional means  ̅  are summarized in the vector  ̅ . 
Assuming that the information set available at time t-1 consists only of the sample 
observations and the pre-sample values collected in      and the states of the 
Markov chain up to     , the conditional density of yt is a mixture of normals: 
 (               ) 
 ∑  (                   )   (          )      
 ∑    
 
   
(  (  ) 
 
        
 
 
    *(    ̅  )
   
  (    ̅  )+) 
if the densities of    conditional on t and Yt-1 can be collected to the vector 
   *
 (             )
 
 (             )
+ 
Thus:  (            )    
        
As the regime is unobservable, the information set available at time t-1 consists 
only of the observed time series until time t and the unobserved regime vector   
has to be replaced by the inference    (     ). Given the information set Yτ, the 
probabilities of being in regime m (denoted as      ) are collected in the vector 
 ̂    such that: 
 ̂    [
   (        )
 
  (        ) 
] 
Due to the binary nature of the elements of   which implies that  ,   -  
  (     )    (    ), there are two different interpretations for  ̂   .  ̂     
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denotes the discrete conditional probability distribution of   given Yτ.  ̂     is also 
equivalent to the conditional mean of    given Yτ. 
Then, the conditional probability density of yt based upon Yt-1 is given as: 
 (       )   ∑  (               )
 
   
 
 ∑  (  
 
   
             )   (            )     
            
The conditional probability density of the sample can be derived analogously.  
Given the pre-sample value   , the density of the sample      conditional on the 
states  is determined by:  
 (   )  ∏ (  
 
   
        )  
The joint probability distribution of observations and states can be calculated by: 
 (   )   (   )   ( )   ∏ (  
 
   
        )∏  (       )    (  
 
   
) 
Model selection and estimation: the MS-VAR model allows for a variety of 
exogenous regime switches: Markov-switching mean (MSM), switching in intercept 
(MSI), switching in the autoregressive coefficients At (MSA), and Markov-switching 
heteroskedasticity (MSH). For empirical applications, it is useful to allow only for 
some of the parameters in the model to be conditioned on the state of the Markov 
chain while other parameters are regime-invariant (Krolzig, 1997). The stylised 
fact in international financial markets has implied a rise in asset price volatility 
that occurs during a period of financial turmoil. Therefore, we follow the literature 
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that expresses the role of volatility to model financial contagion by incorporating 
the VAR models with the following MS specifications:  
 MS-VAR with mean and variance that are allowed to switch simultaneously 
across regimes (i.e. the heteroskedastic mean switch model: MSMH(m)-VAR 
(p)). This is consistent with the observable behavior of asset prices which 
show an immediate jump to new level during the financial crises. This 
process leads to the differences in mean across regimes, which imparts an 
effect and contributes to increasing volatility. Difference in means also 
generates non-zero conditional skewness. In addition, the combined 
differences in means and variances can cause persistence in levels as well as 
squared value akin to volatility persistence observed in many return series 
(Guidolin, 2011). 
 Two discrete regimes (s1, s2) represent: (i) regime 1: non-crisis regime with 
low volatility and (ii) regime 2: crisis regime with higher volatility. Although 
the choice of number of regime appears to be subjective, it is suitable for the 
analysis of crisis contagion, given that the observed time series of financial 
variables shows the prevalence of either a stable stage with relatively less 
volatile movement or a crisis state with strong adjustments. Moreover, the 
literature debates several caveats against particular statistical criteria in 
determining the number of regimes (Hamilton, 2008; Psaradakis and 
Spagnolo, 2003)31.  
                                                          
31 Determining number of regimes basing on hypothesis testing is problematic since it fails to 
satisfy the usual regularity conditions arising from unidentified parameters (Hamilton, 2008). On 
the other hand, state selection procedures using complexity-penalized likelihood criteria (AIC, BIC 
or HCQ) are subject to poor performance under small sample size and parameter changes, constant 
autoregressive coefficients and when the Markov chain is not persistent (Psaradakis and Spagnolo, 
2003). 
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 The number of lag for VAR(p) is decided using Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC) 
 MS-VAR is set up in the analysis framework based on the assumption that the 
probability of switching from one state to another is not affected by 
exogenous variables (i.e. there is no fundamentals control)32. 
 The population parameters of the MS-VAR models are estimated using direct 
maximization of log likelihood function. The full log likelihood function of the 
model is given by: 
    ∑  ∑( (  
 
   
 
   
       )  (    ) 
which  (         ) is the likelihood function for state j conditional on a set 
of parameters ( )  Although this method is disadvantageous when the 
number of estimated parameters increases, it is the most straightforward and 
simplest way to set up.  
 The probabilistic inferences about the unobservable states are made using 
nonlinear filter and smoother. “Filtered” probabilities are inferences about 
st conditional on the information up to time t, while “smoothed” 
probabilities use all the information in the data. All computations were 
implemented by adapting the msvarsetup procedures in RATS.  
3.3.2. Multivariate Unconditional Correlation Tests  
If the MS-VAR system displays significant evidence of shifting regimes of East 
Asian markets following the shift in crisis-originator markets (US and EU), we 
                                                          
32 King et al. (1994) argue that changes in asset price correlations across markets are driven 
primarily by unobservable variables.  
110 | P a g e  
 
could extend our analysis to investigate structural change in cross-market linkage 
between different regimes. We expect asymmetrical effects in market 
performances, including sign reversals or differential speeds of adjustment to the 
shocks. The regime classification allows us to pick up observations across crisis 
and non-crisis states to conduct an unconditional correlation test.  
Applying the Dungey et al. (2005) extended multivariate regression framework of 
the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) unconditional correlation test, we develop the 
following system of equations: 
(    )  
     
    
          ∑   
   
(
     
    
)     (
     
    
)     (
     
    
)
 ∑   
   
(
     
    
)      (
     
    
)      (
     
    
)         
where    represents asset returns at time t, a pooled data set by stacking the non-
crisis and crisis observations. The subscript A, US and EU denote Asian countries, 
the US and European country, respectively.    is scaled by the non-crisis standard 
deviation    (standard deviation of low volatility regime 1), which is derived from 
MS-VAR estimation;  
dt is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the crisis observations and 0 for 
non-crisis observations obtained from MS-VAR regime classification;   
     are disturbance terms.  
β and θ are the vectors of coefficients, while θ captures the additional contribution 
of information on asset returns in Asian country i to the non-crisis regression and 
conveys the ideas of contagion effects. If there is no change in the relationship, the 
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dummy variables provide no new additional information during the crisis state, 
resulting in θ = 0.  
Therefore, the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) correlation test of shift contagion can be 
implemented by estimating equation 3.15 with OLS and performing  a one-side t-
test of:          .  
When we apply the models to test shift-contagion for the FOREX series, we add 
two variables to control for external shocks which triggered the jumps in East 
Asian foreign exchange rates. They are: (i) the S&P500 volatility index (VIX), and 
(ii) TED spreads (TED). VIX is a key measure of a market’s expectation of short-
term (up to 30 days) volatility, and has therefore been considered as the world’s 
premier barometer of investor sentiment. A higher value of VIX corresponds to 
more volatile market expectations. TED is widely used as an indicator to measure 
liquidity and credit risk, since the interbank rate represents banks’ perception of 
the creditworthiness of other financial institutions and the availability of funds for 
lending purposes, compared with risk free investment in government securities. 
The higher spreads reflect the increase in risk of default on interbank loans and 
global liquidity strain. We assume that volatility in global financial markets and 
liquidity tension trigger massive sell-offs by international investors, causing capital 
outflows and depreciation pressure on local currencies. VIX and TED enter the 
regression with a lag.  
Testing contagion based on dummy variables and regression approach of Dungey 
et al. (2004) corrects for simultaneous bias problem in Forbes and Rigobons (2002) 
whose correlation test is conducted on pairs of countries with source country 
being exogenous. Moreover, this approach links to a range of other tests of 
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contagion, for example Favero and Giavazi’s (2002). As a structural model is 
specified where each return is expressed as a function of other returns and the full 
set of dummy variables, the test will identify “shift-contagion” if returns in 
dependent variable is matched with returns in other variables during crisis regime.  
3.4. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
3.4.1. Data Sample 
We analyse contagion effects in different financial market segments: equity 
markets, foreign exchange markets and sovereign debt markets, given that they 
experienced a strong volatility following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008. The different sets of asset price variables entered into our 
models are as follows:   
Equity markets:  
Composite stock price indices of the sample countries were chosen from the 
national leading markets: US: Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (S&P500); Eurozone: 
EURO STOXX Index33 ; Hong Kong: Hang Seng Index (HSI); Singapore: Straits Times 
Index (STI); Korea: Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI); Malaysia: Kuala 
Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI); Philippines: Philippines Stock Exchange Index 
(PCOMP); Indonesia: Jakarta Composite Index (JCI) and Thailand: Stock Exchange 
of Thailand Index (SET). We also use the price indices of the banking sector in each 
market as banks were severely affected during the crisis. US-dollar denominated 
indices are used to facilitate analysis of contagion effects from global investors’ 
perspectives and to disentangle the overlapping effects of currency risks. The 
                                                          
33 The EURO STOXX Index represents large, mid and small capitalisation companies of 12 Eurozone 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain 
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indices are simple average weekly data calculated from daily closing prices for the 
period from 1st January 2004 to 31st December 2011.   
Foreign exchange markets: We use weekly nominal foreign exchange rates of 
domestic currencies against the US dollar, namely the Singapore dollar, Thai baht, 
Malaysian ringgit, Philippine peso, Indonesia rupiah and Korean won. The Hong 
Kong dollar is not included in the estimation as Hong Kong has fixed its currency to 
the USD since 1983 and the average return on its exchange rate is close to zero. 
The remaining East Asian countries pursue a managed float exchange rate system, 
which is subject to varying degrees of central bank intervention. The data sample 
is from 1st January 2005 to 31st December 2011. 
The composite stock prices, bank stock indices and foreign exchange rates are 
converted into returns series by taking the logarithms of the indices ratio between 
two consecutive sessions multiplied by 100, such that:  
           (
    
      
) 
Sovereign debt markets: Weekly data on changes in sovereign CDS spreads (CDS) 
on five-year sovereign bonds for nine selected markets were collected from 1st 
September 2006 to 30th September 2010. The US is considered as the originator of 
the subprime mortgage crisis and Greece as the originator of the European debt 
crisis. We use CDS with maturities of 5 years since they are the most liquid 
contracts and constitute over 85% of the entire CDS market. However, seven-year 
CDS spreads are used for the US since the five-year CDS data are only available 
from 11th December 2007, and also the level and movement of the seven-year CDS 
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are almost identical to those of five-year ones34. The CDS spreads are preferable to 
bond yield as proxy variables to analyse the contagion effect in sovereign debt 
market because they are a very important variable in the context of the global 
financial crisis. The literature has pointed out that the unregulated multi-trillion 
dollar OTC CDS market triggered the US subprime mortgage crisis, followed by the 
credit crisis and finally the systematic financial crisis (Greenberger, 2010). 
Moreover, credit derivatives create a huge web of exposures across financial 
institutions, which easily lead to a large jump in value of these contracts and 
consequently the collapse of the whole financial system if one of the counterparties 
defaults. CDS also allows for more direct comparison of credit risk interlinkage 
across countries. Longstaff et al. (2005) show that while the majority of bond 
spread relates to default risk, there is a significant non-default component 
attributed to illiquidity. Additionally, new information is incorporated into CDS 
spreads faster than into bonds (Blanco et al., 2005). Last but not least, analysis of 
the bond yield may be subject to distortion created by other factors such as tax, 
maturities and particular covenants inherent in bond contracts (e.g. early call-
feature). For example, Elton et al. (2002) find that different tax treatments 
generate substantial effects on bond spreads. Alexander and Kaeck (2008) indicate 
that while CDS spreads are usually quoted as a constant maturity, bond yields are 
not directly comparable when maturities of the underlying bonds differ.  
The data are mostly retrieved from Datastream International. Although a higher 
frequency of daily data is available from Datastream, weekly data are chosen in 
this study since the daily data contains too much noisy information, which tends to 
                                                          
34 According to Wang and Moore (2012), the US five-year and seven-year CDS spreads have nearly 
perfect correlations (0.998) over the crisis period from December 2007 to November 2009. 
Therefore, the difference in degree of shock transmission of either five-year or seven-year CDS 
spreads would be very marginal.  
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produce less powerful results. Additionally, weekly price and return analysis helps 
avoid non-synchronous trading time horizons among countries35. 
Figures 3.3 – 3.6 show the behaviour of return series on stock price indices, foreign 
exchange rates and CDS of all countries in the sample. There are large negative 
stock returns and volatility clusters which occurred during the global financial 
crisis of 2008-2009. Meanwhile, there is cross-country heterogeneity in the 
behaviour of the foreign exchange rates and CDS series, which may be caused 
either by common global shock or country-specific risk characteristics.  
Figure 3-3 - Composite stock return series 
 
 
                                                          
35 Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003) find significant time zone effects in equity markets.  Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) use moving average of returns to control for different in time zones. However, this 
approach has a drawback that the moving-average filtering may potentially introduce spurious 
dynamics into the relationships among asset returns.  
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Figure 3-4 – Bank stock return series 
 
Figure 3-5 – Returns of foreign exchange rates 
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Figure 3-6 - CDS series 
 
3.4.2. Preliminary Analysis 
Summary statistics and the correlation structure of variables for sample countries 
are reported in Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, corresponding to different financial 
market segments. It is clear from Table 3.1 that the mean values of market return 
vary significantly across countries. EMEs have higher returns than AEs, and the 
highest one goes to Indonesia with its mean of 0.394. Euro Stoxx is the only one 
with a negative average return, implying that the stock index faced a downward 
trend over the period (bearish stock market). Standard deviations are higher in 
Korea and Indonesia (4.84 and 4.53 respectively), indicating the existence of 
higher risk in those countries than the others in the region. Stock returns of all 
countries are negatively skewed. A distribution with a kurtosis value of more than 
3 is described as leptokurtic relative to normal. This indicates that the distribution 
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of stock returns in all analysed markets tend to have extreme values. The stock 
markets in East Asian countries are all positively correlated with US and European 
markets at a similar magnitude of between 0.5 and 0.8. However, simple 
correlations merely provide insight into short run market linkages.  
Table 3.1 - Descriptive statistics of stock returns series 
  TL ID PH ML KR 
 Mean 0.139 0.394 0.321 0.202 0.209 
 Median 0.449 0.905 0.288 0.317 0.69 
 Maximum 17.061 19.358 14.304 11.407 31.309 
 Minimum -20.001 -29.974 -17.143 -9.608 -27.4 
 Std. Dev. 3.761 4.539 3.664 2.404 4.84 
 Skewness -0.655 -1.148 -0.383 -0.257 -0.512 
 Kurtosis 7.104 11.038 5.055 4.874 11.988 
 Jarque-Bera 323.24 1216.93 83.79 65.79 1425.37 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 
 Observations 418 418 418 418 418 
Correlations 
     with US 0.448 0.451 0.444 0.51 0.522 
with EU 0.53 0.541 0.532 0.615 0.629 
  SG HK EU US 
  Mean 0.174 0.095 -0.011 0.032 
  Median 0.514 0.331 0.376 0.207 
  Maximum 17.188 15.575 11.734 9.639 
  Minimum -16.899 -15.524 -16.609 -16.451 
  Std. Dev. 3.29 3.532 3.656 2.521 
  Skewness -0.369 -0.264 -0.759 -1.139 
  Kurtosis 7.799 6.19 5.79 9.803 
  Jarque-Bera 410.62 182.09 175.67 896.34 
  Probability 0 0 0 0 
  Observations 418 418 418 418 
 Correlations 
     with US 0.676 0.618 0.801 1.000 
 with EU 0.764 0.675 1.000 0.801 
  
Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics of bank stock return data. Compared with 
composite stock returns, the banking industry has lower mean values but higher 
standard deviations in most of the countries, except Thailand, Indonesia and 
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Malaysia. This implies that the banking sector suffered relatively more devaluation 
than other industries as a consequence several banks’ and financial institutions’ 
failure and bailout during the period 2007-2009. Banks in the large developed 
markets of the US, Europe and Hong Kong have negative average returns and again 
the Indonesian banking sector has the highest value, 0.429. It is interesting that 
East Asian bank returns are more correlated with those of the European banks 
rather than the US ones. Negative skewness coefficients indicate these series are 
exposed to an asymmetric distribution, which is inclined to the left. 
Table 3.2 - Descriptive statistics of bank stock returns series 
  TL ID PH ML KR 
 Mean 0.146 0.429 0.245 0.221 0.08 
 Median 0.307 0 0.221 0.318 0 
 Maximum 15.631 22.314 15.135 13.113 37.469 
 Minimum -18.2 -28.768 -15.924 -10.277 -35.667 
 Std. Dev. 4.527 5.356 3.703 2.693 6.321 
 Skewness -0.172 -0.322 -0.227 -0.145 -0.343 
 Kurtosis 4.294 6.218 5.442 5.315 9.29 
 Jarque-Bera 31.25 187.53 107.42 94.84 697.31 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 
Observations 418 418 418 418 418 
Correlations 
     with US 0.307 0.264 0.508 0.382 0.403 
with EU 0.475 0.477 0.53 0.569 0.581 
  SG HK EU US 
  Mean 0.142 -0.009 -0.23 -0.221 
  Median 0.429 0.088 -0.035 0.272 
  Maximum 21.351 15.653 27.928 18.982 
  Minimum -14.592 -14.842 -27.152 -24.843 
  Std. Dev. 3.53 3.686 5.132 5.322 
  Skewness -0.015 -0.166 -0.163 -0.385 
  Kurtosis 8.219 7.186 11.213 5.74 
  Jarque-Bera 474.33 307.09 1176.64 141.11 
  Probability 0 0 0 0 
 Observations 418 418 418 418 
 Correlations 
     with US 0.343 0.515 0.652 1.000 
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with EU 0.708 0.661 1.000 0.625 
 
 
The descriptive statistics of return on nominal foreign exchange rates are reported 
in Table 3.3, which shows that the mean values vary across countries. While most 
of the East Asian countries’ currencies have negative average returns, which reflect 
an overall appreciation trend, Korean won shows downward pressure on the local 
currency over the period, evidenced by a positive mean value. Korean won also has 
the highest standard deviations, implying they are more volatile than the others in 
the group. The skewness and kurtosis statistics indicate that none of the data 
series have normal distribution. As the region has close links through intra-
regional and inter-regional trade, all the currencies show high pair-wise 
correlations, with the highest correlations belonging to Singapore dollar and 
Malaysian ringgit, Malaysian ringgit and Indonesian rupiah, Malaysian ringgit and 
Philippine peso, and Philippine peso and Korean won (above 0.5).  
Table 3.3 - Descriptive statistics of return on foreign exchange rate series 
  TL ID PH ML KR SG 
 Mean -0.057 -0.004 -0.067 -0.049 0.025 -0.063 
 Median -0.034 0.000 -0.072 -0.014 -0.053 -0.134 
 Maximum 3.128 7.087 2.927 3.373 14.182 4.927 
 Minimum -2.346 -11.006 -3.004 -2.942 -11.113 -3.182 
 Std. Dev. 0.670 1.385 0.877 0.790 2.025 0.830 
 Skewness 0.100 -0.777 0.052 0.149 0.603 0.666 
 Kurtosis 4.930 17.977 3.558 4.394 15.744 7.630 
 Jarque-Bera 57.43 3457.76 4.91 30.99 2499.00 354.03 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Observations 366 366 366 366 366 366 
  TL ID PH ML KR SG 
TL 1.000           
ID 0.361 1.000 
    PH 0.330 0.403 1.000 
   ML 0.448 0.524 0.509 1.000 
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KR  0.297 0.347 0.505 0.458 1.000 
 SG 0.416 0.377 0.277 0.607 0.319 1.000 
 
CDS data series of all countries are very highly volatile. It is noticeable from Table 
3.4 that Greece experienced the highest average change in CDS spreads, which is 
consistent with the sovereign debt crisis, which has occurred in this country from 
2009. The distributions are not normal – they are leptokurtic and positively 
skewed (except Indonesia, US and Greece, which are negatively skewed). The CDS 
spreads in East Asian are all correlated with the US market at a similar magnitude 
around 0.2. While Indonesia and Philippines report low correlations with the US, 
these series tend to show higher correlations with the Greece.  
Table 3.4 - Descriptive statistics of CDS spreads series 
  TL ID PH ML 
 Mean 0.308 -0.093 -0.148 0.249 
 Median -0.06 -1.115 -0.7 0 
 Maximum 240 446.3 382.5 261.7 
 Minimum -216.7 -586.7 -319.5 -230.9 
 Std. Dev. 26.532 64.834 40.748 27.838 
 Skewness 0.924 -1.877 1.541 1.229 
 Kurtosis 53.765 45.768 55.616 60.13 
 Jarque-Bera 22902.3 16358.4 24654.5 29019.8 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 
 Observations 213 213 213 213 
Correlations 
 
   with US 0.223 0.089 0.157 0.201 
with GR 0.145 0.15803 0.195 0.169 
  KR HK GR US 
 Mean 0.361 0.183 3.588 0.251 
 Median 0.2 0 0.3 0 
 Maximum 235.4 40.8 314.94 17.59 
 Minimum -222.9 -32.6 -414.45 -17.05 
 Std. Dev. 29.712 7.053 52.857 4.377 
 Skewness 0.456 0.247 -0.505 -0.044 
 Kurtosis 35.529 11.932 31.317 8.573 
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 Jarque-Bera 9398.16 710.28 7125.53 275.75 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 
 Observations 213 213 213 213 
Correlations 
    with US 0.239 0.24 0.277 1.000 
with GR 0.19 0.167 1.000 0.277 
Note: The descriptive statistics are conducted on the difference of CDS series 
(rather than log difference) to capture the behaviour of variables during the 
examined period. 
In summary, the descriptive statistics imply several key features. First, the asset 
price correlations between East Asian countries, and correlations between Asian 
and the US, European countries, are relatively high, which justifies our preference 
for modelling the relationships and interactions between markets with 
multivariate VAR. Second, the proxy variables in the four analysed financial market 
segments appear to be highly volatile, especially in the CDS series. The largest 
reductions in prices or returns (minimum value) occur simultaneously in all 
markets during the time of the global financial market turmoil, which may be due 
to interdependence or contagion effects. Third, the high level of kurtosis evidences 
the existence of large shocks (of either sign) in all markets. The low probability 
values of the Jarque-Bera statistics in all cases reject normality of the data at any 
level of statistical significance and the presence of non-linearities. Therefore, we 
incorporate regime switching in VAR models to capture the role of volatility shocks 
and non-linear interactions caused by the shocks. Finally, there is considerable 
cross-country heterogeneity in market performance and in response to shocks. 
The combination of MS-VAR and the correlation breakdown tests of Dungey et al. 
(2005) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) will deal with the time-series and cross-
sectional clustering that is commonly found in the literature.  
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Prior to proceeding with the model estimations, the stationarity in time series data 
are checked with the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test at level and first 
difference. The unit root test results are reported in Table 3.5 which suggests that 
the null hypothesis of a unit root in market stock returns, bank stock returns and 
foreign exchange rates is rejected in both the level and first difference. However, 
the CDS series are non-stationary on their levels, while they are stationary on their 
first differences. Therefore, the log differenced series of CDS are used in the 
estimation of the MS-VAR model.  
Table 3.5 - Stationarity ADF test results 
  Market stock returns Bank stock returns 
  Level  1st diff Level  1st diff 
TL -20.962 -11.319 -22.105 -14.430 
ID -9.798 -17.847 -22.509 -17.769 
PH -21.205 -13.649 -21.362 -10.872 
ML -18.778 -12.784 -18.707 -16.050 
KR -11.026 -11.196 -23.101 -14.261 
SG -9.809 -13.835 -9.446 -13.667 
HK -21.274 -14.049 -20.989 -13.156 
US -21.241 -13.757 -24.645 -15.082 
EU -21.872 -11.143 -22.414 -11.075 
  Foreign exchange rates CDS spreads 
  Level  1st diff Level  1st diff 
TL -16.018 -13.111 -1.716 -17.705 
ID -8.481 -12.175 -1.450 -15.703 
PH -18.452 -13.653 -1.510 -17.550 
ML -17.863 -10.638 -1.356 -16.970 
KR -10.821 -10.372 -1.285 -14.107 
SG -19.285 -11.204 
  HK 
  
-1.452 -12.803 
US 
  
-2.857 -15.348 
GR     -0.028 -15.701 
Test critical values 10%: -2.57; 5%: -2.87; 1%: -3.46 
Note: The choice of lag length is based on the Schwarz Information Criterion. 
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3.5. Empirical Results 
3.5.1. Structural Break in Volatility and Volatility Spillovers with MS-VAR 
Estimations 
This section explores the nonlinear interactions between East Asian financial 
markets and those of the US and Europe by assuming that all the series are regime-
dependent. A two regime multivariate MS-VAR model with switches in both mean 
and variance is applied. We first use AIC to select the optimal lag length in the 
models, which suggests 1 lag for stock return and CDS series, and 3 lags for foreign 
exchange rate series. Tables 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 show the estimated parameters of 
MSMH(2)-VAR(p) for different financial market segments, which include the 
switching means       ; variances of two regimes   
    
    the probability of state in 
each regime        as well as regime-switching probabilities          and the 
expected duration       . We also report the autoregressive parameters (up to lag 
1) to view the dynamic relationship between variables. In all cases, the statistical 
results indicate that the data sets fit the model specifications. The LR-test statistics 
show that the hypotheses of linear specification are rejected at a significant level of 
1%, which supports our hypothesis of the regime-switching behaviour in time-
series data of stock returns, foreign exchange rates and sovereign CDS spreads.  
This may also imply the better fit of MS model compared with the existing linear 
models, which have been widely used to study the relationships and linkages 
between financial markets. 
3.5.1.1. Equity Markets 
As can be seen in Table 3.6, volatility breaks are one of the defining characteristics 
of the stock markets in every East Asian country as a consequence of the global 
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financial crisis during the period 2007-2011. The models significantly differentiate 
two trends in stock returns series: (i) state 1, with positive means and low 
variances, corresponding to a stable regime; and (ii) state 2, with negative means 
and high variances, representing a crisis regime. Negative means in the crisis 
regime in all countries in the sample evidence the sharp trend of decline in stock 
prices following the US shock. The jump in mean is also associated with the switch 
in variances, marked with especially high   
  (around 2 to 8 times higher than 
  
 )  varying across countries. Korea is the country in East Asia which experienced 
the highest volatility during the crisis, as well as the highest variation in volatility 
between the two regimes, even higher than the crisis-trigger, the US. This result is 
fairly consistent with the stylised fact that Korea had accumulated a very large 
portfolio flows before the crisis. Non-resident investors have accounted for one-
half of market capitalisation, making this country highly susceptible to changes in 
global market sentiments and the consequent deleveraging effects. The jump in 
means and variance is also quite drastic in Hong Kong and Singapore, as these two 
developed markets have a high proportion of foreign factors and tend to have 
stronger integration with AEs in North America and Europe. This is consistent with 
the financial literature, which proves that the higher the globalisation of an 
economy, the greater the incidence of volatility transmission as a result of the 
information generating process (Arago-Manzana et al., 2006). On the contrary, the 
degree of international integration is weaker for emerging East Asia (Thailand, 
Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia), partly due to the limitations on capital flows.  
The probabilities for the countries to stay in the same state (normal or crisis) are 
much higher than the probabilities of switching between different states, which 
implies that countries that remained in a stable state in a previous period intend to 
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stay in that stable situation now, while countries where crises broke out in a 
previous period find themselves dragged into deeper turmoil. In addition, the 
probability of staying in regime 2 is lower than in regime 1, which suggests that 
regime 1 is more persistent than regime 2. The expected durations indicate that on 
average all the series stay longer in regime 1 (25 weeks) than in regime 2 (6 
weeks). This may imply the short-lived effect of volatility spillovers. Indeed, the 
equity markets in Asia resumed quickly after the second quarter of 2009. The 
results also show strong lead-lag interactions in stock returns between East Asia 
and the US. All East Asian stock market returns are significantly affected by the 
previous one week return in the US market, but there is less significant evidence of 
interactions with European markets.  
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Table 3.6 - Estimated parameters of the MSMH(2)-VAR(1) model for composite stock returns 
  TL ID PH ML KR SG HK US EU 
Mean (µ1) 0.323** 0.789*** 0.662*** 0.436*** 0.678*** 0.508*** 0.394*** 0.271*** 0.295*** 
 
(0.145) (0.166) (0.157) (0.106) (0.151) (0.118) (0.126) (0.079) (0.131) 
Mean (µ2) -0.478 -0.860 -0.913** -0.631* -1.424** -1.035** -0.906* -0.855** -1.141** 
 
(0.519) (0.712) (0.413) (0.347) (0.656) (0.507) (0.512) (0.334) (0.493) 
Variance (σ21) 8.727*** 9.948*** 9.912*** 3.408*** 7.7918*** 4.571*** 5.490*** 2.577*** 6.371*** 
 
(0.554) (0.710) (0.734) (0.246) (0.571) (0.377) (0.389) (0.194) (0.531) 
Variance (σ22) 30.531*** 53.640*** 20.451*** 12.710*** 67.188*** 31.018*** 33.824*** 19.345*** 36.104*** 
 
(2.587) (4.672) (2.005) (1.205) (6.588) (1.599) (2.832) (1.757) (2.189) 
TL(-1) -0.100** 0.025 0.004 0.002 -0.067 -0.022 -0.038 -0.021 -0.055 
 
(0.047) (0.050) (0.049) (0.029) (0.043) (0.033) (0.034) (0.024) (0.039) 
ID(-1) 0.032 -0.112** -0.008 -0.019 -0.071 -0.023 -0.056 -0.027 0.033 
 
(0.044) (0.054) (0.045) (0.028) (0.045) (0.035) (0.036) (0.024) (0.040) 
PH(-1) 0.016 -0.074 -0.143*** -0.044 -0.006 -0.016 -0.030 -0.021 -0.103* 
 
(0.051) (0.061) (0.056) (0.034) (0.055) (0.042) (0.044) (0.030) (0.049) 
ML(-1) -0.278*** -0.313*** -0.108 0.003 -0.243*** -0.012 -0.089 0.011 -0.100 
 
(0.083) (0.100) (0.089) (0.058) (0.091) (0.070) (0.073) (0.054) (0.082) 
KR(-1) 0.127*** 0.097* -0.081* -0.046 -0.098** -0.005 0.012 -0.039 -0.039 
 
(0.047) (0.052) (0.044) (0.029) (0.050) (0.036) (0.037) (0.044) (0.044) 
SG(-1) 0.285*** 0.411*** 0.247*** 0.193*** 0.357*** 0.089 0.194** 0.162*** 0.246*** 
 
(0.098) (0.112) (0.094) (0.065) (0.109) (0.081) (0.084) (0.061) (0.093) 
HK(-1) -0.234*** -0.104 -0.022 -0.043 -0.206*** -0.112* -0.156*** -0.131*** -0.051 
 
(0.068) (0.075) (0.067) (0.046) (0.079) (0.057) (0.055) (0.040) (0.063) 
US(-1) 0.437*** 0.331*** 0.347*** 0.173*** 0.457*** 0.263*** 0.398*** -0.054 0.145* 
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(0.083) (0.096) (0.083) (0.052) (0.091) (0.064) (0.064) (0.054) (0.082) 
EU(-1) -0.172*** -0.032 -0.052 -0.010 0.123** -0.001 0.030 0.051 -0.108** 
 
(0.063) (0.070) (0.061) (0.039) (0.061) (0.044) (0.047) (0.037) (0.054) 
Ρ11 
       
0.959*** 
        (0.281) 
Ρ21        0.041*** 
     (0.012) 
Ρ12        0.169*** 
        (0.008) 
Ρ22 
       
0.831*** 
        (0.042) 
Expected duration of "stable" regime (Ds1) 
    
24.39 
Expected duration of "crisis" regime (Ds2) 
    
5.917 
Log Likelihood               -7970 
Notes:  *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
The number of lag for MS-VAR is 1, which is decided based on AIC 
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The same inference for the banking sector is shown by the estimated parameters 
reported in Table 3.7. There are also positive means and lower variances for the 
stable regime, but negative means and higher variances for the crisis regime. As 
the epicentres of the global financial crisis were the US and European banking 
sectors, who had wide exposure to securities backed by US subprime mortgages, 
they consequently incurred significant unexpected losses. Bank returns in those 
countries have higher variances than those of the aggregate markets during 
volatile regimes. These two crisis-originators also show the biggest variation of 
variances between the two regimes, around 8-12 times. In East Asia, volatilities in 
returns are not as sharp and persistent as those of the shock sources. 
  
  significantly double or triple   
  in emerging markets, while the variation 
between   
 and   
  are much higher in Hong Kong and Singapore as the two 
financial centres have a large incidence of foreign-owned bank presence and 
therefore tend to follow the crisis-originators. In general, East Asian banks’ direct 
exposures to toxic assets are quite limited, therefore the banking system only 
suffered from indirect effects of the turmoil caused by bank deleverage. Among 
emerging East Asia, Korea is more vulnerable to a systematic banking crisis 
because of the highly leveraged banking sector and remarkable increase in foreign 
short-term debts before the crisis period. This gives a good explanation for the 
extremely high variance in bank stock return series in this country during the 
crisis regime. The transition matrix shows that both regimes are quite stable and 
the probabilities of staying in the crisis regime are as high as in the stable regime 
(0.92 and 0.96, respectively). The duration of crisis regime is 12 weeks, which is 
double that of the returns on composite stock market indices. This may suggests 
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the greater volatility persistence and greater sensitivities in prices of the banking 
sectors compared to other industries in the equity markets.  
MS-VAR models also provide smoothed regime probabilities, as shown in Figures 
3.7 and 3.8. There are signs that shock from the US stock market in 2007-2008 
significantly affected the stock return structure in East Asian countries. We 
observe major shifts occurring at three important points of time. There is one that 
happened in late 2007, around the event of the suspension of the three funds of 
Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) Parisbas in August 2007. The major shift, which 
appears to be the most persistent one, followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008. The third one occurred in mid-2011, at the height of the 
European debt crisis. This may suggest integration between international stock 
markets and rapid transmission of information, which cause structural changes in 
prices in many markets simultaneously. However, it is interesting to examine the 
relative differences in responses to shocks between composite return series and 
bank return series. To confirm the analysis above, the overall market returns are 
more prone to shifts in regimes, while bank return series have tended to stay 
persistently in regime 2 since late 2007. It seems that a very significant adverse 
shock in the US might have destabilising impacts on the stock markets of many 
Asian economies via a deleveraging process. This process continues to have a 
greater impact on the banking sector following the massive European bank 
deleveraging in response to the rising turmoil in the euro zone area. 
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Table 3.7 - Estimated parameters of the MSMH(2)-VAR(1) model for bank stock returns 
  TL ID PH ML KR SG HK US EU 
Mean (µ1) 0.362** 0.711*** 0.603*** 0.445*** 0.496** 0.504*** 0.183* -0.029 0.202 
 
(0.218) (0.241) (0.173) (0.135) (0.227) (0.129) (0.110) (0.114) (0.152) 
Mean (µ2) -0.346 -0.138 -0.107 0.113 -0.324 -0.608* -0.111 -0.362 -1.050** 
 
(0.345) (0.405) (0.235) (0.201) (0.395) (0.215) (0.247) (0.367) (0.348) 
Variance (σ21) 13.959*** 20.419*** 7.639*** 3.961*** 15.228*** 4.077*** 3.382*** 4.621*** 8.074*** 
 
(1.134) (1.176) (0.627) (0.307) (1.268) (0.353) (0.321) (0.567) (0.997) 
Variance (σ22) 30.876*** 37.990*** 22.500*** 12.747*** 79.784*** 27.844*** 32.570*** 64.865*** 64.068*** 
 
(3.079) (3.343) (2.004) (1.221) (7.487) (2.706) (3.294) (7.074) (5.539) 
TL(-1) -0.084 -0.008 0.067 0.052* -0.039 0.045 0.045 -0.007 -0.023 
 
(0.051) (0.060) (0.042) (0.029) (0.060) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033) (0.042) 
ID(-1) 0.024 -0.207*** -0.027 -0.002 0.011 0.034 -0.006 -0.002 0.032 
 
(0.037) (0.040) (0.030) (0.019) (0.040) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) (0.029) 
PH(-1) 0.068 -0.043 -0.165*** -0.038 -0.002 -0.001 0.012 -0.056 -0.055 
 
(0.054) (0.059) (0.041) (0.027) (0.055) (0.027) (0.027) (0.042) (0.041) 
ML(-1) 0.036 0.016 0.046 0.049 -0.181* -0.015 -0.109** 0.045 -0.094 
 
(0.084) (0.095) (0.068) (0.045) (0.098) (0.054) (0.048) (0.062) (0.070) 
KR(-1) 0.053 0.109** -0.030 -0.036* -0.102** 0.014 0.017 0.049* 0.066** 
 
(0.039) (0.043) (0.031) (0.022) (0.046) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028) (0.033) 
SG(-1) 0.241*** 0.283*** 0.252*** 0.137*** 0.318*** 0.017 0.071 -0.003 0.155** 
 
(0.082) (0.093) (0.063) (0.045) (0.045) (0.053) (0.049) (0.065) (0.069) 
HK(-1) -0.228*** -0.014 -0.017 -0.016 -0.229*** -0.043 -0.034 -0.076 0.005 
 
(0.069) (0.079) (0.057) (0.043) (0.085) (0.052) (0.049) (0.061) (0.069) 
JP(-1) -0.043 -0.078 -0.037 -0.006 -0.205*** -0.057* -0.110*** -0.051 -0.159*** 
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(0.059) (0.067) (0.045) (0.032) (0.066) (0.034) (0.031) (0.039) (0.044) 
US(-1) 0.082** 0.125** 0.143*** 0.073** 0.161** 0.108** 0.117*** -0.064* 0.090** 
 
(0.041) (0.057) (0.043) (0.031) (0.068) (0.043) (0.043) (0.037) (0.057) 
EU(-1) -0.99** -0.013 -0.071 -0.032 0.109* -0.047 0.009 -0.072* -0.119** 
 
(0.048) (0.064) (0.045) (0.032) (0.064) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043) (0.049 
Ρ11 
       
0.964*** 
        (0.329) 
Ρ21        0.036*** 
     (0.012) 
Ρ12        0.077*** 
        (0.002) 
Ρ22 
       
0.923*** 
        (0.025) 
Expected duration of "stable" regime (Ds1) 
    
25.641 
Expected duration of "crisis" regime (Ds2) 
    
12.987 
Log Likelihood               -9182 
Notes:  *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
The number of lag for MS-VAR is 1, which is decided based on AIC 
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Figure 3-7 - Smooth Probabilities of crisis regime for market stock returns 
 
Figure 3-8 - Smooth Probabilities of crisis regime for bank stock returns 
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3.5.1.2. Foreign Exchange Markets 
The returns in nominal foreign exchange rates are also shown by two different 
regimes. Regime 1 (stable state) is characterised by negative means and low 
variances, implying a slight appreciation of the domestic currency against the US 
dollar. The switch to regime 2 (crisis state) is associated with positive average 
returns accompanied by a higher level of volatility, suggesting mounting pressures 
on the foreign exchange rates. Capital flows out of the region as a consequence of 
massive sell-offs by international investors and the continued reversal of the carry 
trade leads to the sharp depreciation of local currencies across countries, although 
to a different extent. Currency volatility shocks appear to be more serious in Korea 
as the shift in the Korean won is the most drastic, marked by the highest difference 
in mean and an especially high variance in regime 2, as well as the largest spread 
between   
  and   
  (more than 14 times). Indonesia is also a country with high 
variation in volatility between the two regimes (more than 10 times). There is a 
persistence to stay in regimes rather than to switch, since p11 and p22 are all high 
(more than 0.8) and significant at the level of 1%.  
The expected duration in the stable regime is around 20 weeks and in the crisis 
regime for around 5 weeks. As the parameters of the exchange rate series appear 
to be consistent with those of the composite stock return series, this may indicate 
the interrelation between the stock market and foreign exchange market. There 
may be volatility spillovers between these two market segments. This is consistent 
with the findings of Maghrebi et al. (2006), who provide evidence for the dynamic 
relationship between stock market volatility and foreign exchange fluctuation in 
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Asia Pacific countries36. The estimated results in Table 3.9 also confirm the lead-lag 
interaction of Asian local currencies. In particular, the strength of the Singapore 
dollar has some predictive power on other currencies in the region, as its lagged 
coefficients with the others are all positive and significant at a level of 1%. The 
regime smooth probabilities in Figure 3.9 capture well the period of global 
financial market turbulence. The most obvious shift occurs on the depth of the US 
subprime crisis in late 2008 (i.e. after the collapse of Lehman Brothers). In general, 
this picture shows the coherence in behavioural responses with that of the stock 
returns. There is also a jump in late 2005, which may be caused by local shock but 
it is not particularly persistent. However, compared to equity markets, foreign 
exchange rates appear to be more stable after the first half of 2009. The reason is 
that immediately after the Lehman affair, authorities in East Asian countries had 
time-line intervention to stabilise foreign exchange markets, such as use of official 
reserves, arranging stand-by loans from the World Bank and ADB, introducing 
foreign exchange swap facilities and lowering reserve requirements in foreign 
currency deposits.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 Maghrebi et al. (2006) show that “bad news about equity accompanied with currency 
depreciation is likely to generate higher volatility in foreign exchange markets and that such 
depreciations have also the potential of whittling down the leverage effects” (Maghrebi et al., 2006, 
p.253). 
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Table 3.8 - Estimated parameters of the MSMH(2)-VAR(3) model for foreign exchange rates 
  TL ID PH ML KR SG 
Mean (µ1) -0.091** -0.077* -0.160*** -0.120*** -0.106** -0.121*** 
 
(0.038) (0.046) (0.038) (0.031) (0.046) (0.027) 
Mean (µ2) 0.065 0.214 0.299*** 0.223** 0.579** 0.151 
 
(0.087) (0.210) (0.093) (0.091) (0.234) (0.101) 
Variance (σ21) 0.338*** 0.566*** 0.546*** 0.410*** 0.854*** 0.329*** 
 
(0.021) (0.046) (0.036) (0.021) (0.066) (0.021) 
Variance (σ22) 0.529*** 6.530*** 1.128*** 0.991*** 12.058*** 1.883*** 
 
(0.080) (0.971) (0.156) (0.130) (1.180) (0.283) 
TL(-1) 0.011 -0.135* -0.009 -0.041 -0.082 -0.041 
 
(0.040) (0.072) (0.048) (0.042) (0.082) (0.045) 
ID(-1) -0.022 -0.085** -0.017 -0.035* 0.004 0.042* 
 
(0.020) (0.036) (0.023) (0.020) (0.043) (0.022) 
PH(-1) 0.060* -0.133** -0.095** -0.084** -0.046 -0.097*** 
 
(0.032) (0.054) (0.037) (0.035) (0.069) (0.036) 
ML(-1) -0.104*** -0.072 -0.002 -0.157*** -0.093 -0.069 
 
(0.041) (0.075) (0.048) (0.048) (0.082) (0.047) 
KR(-1) -0.001 0.048 -0.017 0.005 -0.224*** 0.043 
 
(0.017) (0.035) (0.022) (0.022) (0.040) (0.024) 
SG(-1) 0.271*** 0.208*** 0.268*** 0.347*** 0.732*** -0.094** 
 
(0.037) (0.063) (0.047) (0.042) (0073) (0.044) 
Ρ11 0.951*** 
 (0.012) 
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Ρ21 0.049*** 
 (0.0005) 
Ρ12 0.189*** 
 (0.044) 
Ρ22 0.811*** 
 (0.188) 
Expected duration of "stable" regime (Ds1) 20.408 
Expected duration of "crisis" regime (Ds2) 5.291 
Log Likelihood -2368 
Notes:  *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
The number of lag for MS-VAR is 3, which is decided based on AIC 
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Figure 3-9 – Smooth Probabilities of crisis regime for foreign exchange rates 
 
3.5.1.3. Credit Derivative Markets 
The estimated parameters shown in Table 3.9 provide evidence of structural 
breaks in the volatility of CDS spread series, while the mean parameters are not 
always significant at conventional levels. The variances in regime 2 are 
significantly higher than those of regime 1 in all countries. We can observe the 
remarkable variation in variances between the two regimes in the crisis generator, 
the US, where   
  is 82 times higher than   
 . The variations are around 8 to 10 
times in emerging East Asia, while they are quite limited in Hong Kong (around 1.5 
times).  As a net creditor economy supported by strong fundamentals, Hong Kong 
has been highly rated and suffered moderate increases in sovereign CDS spreads 
(less than 100 basis points according to the data) in the aftermath of the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. On the other hand, emerging East Asia are net 
debtor economies, which have been evaluated as being more risky and therefore 
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saw an unprecedented surge in CDS spreads during the period. For example, 
spreads increased by approximately 885 basis points in Indonesia and 500 basis 
points in Thailand, Malaysia and Korea. The model estimation delivers 88.5% for 
    and 32.8% for    . This implies that there is a higher probability for regime 2 
to switch to regime 1 than to stay in that regime. On average, the market spends 
8.5 successive weeks in the stable regime, while time in the crisis regime would 
end after about 1.5 weeks. The smooth probabilities also confirm that during the 
period from September 2007 to the end of 2008, the high volatility regime rose 
steeply; therefore it was not particularly persistent. Weeks with positive means 
and high volatilities cluster with weeks with negative means and low volatilities. 
The high volatility regime returns in mid-2010, which coincides with the debt 
crisis in Greece. However, it occurs over a very short period of time and then 
rapidly switches to a stable regime. The estimated autoregressive parameters 
show no significant evidence of lead-lag interactions between CDS markets in East 
Asia and those of the US and Greece.  
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Table 3.9 - Estimated parameters of the MSIH(2)-VAR(1) model for CDS 
  TL ID PH ML KR HK US GR 
Mean (µ1) -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 0.005 0.011 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Mean (µ2) 0.089** 0.031 0.028 0.075* 0.054 0.075 0.205 0.075*** 
 
(0.036) (0.033) (0.031) (0.040) (0.036) (0.066) (0.139) (0.031) 
Variance (σ21) 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Variance (σ22) 0.069*** 0.046*** 0.040*** 0.070*** 0.045*** 0.160*** 0.744*** 0.043*** 
 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.036) (0.169) (0.010) 
TL(-1) 0.089 0.141* 0.167** 0.149 0.189* -0.108 0.131 0.225* 
 
(0.093) (0.079) (0.073) (0.099) (0.097) (0.133) (0.127) (0.128) 
ID(-1) -0.281 -0.093 -0.063 -0.312 -0.175 0.277 -0.192 -0.486** 
 
(0.182) (0.160) (0.147) (0.194) (0.188) (0.222) (0.216) (0.222) 
PH(-1) 0.450** 0.056 0.064 0.479** 0.331 -0.203 0.432* 0.202 
 
(0.210) (0.182) (0.167) (0.219) (0.215) (0.253) (0.242) (0.259) 
ML(-1) -0.476*** -0.299*** -0.257** -0.437*** -0.539*** 0.316 -0.404** -0.015 
 
(0.128) (0.112) (0.103) (0.137) (0.135) (0.202) (0.192) (0.202) 
KR(-1) 0.361*** 0.199** 0.117 0.274** 0.362*** -0.042 0.148 0.192 
 
(0.109) (0.093) (0.086) (0.117) (0.115) (0.141) (0.139) (0.143) 
HK(-1) -0.036 0.008 -0.001 -0.028 -0.015 -0.070* -0.031 -0.011 
 
(0.037) (0.029) (0.028) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.045) 
US(-1) -0.028 -0.004 -0.002 -0.018 -0.016 0.008 -0.021 -0.005 
 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
GR(-1) -0.040 -0.034 -0.010 0.009 0.001 -0.010 0.063 -0.103 
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(0.057) (0.045) (0.042) (0.060) (0.060) (0.067) (0.065) (0.061) 
Ρ11 
     
0.885*** 
      (0.024) 
Ρ21      0.115*** 
   (0.003) 
Ρ12      0.671*** 
      (0.078) 
Ρ22 
     
0.329*** 
      (0.038) 
Expected duration of "stable" regime (Ds1) 
  
8.695 
Expected duration of "crisis" regime (Ds2) 
  
1.488 
Log Likelihood         2199 
Notes:  *, ** and*** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels, respectively 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
The number of lag for MS-VAR is 1, which is decided based on AIC 
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Figure 3-10 – Smooth Probabilities of crisis regimes for CDS 
 
3.5.2. Testing for “Shift – Contagion” Effects 
Although the volatility regime switching analysis with MS-VAR analysed in 3.5.1 
provides insight into the impact and volatility spillovers from the US subprime 
credit crisis to East Asian financial markets, it does not persuasively indicate the 
presence of a shift-contagion effect. The reason behind these abnormally high 
variance episodes may be the continuality of financial interdependence which 
existed in the tranquil period or the common shock that simultaneously leads to 
deterioration in the fundamentals in several economies. Moreover, the MSMH-VAR 
specifications also deliver covariance matrices which vary across regimes (see 
Appendices 3.1-3.4). However, the change in covariance and the implied 
correlations is conditional on the increase in volatility during the turmoil and is not 
relevant for detecting the presence of shift contagion. Therefore, in order to justify 
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the contagion effects, we develop our arguments with a cross-market 
unconditional correlations analysis.    
We apply the extended multivariate regression framework of the unconditional 
correlation tests to our analysis of the contagion effect and estimate the system of 
equation 3.15 as seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) while controlling for 
heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlations. Tables 3.10, 3.11, 3.12 and 
3.13 show the estimated parameters for coefficient vectors θ which capture 
contagion effects for composite stock return series, bank stock returns, foreign 
exchange rates and sovereign CDS spreads series37. They all indicate that there is 
no robust evidence of “shift contagion” from the US and Europe to East Asian 
countries. Instead, East Asian asset return volatility regimes following the US and 
European shocks are more likely to be caused by normal interdependence, 
common shock and/or country-specific risk factors.  
Three exceptional cases are observed in stock returns’ estimations in Thailand, 
Korea and Malaysia. The simultaneous (unconditional) correlations between 
S&P500 and SET; Euro Stoxx and KLPI; Euro Stoxx and KOSPI increased 
significantly in high volatility regime, which justifies the shift-contagion from the 
US to Thailand and from European to Malaysian and Korean equity markets. The 
outcome of “shift-contagion” in Thailand following volatility shock in the US lends 
supports to Mullainathan (2002) who explains that investors may imperfectly 
recall past events. A negative shock triggers investors’ memories, inducing them to 
assign a higher probability of a bad state for countries which used to experience 
financial crises even their current fundamentals are not correlated with the crisis-
originator. Turning into Korea, it is consistent with the analysis in MS-VAR which 
                                                          
37 The full results for equation 3.15 regressions are presented in the Appendices 3.5-3.8. 
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shows a drastic jump in Korea’s asset return volatilities. Due to the large 
proportion with foreign factor in domestic market, this country appears to be very 
sensitive to global investors’ sentiments, as it experienced a structural shift in its 
interdependence with the US, EU and Thailand. However, it is surprising to find 
that unconditional correlations between Thailand and EU, Philippines and US and 
Korea and US decline significantly when they all enter a high-volatility period. As 
proved by Dungey et al. (2006), the sign of correlation change can be ambiguous. 
Negative correlation during a crisis period may be due to the “flight home effect”, 
when domestic investors tend to repatriate their funds after facing with financial 
turmoil in AEs. This may explain why cross-country portfolio diversification 
strategies are still attractive.  
Although our results have not provided convincing support of structural changes 
in transmission mechanisms between AEs in the US and Europe and East Asia, 
there is some evidence to confirm that regional equity market integration 
intensifies during crisis period. As can be seen in the Table 3.10, the unconditional 
correlations in contemporaneous stock returns between Malaysia and Thailand, 
and Hong Kong and Indonesia are significantly strengthened in the highly volatile 
regime compared to the normal regime. Thai volatility shock is also contagious to 
Korea, while pressure on the Philippine stock market may trigger a significant 
downward trend in stock returns in Indonesia and Malaysia. With regard to Asian 
financial centres, our results suggest that Hong Kong tends to export its volatility 
shock to Singapore, while it may suffer some contagion effects from Indonesia via 
transmission channels that did not exist during the tranquil period. Previous 
papers discover equity market contagion in East Asia during the 1997 financial 
crisis (Sebastien, 2003; Yang and Lim, 2004; Chiang et al., 2007); our empirical 
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results confirm that this effect may also happen with an external shock and that 
financial contagion seems to be more regional than global. 
For bank stock returns series, estimated results in Table 3.11 indicate that 
correlation structures between AEs and East Asian countries are constant over the 
analysed period, as verified by the estimated coefficients θUS and θEU, which are 
either negative or positive but without any conventional significant level. 
Therefore, there is no additional change in the transmission mechanisms during 
the crisis regime. The increased co-movement observed following major 
corrections from leading markets may be a consequence of an adjustment in the 
covariance structure of returns. In other words, the increased magnitude in the 
covariate structure is offset by an equivalent magnitude of volatility. Similar to the 
composite return series, bank stock returns appear to be more responsive to 
regional than global factors. For example, Hong Kong bank returns increase their 
dependence on Thailand’s and Singapore’s during a high volatility regime. But the 
opposite directions have not been obvious; i.e., shock in Hong Kong bank returns 
has not yielded significant effects on those of Singapore and Thailand. Bank returns 
in Malaysia depend on shocks in Indonesia and Thailand. This may suggest that 
local investors may look to their neighbours for any signal as to whether or not 
global financial turmoil in North America and Europe may affect Asia. On a 
completely contradictory picture, transmission mechanisms between Singapore 
and Malaysia become weaker after the breakout of a crisis elsewhere.  
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Table 3.10 - Unconditional correlation tests (Dungey et al., 2004) for composite stock returns 
 
  TL ID PH ML KR SG HK 
θTL   -0.055 0.081 0.259** 0.424** 0.013 0.029 
 
 
(0.109) (0.103) (0.100) (0.124) (0.082) (0.099) 
θID -0.140 
 
0.080 0.044 0.194 -0.078 0.315*** 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.094) (0.096) (0.122) (0.078) (0.091) 
θPH 0.125 0.295** 
 
0.262** -0.121 0.023 -0.228** 
 
(0.130) (0.120) 
 
(0.113) (0.149) (0.095) (0.113) 
θML 0.229** 0.034 0.073 
 
-0.186 -0.132 -0.159 
 
(0.114) (0.110) (0.101) 
 
(0.131) (0.081) (0.099) 
θKR -0.027 0.036 -0.091 -0.101 
 
-0.010 -0.112 
 
(0.086) (0.085) (0.081) (0.080) 
 
(0.064) (0.075) 
θSG -0.042 -0.229* -0.067 -0.296** 0.084 
 
0.153 
 
(0.139) (0.132) (0.126) (0.121) (0.156) 
 
(0.105) 
θHK -0.006 0.335*** -0.189* -0.176* -0.026 0.167**  
 
(0.117) (0.110) (0.106) (0.104) (0.130) (0.074)  
θUS 0.199** 0.114 -0.190** -0.083 -0.476*** 0.095 0.008 
 
(0.095) (0.092) (0.086) (0.085) (0.099) (0.068) (0.082) 
θEU -0.244** -0.210 0.111 0.189* 0.304** 0.029 -0.098 
  (0.115) (0.111) (0.105) (0.103) (0.126) (0.081) (0.100) 
R2 0.571 0.690 0.580 0.674 0.701 0.848 0.774 
F-Statistic 31.295 52.471 32.494 48.583 55.122 131.673 80.498 
p-value [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Notes: SUR estimates of a system of equation 3.15 . *, ** and *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 3.11 - Unconditional correlation tests (Dungey et al., 2004) for bank stock returns 
  TL ID PH ML KR SG HK 
θTL 
 
-0.044 0.045 0.165* -0.04 0.084 0.239* 
 
 
(0.098) (0.105) (0.099) (0.126) (0.093) (0.123) 
θID -0.027 
 
0.011 0.235** 0.124 0.088 0.126 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.111) (0.106) (0.135) (0.101) (0.134) 
θPH 0.014 -0.093 
 
0.118 -0.111 0.151* -0.037 
 
(0.099) (0.092) 
 
(0.094) (0.120) (0.088) (0.118) 
θML 0.111 0.133 0.101 
 
-0.217* -0.128** 0.015 
 
(0.103) (0.097) (0.103) 
 
(0.125) (0.090) (0.123) 
θKR -0.141* -0.066 -0.131 -0.151* 
 
0.081 0.029 
 
(0.085) (0.080) (0.086) (0.082) 
 
(0.076) (0.101) 
θSG 0.006 -0.004 0.097 -0.235** 0.206 
 
0.254** 
 
(0.111) (0.105) (0.111) (0.103) (0.134) 
 
(0.124) 
θHK 0.054 0.008 -0.035 -0.046 0.003 0.015 
 
 
(0.089) (0.085) (0.091) (0.086) (0.107) (0.076) 
 θUS 0.026 -0.062 -0.146** -0.013 0.131 0.051 -0.069 
 
(0.073) (0.069) (0.074) (0.071) (0.089) (0.066) (0.087) 
θEU -0.042 0.024 0.095 0.002 -0.028 -0.088 -0.133 
 
(0.091) (0.086) (0.923) (0.087) (0.109) (0.081) (0.108) 
R2 0.432 0.468 0.527 0.562 0.535 0.778 0.706 
F-Statistic 17.889 20.698 26.19 32.482 27.019 82.655 56.552 
p-value [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Notes: SUR estimates of a system of equation 3.15 .  *, ** and *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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In foreign exchange markets, the estimated parameters demonstrate 
comprehensive evidence of strong regional transmission effects. This suggests 
distinctive features of local currency integration and competitive adjustments in 
exchange rates. Table 3.12 shows the overall improvement in correlation 
coefficients in the crisis regime between many pairs of local currencies. For 
example, Thai baht and Malaysian ringgit appeared to have a causal relationship 
with each other. Malaysian ringgit also has a significant influence on Singapore 
dollar, whereas the depreciation of the Philippine peso may trigger the 
depreciation of the Korean won. The Indonesian rupiah significantly strengthens 
its correlation with the Thai baht when the market encounters volatility shock. 
Central bank interventions may play an important role in the collective behaviours 
in regional exchange rate networks (Feng et al., 2010). Generally speaking, given 
highly intra-regional and inter-regional trade integration, some of the economies 
in East Asia monitor their neighbours’ exchange rates and attempt to keep the 
relative value of their currencies in line with the values of selected regional 
currencies to maintain the competitiveness of a nation’s exports in global markets.  
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Table 3.12 - Unconditional correlation tests (Dungey et al., 2004) for FOREX 
  TL ID PH ML KR SG 
θTL 
 
0.435** 0.069 0.224** -0.247 -0.049 
 
 
(0.186) (0.116) (0.097) (0.214) (0.136) 
θID 0.011 
 
-0.103 -0.160*** -0.103 -0.123 
 (0.076) 
 
(0.071) (0.059) (0.132) (0.084) 
θPH 0.058 0.185 
 
0.115 1.268*** -0.290** 
 (0.126) (0.189) 
 
(0.098) (0.197) (0.138) 
θML 0.257* 0.255 0.093 
 
-0.137 0.596*** 
 (0.139) (0.209) (0.130) 
 
(0.243) (0.136) 
θKR -0.184** -0.067 -0.102 -0.242*** 0.092 
 (0.073) (0.112) (0.065) (0.057) 
 
(0.082) 
θSG -0.235** -0.171 -0.081 0.002 0.239 
 
 
(0.094) (0.145) (0.089) (0.068) (0.166) 
 R2 0.292 0.363 0.412 0.600 0.415 0.446 
F-Statistic 11.167 15.387 18.950 40.633 19.150 21.820 
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: SUR estimates of a system of equation 3.15 .  *, ** and *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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The estimated parameters in Table 3.13 also confirm that there is no shift-
contagion from the rising sovereign risks of the US to East Asian economies. In 
other words, international transmission mechanisms remain unchanged and 
volatility spillovers via the CDS market are just a reaction to common shock. 
However, it is interesting to see that the shift-contagion occurred in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Hong Kong following the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, as their 
contemporaneous correlations with Greece significantly intensify in the high 
volatility regime. Moreover, we also observe shift-contagion appearing in the 
cluster of countries with similar fundamentals. For example, the correlation 
structure between Indonesia and Thailand, Indonesia and Korea, and Philippines 
and Malaysia improves following the volatility shock. Philippines and Korea also 
show the evolution of integration with Malaysia during the crisis. This may reflect 
that markets have the same assessment of country credit risk in the region and 
external shocks seem to have strengthened the correlation structures between 
markets within the region. 
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Table 3.13 - Unconditional correlation tests (Dungey et al., 2004) for CDS 
  TL ID PH ML KR HK 
θTL 
 
0.513*** -0.563*** 0.088 -0.738*** 0.354 
 
 
(0.119) (0.102) (0.063) (0.102) (0.513) 
θID 0.581*** -0.066 -0.443*** 0.597*** -0.001 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.075) (0.097) (0.117) (0.564) 
θPH -0.908*** 0.098 
 
0.478*** -0.567*** 0.098 
 
(0.163) (0.098) 
 
(0.103) (0.146) (0.650) 
θML 1.154*** -1.229*** 1.108*** 0.529*** -0.779 
 
(0.134) (0.187) (0.148) 
 
(0.147) (0.867) 
θKR -1.117*** 0.836*** -0.536*** 0.012 
 
-0.148 
 
(0.141) (0.131) (0.128) (0.087) 
 
(0.166) 
ΘHK 0.048 -0.002 -0.008 -0.017 -0.061 
 
 
(0.046) (0.041) (0.036) (0.031) (0.039) 
 ΘUS 0.059 0.051 -0.042 -0.047 -0.059 -0.059 
 
(0.046) (0.042) (0.037) (0.031) (0.039) (0.166) 
ΘGR -0.113 0.137** -0.108* 0.103** -0.121* 0.597** 
 
(0.077) (0.068) (0.060) (0.052) (0.065) (0.270) 
R2 0.892 0.914 0.931 0.994 0.895 0.1393 
F-Statistic 109.38 140.79 176.80 222.728 112.08 2.126 
p-value [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
Notes: SUR estimates of a system of equation 3.15 .  *, ** and *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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3.6. Conclusions  
This chapter empirically investigates financial contagion via asset prices during the 
2007-2011 global financial crisis. It focuses on the US and Europe as the source 
countries (US as the subprime crisis originator and Europe as the epicentre of the 
sovereign debt crisis) which exported their financial volatility to East Asia. 
Although empirical literature on asset price volatility linkages and contagion is 
extensive, the methodologies are subjective to some specific statistical problems, 
making it difficult to assess its significance in shock transmission. For example, the 
conditional correlation test (e.g. King and Wadhwani, 1990) does not take into 
account the presence of heteroskedasticity, while unconditional correlation 
(Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) has sample selection bias and works only with 
bivariate testing. The GARCH models is more likely to deal with time series 
properties of asset prices and volatility modelling, but fails to capture theoretical 
arguments of multiple equilibria associated with asset return behaviour during the 
financial crisis. The DCC and DCC-GARCH can only identify the overall trend in 
dynamic covariance but are unable to detect the breakpoint times that the jumps 
to crisis state may happen and duration of the shift between states. 
Using MS-VAR model and multivariate unconditional correlation test in testing 
contagion, this study not only addresses the theoretical assumptions about 
multiple equilibria and nonlinear linkages, but also handles the problems of 
heteroskedasticity, endogeneity, simultaneous equation and sample selection bias. 
The empirical results within the MS-VAR framework evidence the structural 
changes in volatility across different regimes in all variable series, for all countries 
in the sample, and confirm that the increase in financial market volatility coincided 
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with the global financial crisis of 2007-2011. Specifically, when the US and 
European financial markets switched from a normal regime (low volatility) to a 
crisis one (high volatility), this was followed by the increasing volatility of the East 
Asian financial markets. Despite the strong fundamentals and more resilient 
financial systems that have been built up since the 1997 financial crisis, East Asia is 
still very vulnerable to external financial shock. However, there is cross-country 
heterogeneity in the nature and severity of the spillovers to East Asia financial 
markets, depending on either their economic situation or the level of financial 
openness. In particular, Korea and the financial centres of Hong Kong and 
Singapore, which have a higher degree of financial openness and a large share of 
foreign participation in their domestic markets, tend to suffer more from volatility 
spillovers from AEs in the US and Europe. 
The estimated parameters from unconditional correlation multivariate testing 
explain that international volatility spillovers are more likely caused by real 
linkages or interdependence rather than shift contagion. This means that 
transmission mechanisms remain unchanged and the observed increased co-
movement of asset returns after major market corrections arise due to the change 
in covariate structure. However, there is some evidence of significant increase in 
cross-market linkages in some pairs of East Asian countries after volatility shock 
elsewhere. There may be also directional transfer of shocks. For example, the stock 
return volatility in the US and EU did not have direct contemporaneous effects on 
all East Asian countries at the same time, but it may have exported its volatility 
first to Hong Kong via direct financial linkages, and then Hong Kong volatility 
shock may have caused shift-contagion in Singapore and Indonesia. Another 
example is that turbulence in the global financial market may trigger investors’ 
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memory of the past crisis in Thailand, leading them to withdraw from this country. 
Shock in Thailand stock market may then be exported to its neighbours such as 
Malaysia and Korea. Some evidence of regional contagion has been also reflected in 
foreign exchange markets and credit derivative markets. While the stronger intra-
regional linkages in exchange rates may reflect inter-regional and intra-regional 
trade links, the interactions between equity markets, and sovereign debt markets 
in the region may be due to the fact that markets have the same assessment of 
country credit risk in the region, making those countries more vulnerable to wake-
up call effects. In some cases, asset return correlations between markets even 
decrease significantly during the crisis regime, which implies that the international 
portfolio diversification still benefits international investors, but they need to take 
a different kind of risk into account for their portfolio choices after negative shocks. 
In general, fundamental-based contagion is more common than investor-based 
contagion (or shift-contagion) which may imply that the most important strategy 
to mitigate the contagion effect is to strengthen domestic economies.  There are 
several possible reasons for the minimal shift-contagion effects during the global 
financial crisis: 
- Investors had improved their approach to risk analysis, learning from the series 
of financial crises in the 1990s. They appear to be better at discriminating between 
different economies, especially EMEs, based on the improved information systems 
of individual country characteristics and policies.  
- The development of early-warning models made investors, international financial 
institutions and governments more adept at predicting countries’ vulnerability to 
financial crises. Despite the fact that most of the 1990s’ EME financial crises came 
155 | P a g e  
 
as surprises, these models, although far from perfect, still have some power in 
monitoring and predicting risks in individual countries. 
- The most important reason is the significant economic and financial reforms in 
East Asian countries after the regional financial crisis of 1997-1998, which helped 
to reduce regional vulnerability to external shocks. Such reforms contributed to 
the shift in current accounts from deficit to surplus, higher international reserves, 
more flexible exchange rates, lower rates of inflation, more responsible fiscal 
policies, and stronger corporate and banking sector financial positions. 
Furthermore, the government, central banks and other authorities in these 
countries have implied timeline measures to support equity and other asset prices 
such as restrictions on short sales of equities (in Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and 
Indonesia), tax incentives for investors to hold mutual funds for longer periods (in 
Korea), capital injection into special purpose vehicles for investment in 
undervalued companies (in Malaysia), and easing conditions on regulations and 
taxations to boost the markets (in Philippines and Thailand). 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR – CROSS-BORDER BANKING AND 
TRANSMISSION OF INTERBANK MARKET TENSIONS FROM 
AEs TO EAST ASIA 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Cross-border banking has expanded dramatically since the 1990s and has been 
dominated by a few AEs and financial centres, which form “core nodes” in the 
international banking system (IMF, 2011). In EMEs, despite the fact that cross-
border exposure remains relatively small, international banks have started to play 
an important role as active investors during the last two decades. The expansion of 
international bank operations in EMEs is a consequence of financial liberalisation, 
the introduction of sophisticated new financial services and the search for higher 
yields in the environment of low global interest rates (Herrmann and Mihaljek, 
2010). Emerging Asian countries lag behind the CEEs38 and Latin America in 
foreign bank penetration and cross-border banking activities (Hohl et al., 2006). 
After experiencing a sharp reversal following the 1997-1998 regional financial 
crisis, cross-border banking flows recovered in 2003 and helped to stimulate 
growth in certain market segments, particularly in consumer finance.  
 The turmoil in international credit markets and large write-downs39 by some of 
the major international financial institutions during the 2007-2011 global financial 
crisis have raised questions about the role of multinational banks in transmitting 
                                                          
38 CEE: Croatia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia and Turkey. 
39 The IFM (2010) estimates that banks’ worldwide credit-related write-downs were around 
US$ 1.6 trillion between mid-2007 and end-2009. 
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liquidity shocks to EMEs through various channels such as reductions in their 
cross-border claims on public, private, and banking sectors; sales or scaling down 
of non-core, non-domestic businesses in host countries; deleveraging by 
subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks with reduced funding flows from 
parents; and increased costs of borrowing for subsidiaries (Feyen et al., 2012). 
Evidence from BIS data reveals that after adjusting for changes in exchange rates, 
from the peak in March 2008, cross-border claims of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis 
East Asia as well as other EMEs fell sharply, which had negative spillover effects 
for domestic real economies and intensified the tensions in many financial market 
segments in the region. Further deepening of the euro debt crisis, accompanied by 
the deleveraging process by European banks, continued to challenge the credit 
environment in Asia. Anecdotal information suggests that trade financing 
experienced a significant decline in Hong Kong and Singapore at the end of 2011. 
According to a lending survey by the Institute of International Finance, emerging 
Asia, CEE and Latin America faced tighter credit standards in 2011 and the 
deterioration in lending conditions continued for the third consecutive quarter in 
2012. All of this has brought back the picture of a repeated episode of the credit 
squeeze suffered by the region during the height of the 1997-1998 financial crisis. 
This chapter analyses the magnitude of cross-border banking exposure in East Asia 
and the cross-border contagion in loan provision by multinational banks. The cross 
– border banking discussed in this study most refers to cross-border capital flows 
and cross-border entry by banks (i.e. foreign establishment in a host market) and 
relates to the first and the third form under the GATS framework (Claessens, 
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2006)40. Using the BIS consolidated banking statistics, we first characterise the 
evolution of cross-border banking activities in East Asia and explore how these 
exposures may facilitate shock propagation. Next, we utilise locational bank 
statistics41 to analyse the sudden stop in international lending associated with (i) 
liquidity shock in international credit markets that affects the supply of bank loans, 
(ii) host country aggregate productivity shock that diminishes bank loan demand, 
(iii) the contagion effect via the common lender and wake-up call channels, and (iv) 
adverse feedback from the sudden stop in international lending flows to the 
tension in host countries’ interbank markets. We relate our analysis to the 
theoretical literature on international bank behaviour and its important role in the 
transmission of shocks across countries via common lender and wake-up call 
effects. The existing empirical literature explains the push (home) and pull (host) 
factors of capital flows and uses traditional methodologies of gravity models and 
base regression to measure the waves in gross cross-border banking flows. In 
contrast to this literature, the approach here is to employ the univariate and 
recursive bivariate probit models to quantify the marginal effects of several global 
and country-specific risk factors on the probability of sudden stop and the link 
between the sudden stop and the host country interbank market tensions. 
Moreover, this research is part of the very limited literature to document the 
contagion effect in cross-border lending flows in EMEs, taking into account the 
                                                          
40 Claessens (2006) reviews four forms of cross-border use or provision of financial services as 
follows: (i) the first mode is cross-border supply of traditional trade in goods and services (i.e. in 
the context of finance this means capital flows); (ii) the second mode is consumption abroad, e.g., 
obtaining some financial services while travelling; (iii) the third mode relates to the production of a 
good or service within the country, which means foreign establishment in a host market; and (iv) 
the fourth mode is delivery by the presence of persons in the host country, e.g., solicitation of 
insurance products by agents travelling to the country. 
41 The use of BIS locational statistics instead of consolidated data to analyse cross-border shock 
transmission in international lending is more relevant because they measure cross-border lending 
consistent with the principles underlying national accounts and balance payment statistics.  
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“flight-home effect” caused by the active repatriation of funds invested abroad by 
host country residents during financial crises. The panel regressions are estimated 
based on quarterly data of external assets and liabilities from BIS reporting banks 
to seven East Asian economies from 1996 - 2011, the period involving both the 
1997-1998 regional financial crisis and the 2007-2011 global financial crisis.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the 
theoretical literature and empirical evidence for the sudden stop in cross-border 
banking flows during the financial crisis. Section 4.3 highlights various stylised 
facts of cross-border banking involvement in East Asia and the potential 
vulnerability to funding shock transmission. In section 4.4, the probability of the 
reversal in international bank lending flows associated with financial stress at the 
global, home and host country levels is tested. The link between the sudden stop 
and the interbank market tensions is also assessed. Section 4.5 offers some 
conclusions and policy implications.  
4.2. Literature Review: Cross-border Banking and the Sudden Stop in 
International Lending 
4.2.1. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical literature investigating the systematic risk of financial contagion 
associated with cross-border banking has strongly focused on the “sudden-stop” in 
international lending flows during period of financial crises. The episodes are 
explained and supported by two hypotheses: the common lender hypothesis and 
the wake-up call hypothesis.  
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4.2.1.1. Common Lender Hypothesis 
The common lender channel of contagion arises when a bank creditor withdraws 
its exposures from one country to rebalance its portfolio after experiencing a 
marked deterioration of the loan quality in another country. The assumption for 
this hypothesis is that the accumulated losses of international banks exposed to a 
crisis country are substantial enough for them to call in their loans. The more the 
countries rely on external funding from the same creditors, the more vulnerable 
they are to a systematic sudden stop. The motivation behind banks’ responses to 
negative shocks comes from the need to restore bank capital adequacy, to meet 
margin calls, or to reduce risk exposure (as dictated by the VaR models or similar 
models used by banks) (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2003).  
It is widely explained by bank lending channel theory that the reduction in credit 
availability is associated with the shocks from both borrowers’ and lenders’ 
balance sheets (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke et al., 1994; Holmstrom and 
Tirole, 1997). Deterioration of both borrowers’ and banks’ net worth will increase 
the external finance premium for loans, which in turn adversely affects the demand 
for and supply of credit. Peek and Rosengren (1997) and Van den Heuvel (2002) 
give further reasons why shocks to bank capital affect bank lending from 
regulatory requirement perspectives. The crisis not only deteriorates the level of 
bank capital but also increases risk-weighted asset; banks are therefore faced with 
higher capital needs to meet regulatory requirements or to satisfy investors that 
they are taking measures to decrease the risk of insolvency. Given the increasing 
difficulty in raising new capital during periods of financial distress, banks are likely 
to reduce certain types of assets, such as lending, which have higher risk weights. 
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In short, economic and financial shocks that decrease banks’ risk-based capital 
ratios will be translated into a significant decline in the total loan supply.  
Another theoretical explanation refers to liquidity problems and other constraints 
on lenders. This mechanism indicates that a negative shock in one country that 
diminishes banks’ asset values (i.e. collaterals) leads banks to liquidate a part of 
their holdings in other countries to meet margin calls (Claessens and Forbes, 2004). 
In addition, banks may also foresee future redemptions following an adverse shock 
and therefore need to raise cash by selling off assets in other economies. In light of 
the global crisis, the literature on the liquidity channel has emphasised that 
systematic risk can originate at the nexus of funding liquidity and market liquidity 
(BIS, 2011). Funding liquidity refers to a bank’s ability to obtain funding (via new 
borrowing) and market liquidity is defined as the ease with which a bank’s assets 
are traded. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) present a model explaining that 
traders’ funding (i.e. their capital and margin requirements) not only depends on 
but also impacts market liquidity itself. Therefore, the declines in both funding and 
market liquidity can culminate in liquidity shortages and lead even healthy banks 
to refrain from lending.  
From standard portfolio theory, common lender effects arise as an optimal 
portfolio rebalancing response to a realised loss on a specific position. Specifically, 
a shock to asset-return pattern in one country usually leads to wealth allocation 
across countries. For example, the theoretical model of Schinasi and Smith (1999) 
indicates that in the presence of leverage, investors’ optimal response to a crisis in 
one market is deleveraging and reducing their risky asset positions in all other 
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markets. Their explanation is simply based on portfolio diversification, without 
any recourse to market imperfections.  
4.2.1.2. Wake-Up Call Hypothesis  
The wake-up call effects explain the withdrawal of international banks from EMEs 
related to a sudden shift in the perceptions of an entire loan portfolio due to the 
reinterpretation of existing information or a general increase in risk aversion 
following an initial shock in one country. One strand of theoretical literature 
focuses on the reassessment of macroeconomic fundamentals. Under this approach, 
a crisis in one country induces investors to take a closer look at countries with 
similar conditions with the crisis originator. Contagion occurs if the process of 
information update leads them to recognise problems or risks they failed to see 
before even if the fundamentals in these countries remain unchanged. In other 
words, they become aware of the existing problems and therefore decide to sell 
assets, call in loans, or stop lending to these vulnerable countries. This kind of 
investor behaviour indeed reflects an efficient correction as a result of more 
accurate assessment of fundamentals (Moser, 2003). A crisis in one country may 
also lead to a loss of public confidence, inducing investors to revaluate countries 
and assign more risks in international investments, setting off runs in financial 
markets around the world.   
Another strand of theories relates this hypothesis to the imperfect market and 
information asymmetries. In the presence market imperfection and costs of 
acquiring and processing information, investors are uncertain about the true state 
of a country’s vulnerability. Therefore, they tend to derive information from the 
actions of other investors, causing herding behaviour, financial panic and multiple 
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equilibria, which have already been discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis. These 
kinds of investor behaviour may be rational or irrational, while irrational 
behaviour is caused by signal extraction failures. For example, investors falsely 
assume interdependence of fundamentals or overestimate the extent of 
interdependence when they misinterpret a country-specific shock as a common 
shock. Irrational investor behaviour is usually associated with an inaccurate 
assessment and inefficient revision of fundamentals.  
Tornell (1999) combines the two groups of wake-up call theories in a theoretical 
model that explains a cross-country variation in the severity of the crisis. The key 
point in this model is that a currency crisis in an emerging market will act as a 
coordinating device, alerting each investor to a coming attack on vulnerable 
countries by all other investors. Country vulnerability is measured by the 
likelihood of depreciation associated with weak banks, low reserves and severe 
real appreciation. In other words, investors concentrate their attacks in countries 
that are more likely to respond to an attack with an excessive depreciation, which 
is directly related to weakness in macroeconomic fundamentals.  
4.2.2. Empirical Evidence  
Empirical evidence for the systematic risk of cross-border banking is extensive. A 
number of studies explain the volatility in cross-border banking flows, especially 
the adjustment in international lending during crisis episodes, with various pull 
and push factors. The pull factors deal with the reduction in lending from 
international banks’ reactions to the economic and financial disturbances in the 
host country. This was witnessed by simultaneous withdrawals of global banks 
from EMEs during the financial crises of the 1990s (Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 
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1997-1998, Brazil and Russia in 1999, Turkey in 2000 and Argentina in 2002). The 
push factor corresponds to the spillovers from home country shocks through 
credit contraction by parent banks or foreign affiliates and branches. Many of the 
recent studies of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 stress the importance of 
global push factors; in particular, risk, liquidity, interest rates and growth. 
Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010) provide strong evidence for spillover effects on 
bank lending flows from AEs to EMEs via different channels, such as the weak 
performance of banks in AEs, global financial market volatility (VIX index) and 
global risk aversion, measured by the spreads between US corporate bond yields 
and 10-year Treasury bond yields. Bruno and Shin (2012) address the links 
between the fluctuation in global liquidity, risk premiums, the leverage cycle of 
global banks and cross-border capital flows, as well as domestic private credit in 
47 developed and developing countries. Kamil and Rai (2010) investigate the effect 
of the global credit crunch on foreign banks’ lending to EMEs. The empirical results 
suggest that weakening of parent banks’ financial health and decreases in 
economic growth of the home country consistently lead to slower growth in 
international banks’ lending to Latin America. Specifically, a rise in one standard 
deviation in parent banks’ EDF (Expected Default Frequency) is associated with a 
1.5 percentage point average decrease in the growth rate of foreign banks’ lending 
in the subsequent quarter. These results are consistent with the findings of Cihak 
and Brooks (2009) that bank loan supply in euro area moves in line with parent 
banks’ financial soundness. Likewise, Popov and Udell (2010) confirm the 
hypothesis that the credit crunch was transmitted to CEE following the contraction 
in parent and foreign banks’ balance sheets caused by losses on financial assets 
and deterioration of their equity positions.  
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On the contrary, other papers emphasise the “pull factors” as key drivers of cross-
border banking flows, especially domestic fundamentals, fiscal position, country-
specific risks, financial policies and external exposure through trade and financial 
links. Derviz and Podpiera (2007) establish that host country factors, instead of 
home country ones, are particularly important as a source of cross-border lending 
contagion. Influential host economic development variables include inflation, long-
term interest rates, and exchange rate volatility, while the equivalent variables for 
the home country appear to be insignificant. Hawkins (2002) shows that 
international bank lending to EMEs is subject to the strength of both home (source) 
and host (user) countries, which is captured by their respective expected returns. 
However, the pull factors are generally stronger than the push ones. Papaioannou 
(2005) focuses more on the legal aspects of borrower countries and empirically 
shows that foreign banks tend to prefer to invest and allocate credit to countries 
with a well-functioning legal system, banking law harmonisation policies and 
minimisation of exchange rate risks. Jeaneau and Micu (2002) discuss the 
dominant influences of economic growth in host countries, their exchange rate 
variance, changes in foreign reserves and current accounts. However, there is only 
one push factor of real short-term interest rates which significantly contributes to 
the reversal of capital flows. Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010) also find the combined 
effects of both global risk factors and country-specific risks as key drivers for the 
reduction in cross-border loan flows to EMEs, while the latter is represented by 
fiscal deficits, exchange rate depreciation, and deterioration in domestic bank 
performance.  
In addition to global and country-specific risks, another strand of literature 
emphasises regional contagion factors and the structure of cross-border banking 
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flows as determinants of the sudden reversals in international lending. For 
example, the importance of the common lender effect of contagion was empirically 
investigated by Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Caramazza et al. (2000), 
Hernandex and Valdes (2001), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003), Peria, et al. 
(2005) and Pontines and Siregar (2012). They all indicate that vulnerability to the 
risk of sudden stop can spread among clusters of countries that depend on the 
same lenders. In addition, Caramazza et al. (2000) show that countries which are 
more important to the common lenders are more likely to experience financial 
crises than those which only receive a very small proportion of the common 
lenders’ total lending. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003) investigate the 
withdrawals of common lenders, which led to remarkable capital outflows from 
EMEs during the Mexican, Asian and Russian crises. However, in the Russian crisis, 
a more general reversal of bank flows was due to the wake-up call effect caused by 
a sudden increase in banks’ risk aversion, even if financial links via common 
lenders were weak among these EMEs. De Haas and Van Horen (2010) provide 
more evidence on the importance of the wake-up call effect. They show empirically 
that the sub-prime mortgage problem in mid-2007 acted as a wake-up call for 
banks to review their screening and monitoring standards, which lead to a 
significant shrinking of syndicated loans in both AEs and EMEs. 
Contagion factors have also been considered in terms of the structure of cross-
border banking flows. Besides the existence of common lenders, Gersl (2006) 
analyses two other main factors that increase the vulnerability in the CEE banking 
system. They are maturities of cross-border exposures and funding concentration. 
As suggested by the BIS data, banks’ short-term claims fell much more during the 
crisis than long maturity claims, which suggests the dominant effect of bank 
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deleveraging. Moreover, if the foreign bank claims of a country are concentrated 
with one large creditor, when that creditor is hit by a shock which forces it to 
liquidate foreign investments, the impact on the debtor country will certainly be 
greater than if the domestic economy uses foreign capital from several countries. 
Kamil and Rai (2010) argue that the size of foreign banks’ lending response to 
shocks depends on their lending structure. Cross-border lending flows, which are 
largely denominated in foreign currencies and funded in wholesale markets, 
experience much higher volatility. Lending flows from foreign affiliates and 
branches are less volatile because they are mostly denominated in local currencies 
and financed by domestic deposits. Hoggarth et al. (2010) examine the dynamic 
international bank capital flows from the perspectives of borrowers and conclude 
that withdrawals were much greater with bank funding flows to non-related banks 
than the banking sector, with cross-border lending than lending from foreign 
subsidiaries, and over a shorter period of time. A possible reason is that banks are 
more likely to reduce exposures in markets where they have less knowledge of 
their customers.  
In general, the growing literature focuses on analysing pull and push factors 
driving international lending to EMEs or the determinants of the volatility of cross-
border banking flows. There is a consensus from these studies which confirms the 
significant effects of pull, push and contagion factors, but their relative importance 
vary substantially over time and across countries. While empirical work implicitly 
or explicitly confirm international bank behaviour of calling in their foreign claims 
during the financial crisis, very limited literature is found to directly test the 
probability of the sudden stop in lending behaviour associated with different kinds 
of shocks. Additionally, none of the studies investigates the feedback of the sudden 
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stop to the financial tensions in the host countries. There is also little work to 
document the contagion effect in cross-border lending flows in EMEs, taking into 
account the “flight-home effect” caused by the active repatriation of funds invested 
abroad domestic investors during financial crises. In terms of methodology, a 
majority of the literature use the traditional gravity models or base regression. 
Nevertheless, the base regression technique is subject to model uncertainties due 
to the nonlinear nature of international capital flows, as verified by low R2 in the 
estimated results in many empirical papers on this topic. Therefore, this study’s 
approach and its econometric procedure aim at bridging the literature gaps.  
4.3. Stylised facts on Cross-border Banking and Potential Vulnerability to 
Systematic Risk in East Asia 
4.3.1. Data Description 
In this section, we analyse various stylised facts about the pattern of cross-border 
banking flows and the possible vulnerabilities to cross-border shock transmission 
in loan provision using BIS consolidated and locational banking statistics. The 
consolidated data aggregate foreign claims of banking groups based on the 
nationality of the parent banks. These data therefore exclude intragroup claims. On 
the other hand, locational data comprise the gross international claims and 
liabilities of bank residents in given countries on banks and non-bank sectors in 
other countries (including intragroup). The combination of consolidated and 
locational data in our analysis arises from the limitations in BIS reporting statistics, 
which make our assessment challenging. First, few EMEs report their international 
banking statistics with BIS and the intra-regional credit within emerging East Asia 
is also not available to the public. Second, the consolidated data report total foreign 
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claims based on creditor nationality with a breakdown of maturities and 
currencies. Therefore, these data are relevant for assessing the size of cross-border 
banking activities of one country and the liquidity risk exposures. However, the 
lack of reporting of the exchange rate adjusted change basis makes it difficult to 
interpret the underlying dynamic behaviours of cross-border banking flows. 
On a locational basis, there is no breakdown in maturity, currency and creditors, 
which are considered to be important factors contributing to the volatility of cross-
border banking flows. The advantages of locational data are the availability of 
exchange rate adjusted changes in banking flows, and the fact that flows between 
parent banks and subsidiaries are not netted out. Therefore, locational data 
measure cross-border lending consistent with the principles underlying national 
accounts and balance of payments statistics42 and are more relevant for analysis of 
cross-border shock transmission in international lending when funding shocks 
arise from a particular country or region.  
We therefore utilise consolidated data to address the involvement of East Asian 
countries to cross-border banking and the concentration of creditors and debtors. 
However, data on a locational basis is used to measure changes in external lending 
flows to facilitate the analysis of systematic risk and contagion effects caused by 
the sudden stop during financial crises. 
4.3.2. Cross-border Banking Exposures and Potential Vulnerability to 
Systematic Risk in East Asia: A Cross-Country Heterogeneity Analysis 
Foreign bank participation and cross-border banking flows expanded in East Asia 
in the early 1990s, reflecting the pursuance of a liberalisation policy in the 
                                                          
42 External loans are equivalent to the “other investment” category of capital flows in the balance of 
payments.  
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domestic banking sectors. By the end of 1995, total foreign claims (assets and 
liabilities) of BIS reporting banks to the region rose to more than US$ 700 billion, 
much of which involved the growth in trade financing and the creation of off-shore 
banking centres (Siregar and Choy, 2009). However, the region suffered a drastic 
“cut and run” from international banks during the 1997-1998 financial crisis. The 
hardest hit economies were Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Philippines, 
which experienced a drop in total foreign liabilities by around 45% in 1998. During 
the period from 1997 to 2000, international bank claims to Thailand and Korea 
contracted by average annual rates of around 14% and 8% respectively. After 
experiencing substantial unwinding, cross-border banking activities started to 
recover in 2003. However, there is considerable cross-country heterogeneity.  
Hong Kong and Singapore are regional financial centres who have actively 
participated in circulating foreign money throughout emerging Asia by hosting the 
regional operations of many foreign banks. These two countries had a relatively 
large amount of external assets and liabilities as a share of GDP, at around 200% in 
Hong Kong and 150% in Singapore during the period before the global financial 
crisis of 2003 to 2008. These figures are even somewhat higher than Japan’s. It 
appears that Japanese banks have not offered a place in the intermediation of 
global money and that they have become more cautious after experiencing serious 
domestic banking sector problems in the 1990s. Among emerging East Asia, 
Malaysia and Korea had higher proportion of foreign claims held by international 
banks (around 40-60% of GDP), while this percentage in Thailand, Philippines, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam were very small (see Table 4.1).  
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Table 4.1 - Foreign Claims of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis East Asian countries 
(Amount outstanding in USD billion and % of GDP) 
 
  1995 1998 2003 2007 2008 2009 2010 
HK 336.74 275.49 267.54 375.16 387.23 448.56 561.24 
 
2.33 1.65 1.69 1.81 1.80 2.14 2.49 
SG 214.32 165.90 131.95 259.47 248.49 261.77 328.94 
 
0.78 1.95 1.38 1.46 1.31 1.43 1.48 
KR 85.83 79.56 103.61 374.63 299.79 350.04 339.56 
 
0.99 0.22 0.16 0.36 0.32 0.42 0.34 
TL 68.28 58.05 39.07 54.93 55.82 66.64 87.05 
 
0.41 0.52 0.27 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.27 
ID 48.12 49.55 34.52 67.08 66.51 75.83 99.95 
 
0.22 0.47 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.14 
ML 20.98 27.95 61.21 110.25 103.73 106.59 127.77 
 
0.23 0.38 0.56 0.59 0.47 0.55 0.54 
PH 9.75 20.03 24.13 31.02 24.71 27.40 34.54 
 
0.13 0.30 0.30 0.22 0.15 0.17 0.18 
VN 1.15 2.11 3.48 15.29 15.10 16.95 21.05 
  0.06 0.08 0.09 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.20 
Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics, immediate borrower basis; IMF-WEO 
Nearly 80% of the external assets and liabilities of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis 
East Asian countries consist of loans and deposits. The remainder include 
investments in bonds, money market instruments and equities issued by bank and 
the non-bank sectors. The region has not been very engaged in investment in 
structural credit assets or off-balance sheet activities, which were at the heart of 
the global financial crisis. Therefore, losses associated with the damage in the US 
subprime mortgage credit market were negligible (less than 1% of total assets of 
the regional banking system, according to the IMF). However, Asia suffered the 
systematic risk of contagion from the simultaneous funding withdrawals of 
international banks. The sharp reversals in international lending flows stimulate 
the transmission of funding shock throughout the global banking network.  
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Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics 
As in other EMEs, international lending became an important source of funding to 
finance the rapid economic growth in East Asia, especially during the 1980s and 
1990s (Levine, 2005). East Asian borrowing from the international credit markets 
grew in the early 1990s, but then experienced a large run-up from Japanes, US and 
European banks on the rise of the 1997 crisis. Consistent with the total foreign 
claims in consolidated data, external loan flows to the region started to boom in 
2003 and peaked in the period from 2007 Q1 to 2008 Q1; however, following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, these flows fell sharply in the third quarter of 2008. 
Figure 4.1 shows the dynamic behaviour of external assets and loans from BIS 
reporting banks vis-à-vis East Asia during the period 1996 to 2011. The sharp fall 
in the flows in the wake of the two crisis episodes (the 1997-1998 Asian crisis and 
the 2007-2008 US subprime crisis) reflects both local currency depreciation and 
Figure 4-1 - External assets and loans of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis East Asian 
countries (Exchange rate adjusted changes, in $US billion) 
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the unwinding of loan flows. The largest reductions took place in 2008 Q4 and 
2009 Q1, at the peak of the disruption to international credit markets. The flows 
quickly recovered in 2010, nearly reaching the peak of 2007 but once again 
reversing in the last quarter of 2011, when the euro-related tension persisted, 
which led to massive deleveraging from European banks.  
One of the distinct features in the composition of cross-border banking flows in 
East Asia compared to other EMEs is that around 80% of the flows go to the 
banking sector (both inter and intragroup). However, in CEE international banks 
have roughly equal claims vis-à-vis banks and non-bankers and in Latin America 
claims against the non-banking sector are somewhat higher (60% vs. 40%) 
(Mihaljek, 2008). External loan flows to the banking sector suffered much higher 
level of volatility during the crisis periods (Figure 4.2) because international banks 
tended to cut back their interbank exposure much more than their intragroup 
exposure (Hoggarth, 2010). On the contrary, international lending to the non-
banking sector appeared to be more stable, as most was provided by foreign 
affiliates and branches in local currencies. After the 1997 crisis, foreign banks in 
East Asia tried to expand their local positions, while this process started earlier in 
CEE and Latin America. According to the BIS report of 2005, local currency claims 
booked by BIS reporting banks’ local affiliates grew from about 15% of their total 
foreign claims on emerging Asia in 1996 to nearly 40% in 2004. Loans themselves 
shifted away from the traditional customer base (i.e. manufacturers) toward 
consumer finance (i.e. credit card loans) and mortgage lending in these countries.  
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Figure 4-2 – Cross-border loan flows to East Asia by sector 
(Exchange rate adjusted changes, in millions of US dollars) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics 
After the 1997-1998 crisis, the shift in current account balances from deficit to 
surplus in East Asian countries encouraged domestic investors to place deposits in 
and extend loans to international banks. In other words, their operations in cross-
border banking changed from net receiver to provider of foreign claims from 
(against) international banks (Shirai, 2009). Like external loans (assets), external 
liabilities of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis East Asia experienced a dramatic rise in 
the past 15 years. From $US 550 billion in 1995, the gross flows increased to a 
peak of nearly $US 1,400 billion at the end of 2007 (Figure 4.3, left panel). These 
flows also underwent a strong adjustment in crisis episodes. The right panel in 
Figure 4.3 shows substantial negative changes in cross-border flow of liabilities 
from 2008 to 2011. It appears that East Asian residents tended to retrench their 
investments from foreign markets and bring money home. Many domestic 
investors move their deposits from international banks to local ones as they still 
believe in the protection provided by the domestic deposit insurance scheme 
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(flight to quality by depositors)43 and their trust in domestic economies has been 
restored after a successful crisis resolution. This flight-home behaviour 
contributed to the stabilisation of net cross-border banking flows and to alleviation 
of the stress in the host-country interbank markets. However, IMF (2011) present 
data to show that in general EMEs experienced a sharp reversal in net flows 
because the sudden stop in capital inflows was relatively more substantial than 
capital outflows. Given the low levels of interconnection and flexibility, EMEs were 
more likely to be subject to the higher one-way risk of deleverage44. 
Figure 4-3 – External liabilities of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis East Asia 
(Gross flows in million USD and exchange rate adjusted changes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics 
In terms of source of countries, Table 4.2 shows that more than half of total foreign 
claims of BIS reporting banks to East Asian economies come from European banks. 
                                                          
43 The episode is different from the 1997-1998 regional financial crisis, when depositors in ID, ML, 
KR, PH and TL moved out of the domestic banking market and deposited their money abroad (Ding 
et al., 1998).   
44 In AEs, the shifts in gross inflows are normally offset by changes in outflows because AEs are 
more connected both in terms of inward and outward dimensions and hence are more flexible in 
offsetting the change in one linkage with another adjustment elsewhere in the network (IMF, 2011).  
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Among them UK banks take a very high share, which confirms the very active role 
of the banking system in the UK in cross-border banking business around the 
world (Shirai, 2009). Before the 1997-1998 crisis, banks in Japan held a very large 
amount of East Asian foreign assets and liabilities (more than a 25% in total) and 
provided more than 65% of loans from OECD banks (Siregar and Choy, 2009) to 
this region. Among East Asian countries, Thailand is notable, with half of its 
external liabilities to international banks provided by Japanese banks. However, 
Japanese banks’ dominant role in East Asian credit markets changed slightly as 
they ran out of the region after the 1997-1998 crisis. From 2003, US and EU banks’ 
claims to East Asia started to grow, while the lengthy retrenchment by Japanese 
banks has only recently bottomed out. In 2004, new Japanese bank loans to East 
Asian countries were barely 30% of their level at the end of 1996. In the 10 year 
period from 1997 to 2007, Japanese banks’ share of total foreign claims declined 
by more than 50% (from 25.12% to 11.95%). Before the global credit crisis of 
2008 to 2011, US and Japanese banks shared the same position in East Asian 
markets, but US banks dominated Japanese banks in Philippines and Korea, and 
Japanese banks outshone the others in Thailand. The role of European banks has 
been reinforced with their increasing holdings of East Asian assets and they 
remain in a dominant position. However, the concentration of foreign claims and 
the similarities in creditor structure in these countries increase the risk of cross-
border contagion via the common lender and wake-up call effects. 
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Table 4.2 - Foreign claims of BIS reporting banks by nationality vis-à-vis East Asian 
countries (as percentage of total foreign claims) 
  US banks 
EU banks 
(excluding UK) UK banks JP  banks 
  1997 2007 1997 2007 1997 2007 1997 2007 
HK 7.68 5.7 27.4 22.06 36.33 44.76 20.97 11.73 
SG 5.16 13.12 43.31 34.95 15.28 20.94 25.26 15.09 
ID 10.74 14.23 32.38 36.61 7.00 11.4 35.56 14.32 
ML 17.03 11.88 40.85 22.27 5.92 26.37 27.25 7.69 
PH 25.91 15.75 48.71 42.73 6.88 16.44 11.61 12.31 
KR 14.32 19.73 29.08 33.8 7.28 24.39 19.86 7.96 
TL 8.47 10.09 23.98 21.65 3.21 14.64 47.73 31.63 
VN 15.17 9.32 57.68 36.75 6.52 22.5 13.00 11.75 
Total 8.95 12.71 32.91 29.56 20.66 28.47 25.15 11.95 
 
Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics, immediate borrower basis.   
 
As can be witnessed in the regional crisis in 1997-1998, when Thailand was first 
hit by a shock, Jaopanse banks, who were the biggest and common lender in the 
region, tried to withdraw from neighbouring East Asian countries such as 
Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Korea. Consequently, the crisis spread 
throughout the region. Given their high exposure to European banks as shown in 
Table 4.2, such concern was intensified on the escalation of the problems in euro 
area and the accelerating deleveraging process of European banks. According to 
the World Bank report of 2012, the cross-border banking flows from European 
banks (excluding claims of local offices in the given host country) have declined 
since 2008, especially in the last quarter of 2011, amounting to US$ 48 billion in 
Asia, US$ 40 billion in CEE and US$ 6 billion in Latin America (Feyen et al., 2012). 
Trade financing experienced significant declines in some countries such as Hong 
Kong and Singapore, which had a large number of European bank cross-border 
claims relative to the size of their domestic economies. Moreover, a number of 
European and US subsidiaries in East Asia saw their credit ratings downgraded 
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following rating actions on the parent banks (e.g. HSBC, Santander, BBVA, 
Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, KBC, and Unicredit).  
In order to capture the potential vulnerability through the common lender channel, 
we follow Gersl (2006) and construct a common lender index to measure the 
similarity in patterns of creditors between two countries. This index is bounded 
between 0 and 1; 0 indicates no common creditors and 1 indicates the same 
composition of creditors.  The formula is expressed as follows: 
   ∑
(           )
(       )
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where FCc,i, FCc,j denotes foreign claims of a common creditor on East Asian 
countries i and j, respectively; FCi, FCj denote total foreign bank claims on countries 
i and j. The index is made up of two terms. The first term equals the common 
creditor’s share of total foreign claims on the two East Asian countries. The second 
term weights the first term – a higher weight reflects greater similarity between 
the shares of total foreign claims held by the common creditor. Summing is done 
across several common creditors: US, Japanese, Canadian, UK and other European 
banks (from France, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherland and Denmark).  
Table 4.3 provides common creditor indices for East Asian countries at pair-wise 
levels for two periods of time, 1993-1997 and 2003-2007. The results indicate that 
all countries studied share to some extent common creditors with each other, 
represented by high indicators (over 0.5) for both periods of time. This reflects the 
results of the expansion strategy of many creditors (mainly from Europe and the 
US) in East Asia. Singapore’s creditor structure is broadly similar to all other East 
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Asian  countries (all indicators are especially higher than 0.77), which is due to the 
significant role of foreign banks in this country and its diversification in cross-
border banking business. 
Table 4.3 – Common creditor indices 
For the period 1993 -1997  
  HK SG ID ML PH KR TH VN 
HK 1.000 
       SG 0.805 1.000 
      ID 0.708 0.792 1.000 
     ML 0.684 0.773 0.775 1.000 
    PH 0.514 0.655 0.559 0.714 1.000 
   KR 0.655 0.676 0.663 0.686 0.542 1.000 
  TH 0.660 0.691 0.809 0.685 0.451 0.614 1.000 
 VN 0.554 0.666 0.622 0.662 0.653 0.575 0.534 1.000 
For the period 2003-2007 
  HK SG ID ML PH KR TH VN 
HK 1.000 
       SG 0.679 1.000 
      ID 0.514 0.777 1.000 
     ML 0.711 0.808 0.507 1.000 
    PH 0.538 0.772 0.764 0.523 1.000 
   KR 0.630 0.822 0.670 0.685 0.737 1.000 
  TH 0.620 0.853 0.625 0.538 0.608 0.647 1.000 
 VN 0.594 0.789 0.724 0.519 0.755 0.699 0.596 1.000 
Source: Calculated by author based on BIS data  
The concentration of foreign claims and the high degree in similarity in creditor 
structure explain the synchronisation in the adjustment of cross-border loan flows 
to East Asian countries, especially at the time of financial stress. As seen from 
Table 4.4, bilateral correlations of changes in international loan flows between two 
countries for the whole period from 1993-2011 are all positive. Hong Kong 
appears to have higher correlations with Singapore and Indonesia, whereas loan 
flows to Malaysia are more correlated with those of Korea (bilateral correlations 
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are more than 0.5). Thailand shows a highly synchronised shift in external loan 
flows with Hong Kong and Indonesia.  
Table 4.4 - Correlation matrix of cross-border loan flows (exchange rate adjusted 
changes) to East Asian countries  
  HK SG ID ML PH KR TL VN 
HK 1.000 
       SG 0.539 1.000 
      ID 0.556 0.445 1.000 
     ML 0.201 0.353 0.397 1.000 
    PH 0.314 0.376 0.485 0.286 1.000 
   KR 0.288 0.444 0.365 0.534 0.151 1.000 
  TL 0.483 0.250 0.425 0.285 0.357 0.267 1.000 
 VN 0.293 0.316 0.366 0.396 0.149 0.285 0.139 1.000 
Source: Calculated by author based on BIS data  
Figure 4-4 – Correlation of (exchange rate adjusted) changes in cross-border loans 
flows to East Asia (3 year moving average) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated by author based on BIS data 
The time series correlations presented in Figure 4.4 are constructed based on the 
method of Van den End and Tabbae (2012) by averaging the bilateral correlations 
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in the matrix and calculating over a rolling window of 12 quarters. This measures 
the commonality in loan flow adjustments across East Asian countries, which was 
low during stable periods because it depended on the country-specific 
circumstances and pull factors but peaked during the financial stress of 1997-1998 
and 2008-2009 due to global risk aversion (wake-up call effect) and the common 
credit structure (common lender effect).  
In general, analysis of the BIS data on international banking business in East Asian 
countries reveals some evidence of increased integration of the region in 
international financial markets. The analysis focuses on the external position, 
foreign borrowing and structure of cross-border banking flow, which may generate 
the vulnerability of East Asia to foreign shocks and foster greater susceptibility to 
systematic sudden stop. However, this descriptive analysis with illustrated figures 
does not represent an overall assessment of the financial or macroeconomic 
vulnerability and stability of the individual countries studied. The actual 
vulnerability of a country depends on its macroeconomic fundamentals, 
capitalisation, liquidity and the general soundness of its banking system, financial 
sector fragilities, and policy response to external shocks (Goldstein and Xie, 2009; 
Árvai et al., 2009).   
4.4. Transmission of Funding Shock to East Asia: Empirical Analysis 
4.4.1. Empirical Models 
The empirical investigation in this section estimates the probability of systematic 
sudden stop in cross-border banking flows in East Asian associated with: 
(i) Liquidity shocks in international credit markets that affect the supply of 
bank loans 
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(ii) Aggregate productivity shocks in host countries that lower the demand for 
bank loans  
(iii) A contagion effect via the common lender and wake-up call channels 
(iv) The link between the sudden stop in international lending flows and the 
tensions in interbank markets 
(v) Domestic investors’ retrenchment from foreign markets to mitigate 
interbank market tensions. 
Together with the analysis in section 4.3.2, the test for the sudden stop probability 
relating to different kind of shocks mentioned in (i), (ii) and (iii) will help to 
answer the following research questions: 
RQ2a - How can cross-border banking expose domestic financial markets to the risk 
of a sudden stop in international lending? 
RQ2b - Do international bank withdraw their exposures across the board or do they 
discriminate between countries, and if so, how? 
The analysis in (iv) and (v) aims at addressing the research question 2c.  
RQ2c – Was the sudden stop in international lending linked to the tensions in host 
countries’ interbank market? 
The sudden stop in cross-border banking flows is denoted as an event when an 
East Asian country experiences a negative foreign exchange rate adjusted change 
in gross external loan flows (Exloan) from BIS reporting banks. Figure 4.1 shows 
the identification of the sudden stop which occurred simultaneously in many East 
Asian countries and mostly at the height of the 1997-1998 regional crisis and the 
2007-2011 global crisis. This is considered as cross-border contagion in loan 
provision (or systematic sudden stop), which may stimulate the transmission of 
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money market tensions from AEs to the East Asia (Fung and Yu, 2009)45. However, 
at the same time as the synchronous withdrawals of international banks during the 
crisis, East Asian domestic investors tended to liquidate their foreign investments 
and bring money home (Figure 4.3), which contributed to mitigate the volatility in 
net cross-border bank flows and reduced stress in local interbank markets. 
Appendices 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the reversal in external loan flows in many East 
Asian countries and the accompanying significant increase in TED spreads. 
Interbank market stress is measured as an episode when the local TED spreads 
(LTED) in an East Asian country exceeds one standard deviation of its historic 
average, calculated by the rolling windows of 8 consecutive quarters. For Thailand 
and Philippines, due to data limitation the change in interbank call rate instead of 
TED is used and assumed that interbank stress occurs when interbank call rate 
increases more than one standard deviation above its mean calculated for 8 
consecutive quarters. Given the binary nature of two interested variables, the 
univariate and recursive bivariate probit models are employed, which allow for a 
joint estimation of the two equations 4.1 and 4.2 as follows:  
(   )      
                               
(   )      
            
                      
where: 
       {
          
             
            
 (Sudden stop event: S-Stop) 
      {
           
                     
            
 (Interbank stress event: IB-Stress) 
                                                          
45 However, Fung and Yu (2009) study the transmission of money market tension in terms of 
volatility co-movement between interbank stress of the US dollar and that of local currencies in 
Asia.   
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 ,  -    ,  -        ,  -      ,  -    
          are vectors of regression parameters to be estimated; 
    is a set of variables representing different kinds of shocks that cause the sudden 
stop event; 
      is a set of variables to control for additional pull and push factors driving 
international bank lending flows; 
      is a vector of exogenous factors that may affect the probability of stress event 
in interbank markets; 
Di are country dummies to control for country-specific fixed effects. 
The empirical analysis has two-step econometric approaches: we first utilise the 
univariate probit model for panel data to test the probability of sudden stop 
(equation 4.1); and then apply recursive bivariate probit model to jointly test the 
risk of sudden stop and its impact on interbank market in host countries (a 
simultaneous regression of equations 4.1 and 4.2). In the following, the general 
specifications of univariate probit and recursive bivariate probit model are 
introduced.  
Univariate probit model for panel data: 
(   )      
      
                               
            
                      
where    is the unobserved, individual specific heteroskedasticity and     is error 
term. 
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It is necessary to identify the relationship between    and     to distinguish 
between random and fixed effects. The literature suggests that there are many 
geographical and demographical factors driving international lending flows. 
Therefore, the assumption that     are uncorrelated with      which produces the 
random effects model appears to be unreasonable. Nevertheless, the fixed effect 
specifications may encounter incidental parameter problem, especially in a panel 
with small T and large N (N is number of cross-sections)46(Greene, 2012).  The 
panel regression in this study is based on a sample of quarterly data of seven East 
Asian countries during the period from 1996 to 2011, which gives T = 64 and N = 7. 
In that case, the incidental parameter problem is not too severe. The fixed effects 
model would be: 
 (   )      
      
                                 
            
                      
with   is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for individual country i and 
zero otherwise. The log-likelihood function for the fixed effects model is given by: 
     ∑∑   (        
    )
  
   
 
   
 
where  ( ) is the probability of the observed outcome. 
Recursive bivariate probit model: 
The recursive bivariate probit model is an extension of the basic bivariate probit 
with a simultaneous estimation of two equations for   
  and   
 , while y2 depends on 
the observed variable y1. The general specification of the model would be: 
                                                          
46 When T is small and fixed, estimators of the constant terms are not consistent because they do 
not converge at all. The estimation of explanatory variable coefficient is, therefore, not consistent 
(Greene, 2012).  
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(   )   
                                            
                 
(   )  
                                  
                  
(
  
  
      )  [(
 
 
)  (
  
  
)] 
where           are jointly standard normally distributed with correlation 
coefficient ρ. The recursive bivariate probit is estimated using the log-likelihood 
function, which is the same for the usual bivariate probit as the endogenous nature 
of variable y2 can be ignored in formulating the log-likelihood (Greene, 2012). 
To construct the log-likelihood, let                            Thus, 
                                             Denoting that: 
                       (                                           )     
             .  
The probability terms that enter the likelihood function are:  
    (                  )    (           ) 
Specifically, there are four cell probabilities in the recursive bivariate probit model 
such that: 
1.   (         )     (              )       
2.   (         )     (             )       
3.   (         )     (                )       
4.   (         )     (             )      
where   is the cumulate distribution function (CDF) of the bivariate normal 
distribution. 
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Thus, the log-likelihood is given by: 
      ∑    (          )
 
   
 
Interpreting the magnitudes of bivariate probit coefficients is not straightforward, 
because it depends on the slope of the CDF. We, therefore compute the marginal 
effects of explanatory variables on the probabilities, i.e. the changes in the 
response probabilities as a result of one unit change in the explanatory variables. 
The marginal effects in the first equation y1 can be defined exactly as that of 
univariate probit model (but with the parameters estimated from recursive 
bivariate probit):  
 ,     -      ,    -   (    )  where  is the univariate CDF. 
 For a continuous variable zi, marginal effect is measured by: 
  ,     -
   
 
  (    )
   
  (    )     
where  ( ) is the density function of the standard normal distribution and    is the 
coefficient on variable z.  
 The appropriate way to calculate marginal effect for a binary variable zi  is 
to use: Effect on  ,     -   ,        -   ,        - 
In the recursive bivariate probit model, computation of the marginal effect is 
complicated because the explanatory variable which appears in both equations of 
y1 and y2 should have a direct effect on y2 as well as indirect effects on y2 via y1, 
therefore the marginal effect of this variable will be the sum of direct and indirect 
effects. In particular, we will measure the change in variable z on the probability of 
the occurrence of interbank market tension and the indirect effect of the change in 
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this variable on the probability of sudden stop event, which in turn affects the 
probability that interbank market tension equal to one.  Following Greene (1998), 
marginal effects are computed as follows: 
 For a continuous variable, z that might appear in either equations  
  ,       -    , (    ) (       )   (     ) (    )-  
  (Direct effect) 
  , (    ) (       )   (     ) (    )-  
 (Indirect effect) 
where   
    
  are the coefficients on variable z in two equations. 
 For endogenous binary variable y1, 
 ,             -   ,             -   (       )  (    ) 
In all cases, standard errors are computed using the delta method47.  
The identification by the function form is present in the recursive bivariate probit 
in the absence of exclusion restrictions (Wilde, 2000), but common practice 
imposes restrictions when they improve the identification of the model (Baslevent 
and El-hamidi, 2009). Therefore, we decide all the exclusion in the models by 
including the variables in both equations first and then eliminating them from the 
equation(s) in which they are jointly insignificant. 
The definition of variables that enter the estimation of equations (4.1) and (4.2) is 
presented in Table 4.5. Xi,t includes different variables to represent different kind of 
shocks that may affect the probability of a sudden stop. 
(i) Liquidity shock in the international credit market that drives shifts in 
international loan supply, is proxied by the spreads between three-month U.S. 
dollar LIBOR and 3-month US Treasury bill rates (TED spreads). The 
                                                          
47 See Greene (1998) for further explanation of the computation of standard errors. 
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widening TED spreads signal the deterioration in global liquidity conditions. 
We therefore expect a positive coefficient on TED variable.  
(ii) Host-country productivity shock is represented by the percentage change in 
quarterly real GDP in borrower countries (GDP-host). A decline in real GDP 
implies weakening economic conditions and lower returns in these countries, 
which may diminish credit demand and in turn have a negative effect on the 
reversals of international lending.  
(iii) Shocks are also amplified by the contagion effect via the common lender and 
wake-up call channels. The common lender effect is captured by the potential 
spillover of changes in international bank flows among East Asian countries, 
given that they share the same creditor structure. Following Peria et al 
(2005), the common lender factor is calculated as the changes in loan flows 
from international banks to all the East Asian host countries in our sample, 
except that of the individual East Asian country i. The sign of common lender 
coefficient should be negative, as a decrease in cross-border lending to other 
countries will lead to potential withdrawals from the other recipient country.  
To measure wake-up call effect, VIX variable which is generally considered as 
the barometer of investment sentiment and market volatility is used. A high 
value of the VIX indicates more volatile market expectations and hence 
higher international investor risk aversion. If the wake-up call effect works, 
the coefficient on VIX would be positive and significant. Furthermore, the 
wake-up call hypothesis is also tested by including two further variables: 
changes in lending flows to EMEs in Latin America (Co-LA) and in CEE (Co-
CEE). When international investors are risk-averse, they have incentives to 
withdraw from many EMEs, even without any fundamental relationship. 
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Variables representing the changes in external loan flows such as Exloan, Co-
lender, Co-LA and Co-CEE are expressed as logarithms based on the method 
proposed by Papaioannou’s (2009). Specifically, for negative observations, it takes 
logarithms of the absolute value and assigns them with a negative sign. This 
transformation preserves the sign in the original variable and retains the 
symmetry between increases and decreases in capital flows. 
The set of pull and push factors       that may influence international bank lending 
decisions includes: economic performance in the home country (GDP-home) and 
economic and financial risks in the host countries (inflation, foreign exchange rates, 
stock market volatility, bank stock return and financial integration). Stock market 
volatility is a time-varying measure of volatility obtained from GARCH (1,1) 
specification, using weekly real stock returns and modelled as an autoregressive 
process with five lags. Financial integration is defined as a host country’s exposure 
to cross-border banking and measured by the ratio of external assets and liabilities 
of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis recipient country i relative to that country’s GDP. 
Large external exposure represents a potential source of external vulnerability 
(Mihaljek, 2008). However, some of the literatures argue that this relationship is 
nonlinear; as a country becomes more integrated with the global financial market, 
capital flow volatility initially increases but will then decrease as the integration 
exceeds the threshold (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; Calvo et al., 2008; Aghion et 
al., 2004). Therefore, the expected sign of this variable is very ambiguous.  
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Table 4.5– Description of variables and source of data 
Variables Definition (and source) Expected sign 
of coef. (for 
equation 4.1) 
S-Stop        {
                
            
 
 
Exloan Exchange rate adjusted change in external loan 
flows from BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis East Asian 
country i (from BIS locational statistics) 
 
IB-stress Interbank market tension is measured by the 
episode when the LTED exceeds one standard 
deviation above its historic mean. 
          {
                        
            
 
 
TED The spreads between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month 
US Treasuries bill rates. (Datastream) 
+ 
LTED TED spreads for East Asian countries to be 
measured by the difference between 3-month 
interbank rates and yield of 3-month government 
securities, or change in interbank call rates. 
(Datastream) 
 
VIX The S&P100 Volatility Index of the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange (in logarithm). (Datastream) 
+ 
GDP-home Real GDP growth rate of AEs since most BIS 
reporting banks come from AEs. (IMF-IFS) 
+/- 
GDP-host Real GDP growth rate of Asian countries (IMF-IFS) - 
Inflation Percentage change in CPI (IMF-IFS) + 
FOREX Nominal exchange rate of local currency against US 
dollar (in logarithm). (IMF-IFS) 
+ 
CVSR Conditional variance of stock market return 
obtained from GARCH(1,1) estimation on 
autoregressive model of weekly stock market 
returns with five lags. 
+ 
BR Domestic bank stock return. (Datastream) - 
Fin-open Financial integration is measured as the ratio of 
external assets and liabilities of BIS reporting 
banks vis a vis East Asian country relative to that 
country’s GDP.  (BIS locational statistics and IMF-
IFS) 
+/- 
Co-lender  Changes in external loan flows to all East Asian 
countries in our sample except that of the 
individual East Asian country i. (BIS locational 
statistics) 
- 
Co-LA  Changes in external loan flows to Latin American 
countries (BIS locational statistics) 
- 
Co-CEE  Changes in external loan flows to CEE (BIS 
locational statistics) 
- 
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4.4.2. Estimation Results and Discussion 
Table 4.6 – Univariate and Recursive Bivariate Probit Estimations 
  Univariate probit (Equation 4.1) Recursive bivariate probit 
   (1)  (2) (3) Equation 4.1 Equation 4.2 
Constant -6.035*** -6.846*** -6.836*** -4.527** -0.610** 
 
(2.269) (2.384) (2.061) (2.389) (0.257) 
S-Stop     0.736*** 
     (0.278) 
Retrenchment     0.324*** 
     (0.132) 
TED 0.423** 0.493** 0.272 0.418**  
 (0.204) (0.220) (0.191) (0.200)  
VIX 0.021* 0.009 0.022* 0.020* -0.023*** 
 (0.012) (0.939) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
GDP-home 0.192*** 0.196*** 0.099** 0.185*** 
 
 
(0.058) (0.055) (0.048) (0.055) 
 GDP-host  -0.113*** -0.108*** -0.044** -0.103*** 
 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) 
 Inflation -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 
 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017) 
 FOREX 1.619*** 2.000*** 1.765*** 1.164* 
 
 
(0.623) (0.655) (0.558) (0.666) 
 CVSR 0.086** 0.057 0.078** 0.107*** 
 
 
(0.043) (0.060) (0.039) (0.041) 
 Bank return 
 
-0.006* 
   
  
(0.003) 
   Fin-open -0.125** -0.142** -0.025 -0.116* 
 
 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.058) (0.065) 
 Co-lender -0.069*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.067*** 
 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) 
 Co-LA  -0.040** -0.028 -0.025 -0.045** 
 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
 Co-CEE  -0.015 -0.060** -0.003 -0.013 
 
 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) 
 Country 
dummies YES 
 Log-likelihood -204.967 -210.823 -221.58 -456.53 
[p-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Wald chi2 100.69 105.71 99.15 190.14 
Pseudo-R2 0.273  0.244 0.204 
 
Notes: (1), (2) and (3) denote total external loan flows, external loan flows to 
banks, and external loan flows to the non-banking sector, respectively. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 
1% , respectively.  
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Table 4.7 – Marginal effects of variables 
  Univariate probit (Equation 4.1) 
Bivariate probit 
(Equation 4.2) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Indirect 
effect 
Direct 
effect 
S-Stop     0.288*** 
          (0.101) 
Retrenchment     0.127** 
     (0.051) 
TED 0.168** 0.193**  0.107 0.071*  
 (0.081) (0.086) (0.075) (0.038)  
VIX 0.008* 0.003  0.008* -0.006 -0.009*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
GDP-home 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.039** 0.031*** 
 
 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.012) 
 GDP-host   -0.045*** -0.042*** -0.017** -0.017*** 
 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) 
 Inflation  -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.008 
 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) 
 
FOREX 0.646***  0.784 
 
0.693***  0.198 
 
 
(0.009) (0.257) (0.219) (0.136) 
 CVSR  0.034** 0.022 0.030  0.018** 
 
 
(0.017) (0.023) (0.015) (0.007) 
 Bank return 
 
-0.002* 
   
  
(0.001) 
   Fin-open -0.050**  -0.056 0.010 -0.019* 
 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.012) 
 
Co-lender -0.027*** -0.028*** 
 -
0.028** -0.011*** 
 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) 
 Co-LA   -0.016*  -0.011  -0.009 -0.007** 
 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) 
 Co-CEE   -0.006  -0.023** -0.001 -0.002 
 
 
(0.011) (0.001) (0.010) (0.004) 
 
Notes: (1), (2) and (3) denote total external loan flows, external loan flows to 
banks, and external loan flows to the non-banking sector, respectively. Standard 
errors in parentheses.  *, ** and *** represent significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
 
The full information maximum likelihood estimates of univariate and recursive 
bivariate probit models are summarised in Table 4.6, and Table 4.7 shows the 
marginal effects of variables. For the recursive bivariate probit, the marginal 
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effects of variables on  (           ) include both direct and indirect effects. 
Three columns in the Univariate probit estimates (Table 4.6) represent the 
regression results for total loan flows (1), loan flows to the banking sector (2), and 
loan flows to the non-banking private sector (3). The last two columns in Table 4.6 
show the estimated parameters for equations 4.1 and 4.2 in the recursive bivariate 
probit models. Most parameters have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant, which is consistent with the theories and confirms our hypotheses that 
the sudden reversals in international loans are associated with the liquidity shocks 
that affect the supply of loans, aggregate productivity shocks in host country that 
diminish the demand for loans and the contagion factors of the common lender 
and wake-up call effects. In order to measure how well the model fits the data, the 
McFadden pseudo-R2 goodness-of-fit is calculated: 
            (
   
   
) 
where LLu is the value of the log-likelihood function at the estimated parameters in  
the full unrestricted model and LLr is its value when all parameters except 
constants are set equal to zero48. Additionally, the    Wald test is used to test the 
hypothesis that the coefficients of several or all variables are zero. The Pseudo-R2 
reported in Table 4.6 explains around 20-27% of the variation in the probability of 
sudden stop in international lending flows to East Asia. The likelihood ratio test 
(with a p-value of 0.00) rejects the null hypothesis that all independent variables 
                                                          
48 The log-likelihood function is given by:     ∑ ∑         
 
   
 
    
where N is the number of observations, Iij is an indicator variable that is equal one if the ith 
observation falls in the jth event and zero otherwise. If the model contains no covariates, but only a 
constant term, then the restricted log-likelihood is:      ∑      (
  
 
 
   )  ∑   
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are simultaneously equal to zero. In all cases, country dummies are highly 
significant, indicating the importance of domestic effects.   
4.4.2.1. The Systematic Sudden Stop in International Lending 
Starting from supply shocks, the empirical results suggest that subject to funding 
pressure caused by global liquidity shortages, international banks tend to cut their 
lending to East Asian countries. This finding is consistent with those of MacGuire 
and Tarashev (2008) and Kamil and Rai (2010), who provide significant evidence 
that a deterioration in inter-bank liquidity adversely affects foreign banks’ lending 
growth to Latin America. The marginal effects in Table 4.7 show that a 10% 
increase in TED spreads may increase the probability of sudden stop by a 1.68% 
point with a significant level of 5%. However, while liquidity shock has a powerful 
predictive function on loan flows to the banking sector, it appears to be 
insignificant for lending flows to the non-bank sector. This may be due to the fact 
that loans to non-bankers are usually in the form of local lending by foreign 
subsidiaries and branches, which is considered more stable than cross-border 
lending. As documented in Kamil and Rai (2010), the effect of global interbank 
market tensions on cross-border lending (which is largely denominated in foreign 
currencies and funded in wholesale markets) is larger, while the effect on lending 
from local affiliates (mostly denominated in local currencies and funded by 
domestic deposits) is much smaller. Herrero and Martinez Peria (2007) and 
Mihaljek (2008) also confirm that some countries with a higher presence of foreign 
owned banks even received additional loans during the global financial crisis, 
which contributed to the stability in overall foreign bank lending.   
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The positive significant coefficient of GDP-home versus the negative effect of GDP-
host on the dependent variable strongly supports the flight to quality theory in 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke et al. (1994). International banks tend 
to pull out from EMEs if there is a deterioration in economic growth in these 
countries and an improvement in economic performance in AEs (home countries) 
since this will entail higher profit opportunities at home. Moreover, the reversals 
may also come from the decline in loan demand from EMEs when they are faced 
with productivity shock that worsens their macroeconomic conditions. Specifically, 
a 10% decrease in GDP growth rate in East Asian countries increases the 
probability of sudden reversals in overall international bank loans flows to 0.45%, 
and to 0.42% and 0.17% for loans to bank and non-bank sectors, respectively.  
Turning to contagion variables, there is convincing evidence to support the 
common lender hypothesis as the coefficient on Co-lender is negative and highly 
significant at 1% level in all specifications. The marginal effect in Table 4.7 reveals 
the consistence in magnitude of the effect for all cases and implies that East Asian 
country i will experience an increase of around 0.28% in the sudden stop 
possibility if gross international loans to the remaining countries in the sample 
decrease by 10%. This may imply that the common lender effect not only works 
with host country shocks, as discussed in numerous empirical papers (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 2000; Caramazza et al., 2000; Hernandex and Valdes, 2001; Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 2003; Peria et al., 2005) in the context of the 1990s 
financial crises in EMEs, but is also a concomitant of shocks emanating from source 
countries.  
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The wake-up call effect is not very clear, as the estimated marginal size of the 
coefficient on VIX is very low and only significant at a level of 10%. The effect of 
Co-LA is solely significant for total loans, and the Co-CEE coefficient is significant 
for loans to banks only. While global market uncertainty is found to significantly 
contribute to the decline in international lending flows to Latin America by 
Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010) and Pontines and Siregar (2012), it is not a 
dominant factor which can explain sudden stop probability in East Asia. In 
specification (1), the estimated parameter is significant for Co-LA, but not for Co-
CEE, because CEE experienced less severe reduction in cross-border banking flows 
during the financial crises than Asia and Latin America, as mentioned by some 
studies (for example, Mihaljek, 2008; Heemann and Mihaljek, 2010). A healthier 
banking sector, more rigid exchange rates and greater financial openness with a 
large share of foreign-owned bank presence, have accounted for higher stability in 
cross-border bank flows in CEE (Mihaljek, 2008). In reality, even Latin America 
was less prone to credit pull-back during global financial crisis than emerging Asia 
because two-thirds of international loans to Latin America were disbursed by 
foreign affiliates and branches (around 35% in emerging Asia) and were mostly 
denominated in local currencies (Kamil and Rai, 2009).  
Referring to other pull factors, the results indicate that international loan flows are 
more likely to stop going into countries with low financial openness (low exposure 
to cross-border banking activities) and higher financial risk. Specifically, in line 
with Peria et al. (2005) and Ponines and Siregar (2012), the estimated parameters 
suggest that the sensitivity of international lending to shocks in home or host 
economies tends to decrease as East Asian borrower countries increase their 
exposures to cross-border banking. In terms of financial risk, the high magnitude 
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and significant positive coefficient of FOREX on sudden stop events captures 
mechanical valuation effects as well as the impact of currency crises occurring 
during the examined period. Local currency depreciation discourages international 
lending because it pushes up the cost of borrowing, weakens the expected rate of 
return (measured by the foreign currency) and reduces a borrower’s ability to pay 
back an external loan. At the same time, increasing stock market volatility 
promotes financial instability and increases adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems (Mishkin, 1999), consequently making international banks more likely to 
cut and run out of these countries. Under this circumstance, we may assume that 
EMEs (Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines and Korea) are more susceptible to 
systematic sudden stop than the two financial centres of Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Although the literature suggests a significant effect of inflation on the volatility of 
international capital (Buch et al., 2010), the coefficient on this variable is not 
significant in any specification.  
4.4.2.2. Sudden Stop and its Impacts on Host-Country Interbank Markets: 
Analysis with the Recursive Bivariate Probit Models  
With respect to recursive bivariate probit estimates, the results from equation 4.1 
show little variation compared to those of univariate probit models. However, as 
the coefficient on the S-Stop dummy in equation 4.2 is statistically significant and 
the null hypothesis of ρ=0 is rejected (the estimated value of ρ is 0.169 with a 
standard error of 0.104), it is reassured that the recursive models provide more 
reliable results than a single equation model. The positive coefficient of the S-Stop 
is consistent with our expectation and strongly supports the hypothesis about the 
feedback from the reversal in international loan flows to the tension in interbank 
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markets in East Asia. The marginal effect estimations imply that after being 
controlled for supply, demand and contagion shock, as well as other pull and push 
factors, a 10% point increase in the probability of sudden stop will significantly 
boost the probability of interbank stress by 2.88%. As mentioned in section 4.4.1, 
our recursive bivariate probit estimates suffer from the exclusion restriction of 
jointly insignificant variables; therefore, the interbank stress equation includes 
two explanatory variables (except y1 of the S-Stop variable), which are both 
statistical significant at the level of 5%.   
As argued in Forbes and Warnock (2011), although global liquidity contracted 
during the global financial crisis, some countries received net capital inflows 
driven by the large repatriation of domestic investors as they liquidated their 
investment in foreign markets. This retrenchment will lead to an increase in bank 
loan portfolio “home bias”, i.e. a reduction in the share of foreign assets in 
investors’ portfolios. As a consequence, the volatility in net cross-border banking 
flows is mitigated, contributing to a calming down of interbank market tensions in 
host countries. Therefore, the retrenchment variable is included in the right-hand 
side of equation 4.2. This variable is measured by change in liabilities of BIS 
reporting bank vis-a-vis East Asian countries. The expected coefficient sign is 
positive as when domestic investors retrench their foreign investments, 
international banks’ liability flows should be negative and interbank tension is less 
likely to occur. To be consistent with our hypothesis, the estimated results show 
that with a 10% point decline in international banks’ liabilities, interbank market 
tension probability declines by 1.27% point. This finding increases evidence for 
the “flight-home effect” in cross-border banking, as studied in Milesi-Ferretti et al. 
(2010) and Giannetti and Laeven (2011).  
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However, the VIX index is surprisingly found to have negative influence on 
interbank stress. Although this result contradicts many empirical studies about the 
companion between financial risk and credit risk, this might be interpreted as the 
substitution between equity financing and debt financing in Asian financial 
markets. The finding also helps to strengthen the “flight-home effect” analysed 
above and is consistent with the theoretical model of Diamond and Rajan (1999, 
2001), who provide more in-depth analysis of the relationship between financial 
risk and banks’ willingness to lend. The analysis carries an important implication 
for our results, in that a rise in financial risk would actually enhance profit-making 
opportunities, thus promoting domestic commercial banks’ willingness to provide 
loans via interbank markets. In general, despite the offsetting effects from the VIX 
and retrenchment channels, East Asia was not totally immune from liquidity shock 
spillovers and the consequence of the massive deleveraging process from 
international banks. However, the interbank market tension was relatively minor 
and manageable.  
4.4.3. Robustness Tests 
The robustness of the empirical results is tested from two dimensions: (i) 
estimates using different econometric methodologies (base regression vs. 
probability model); and (ii) estimates accounting for financial centre effects (EMEs 
vs. financial centres). 
Base regression 
Instead of applying the non-linear probability model to test the risk of sudden stop, 
equation 4.1 is estimated using base regression with fixed effects. In base 
regression, the dependent variable is not a dummy representing the outflows of 
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external loans but is the change in external loan flows adjusted for exchange rate 
valuation effects in a given quarter.  
Table 4.8 – Robustness check with base regression estimates. 
Dependent  y1 = Exloan y2 = LTED 
variable (1) (2) (3)   
Constant 11.506** 12.533 11.488 -10.37*** 
 
(4.644) (5.229) (4.046) (2.488) 
S-stop 
   
0.537*** 
    
(0.184) 
Retrenchment 0.252* 
    (0.166) 
TED -0.607* -0.735** -0.366  
 
(0.348) (0.353) (0.310)  
VIX -0.051** -0.016 -0.046** -0.028** 
 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.012) 
GDP-home  -0.336*** -0.311*** -0.138*  
 
(0.097) (0.099) (0.083)  
GDP-host 0.190*** 0.172*** 0.066*  
 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.036)  
CPI 0.046* 0.043 0.008  
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.023)  
FOREX -2.766** -3.344*** -2.425**  
 
(1.123) (1.261) (0.974)  
CVSR -0.103* -0.044 -0.105*  
 
(0.062) (0.065) (0.056)  
Bank return 
 
0.009 
 
 
  
(0.006) 
 
 
Fin-open 0.250** 0.291** 0.013  
 
(0.115) (0.116) (0.102)  
Co-lender 0.195*** 0.183*** 0.178***  
 
(0.038) (0.040) (0.044)  
Co-LA  0.085** 0.048 0.047  
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.039)  
Co-CEE  -0.006 0.054 -0.019  
 
(0.051) (0.052) (0.049)  
R2 0.044 0.023 0.036 0.001 
F-test 17.37 12.27 10.78 5.32 
(p-value) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Notes: (1): total external loan flows, (2): loan flows to banking sector, (3): loan 
flows to non-bankers. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 4.8 shows the estimated results, which are fairly consistent with those of the 
panel probit model estimates in Table 4.6 and similar to other empirical papers. 
Overall, the results suggest that liquidity shocks, host country productivity shocks 
and contagion via common lender effects act as the most important factors that 
make international active banks withdraw their lending from East Asia. Another 
significant contribution to the decline in cross-border banking flows comes from 
specific risk factors in the recipient country. The low R2 in the fixed effect 
estimation explains the bias under base regression due to the nonlinear nature of 
international capital flows, and increases the explanatory power for this research’s 
selection of probability models. The dependent variable is the change in external 
loan flows, which is expected to switch the signs to reflect inflows and outflows; it 
therefore has extremely high volatility. For example, the raw data of external loans 
flows in our sample range from a minimum of -US$ 67 billion to a maximum of 
US$ 50 billion per quarter. The average size of loan flows is US$ 0.17 billion and 
the standard deviation is also high. 
EMEs vs. financial centres  
As mentioned in Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010), locational data cannot control for 
third party effects, i.e. international bank lending to an East Asian country via a 
financial centre (Hong Kong and Singapore). Moreover, as regional financial 
centres, Hong Kong and Singapore play intermediary roles in circulating foreign 
money throughout emerging Asia by hosting a large number of foreign nationality 
banks. Therefore, the cross-border banking flows in these centres may experience 
quite different dynamics from those of EMEs. We therefore perform a robustness 
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test by dropping Hong Kong and Singapore from the sample to ascertain whether 
the presence of these centres affects the results.  
Table 4.9  – Robustness check with univariate and recursive bivariate probit 
estimates (excluding financial centre effects) 
  Univariate probit (Equation 4.1) Recursive bivariate probit 
  (1) (2) (3) Equation 4.1 Equation 4.2 
Constant -6.106*** -6.065** -7.957*** -3.856 0.481 
 
(2.234) (2.524) (2.397) (2.632) (0.320) 
S-Stop 
    
0.850** 
     
(0.403) 
Retrenchment 0.309** 
     (0.148) 
TED 0.549** 0.562** 0.262 0.473* 
 
 
(0.241) (0.274) (0.214) (0.256) 
 VIX 0.031** 0.040 0.011 0.026* -0.020** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) 
GDP-home 0.231*** 0.243*** 0.086 0.197*** 
 
 
(0.070) (0.067) (0.061) (0.075) 
 GDP-host -0.098*** -0.111*** -0.075*** -0.080** 
 
 
(0.030) (0.034) (0.027) (0.035) 
 Inflation 0.015 0.017 -0.025 0.010 
 
 
(0.027) (0.029) (0.018) (0.021) 
 FOREX 1.534** 1.749*** 2.030*** 0.873 
 
 
(0.605) (0.680) (0.632) (0.736) 
 CVSR 0.081* 0.186** 0.079 0.127** 
 
 
(0.048) (0.075) (0.051) (0.050) 
 Bank return 
 
-0.007** 
   
  
(0.003) 
   Fin-open -0.214 -0.503** 0.469** -0.133 
 
 
(0.232) (0.245) (0.237) (0.227) 
 Co-lender -0.042** -0.054** -0.076*** -0.041** 
 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.020) 
 Co-LA -0.059** -0.045* -0.002 -0.061** 
 
 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
 Co-CEE  -0.014 -0.066** -0.022 -0.016 
 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.030) 
 Country 
dummies YES 
 Log-likelihood -160.32 -156.17 -163.69 -345.41 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Pseudo-R2 0.258 0.264 0.238 
 Wald chi2 65.07 81.17 80.24 151.18 
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Notes: (1), (2) and (3) denote total external loan flows, external loan flows to 
banks, and external loan flows to the non-banking sector, respectively. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at the levels of 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 4.10 - Robustness check for marginal effects of variables (excluding financial 
centre effects) 
Notes: (1), (2) and (3) denote total external loan flows, external loan flows to 
banks, and external loan flows to the non-banking sector, respectively. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at the levels of 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Univariate probit  Recursive bivariate probit 
 
(1) (2) (3) Indirect effect Direct effect 
S-Stop 
    
0.316** 
     
(0.144) 
Retrenchment 0.096* 
     (0.050) 
TED  0.218** 0.213** 0.262  0.188** 
 
 
(0.095) (0.104) (0.214) (0.102) 
 VIX 0.012** 0.001 0.011 0.010** -0.006*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.003) 
GDP-home 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.086 0.078*** 
 
 
(0.027) (0.025) (0.061) (0.029) 
 
GDP-host 
-
0.039***  -0.042*** -0.075*** -0.032*** 
 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.027) (0.014) 
 Inflation  0.006 0.006 -0.025 0.004 
 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.008) 
 FOREX  0.610** 0.665*** 2.030*** 0.348 
 
 
(0.241) (0.259) (0.632) (0.293) 
 CVSR 0.032* 0.071** 0.079  0.051** 
 
 
(0.019) (0.027) (0.050) (0.020) 
 Bank return 
 
-0.002** 
   
  
(0.001) 
   Fin-open -0.085  -0.191 0.469 -0.053 
 
 
(0.092) (0.092) (0.236) (0.090) 
 Co-lender -0.016**  -0.020** -0.076***  -0.016** 
 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.027) (0.008) 
 Co-LA -0.023** -0.017* -0.022 -0.024** 
 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.030) (0.009) 
 Co-CEE   -0.005  -0.025** -0.002 -0.006 
   (0.013) (0.012) (0.030) (0.012)  
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As can be seen from Tables 4.9 and 4.10, estimates of the parameters are quite 
comparable to those of the original models reported in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. The only 
difference is that the variable of financial integration becomes statistically 
insignificant due to the similar level of exposure to cross-border banking between 
emerging Asia economies, but with a marked deviation from that of regional 
financial centres.  
 
4.5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The sudden reversals in cross-border banking flows was one of the main reasons 
for the severity of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998. The global economic 
and financial turbulence in 2007-2011 brought back the picture of a repeated 
episode of the credit squeeze suffered by the region ten years ago given their 
increasing dependence on foreign-based financing to sustain the rapid growth of 
domestic economies. The large write-downs by some of the major international 
financial institutions after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and 
the synchronous deleveraging process of European banks at the height of the 
European sovereign debt crisis have raised much concern about the risk of 
systematic sudden stop in EMEs.  
This chapter has examined the cross-border banking exposure and cross-border 
shock transmission in loan provision by international banks in East Asia. Based on 
BIS banking statistics, the evolution of cross-border banking activities and the 
potential vulnerability to contagion risk is analysed. The empirical tests of the 
probability of sudden stop in international lending flows and its impacts on the 
interbank markets in host countries follow. Differentiating from other empirical 
papers which focus on the gravity models and base regression to measure the 
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waves in cross-border banking flows associated with various pull and push factors, 
this study employs the univariate and recursive bivariate probit models to quantify 
the marginal effects of several global and country-specific risk factors on the 
probability of a sudden stop and the link between the sudden stop and interbank 
market tensions during financial crisis episodes.  
The empirical results suggest that sudden stops in international lending flows are 
significantly associated with (i) liquidity shocks in international credit market that 
affect the supply of bank loan, (ii) host country aggregate productivity shocks that 
diminish bank loan demand and (iii) the cross-border contagion effect via the 
common lender channel. This led to the transmission of money market tensions 
from AEs to the East Asian countries. However, interbank stress is mitigated by the 
“flight-home effect” caused by the active repatriation of funds invested abroad by 
domestic investors. We also find that emerging East Asia, with lower financial 
openness but higher financial risks is more prone to the sudden stop than the two 
regional financial centres of Hong Kong and Singapore. In terms of customer 
classification, the common lender effect and host-country productivity shock serve 
as key drivers of the sudden stop in cross-border lending flows to both non-bank 
private sectors and banking sectors. While the former is more stable and less 
susceptible to liquidity shock, the latter appears to suffer a much higher level of 
volatility. There is no robust evidence to support the wake-up call effect hypothesis. 
The sharp reversals in cross-border banking flows in East Asia during the past 16 
years (1996-2011) seem to harmonise with Latin Amercia but differ from CEE.  
Overall, the findings confirm the role of international banks in the transmission of 
economic and financial shocks from AEs to EMEs. Increasing cross-border banking 
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alters the nature of the risk of financial instability by generally lowering the 
solvency risk, while increasing the potential for capital flow volatility and cross-
border contagion (Mihaljek, 2008). In other words, there is potentially a trade-off 
between benefits and costs from a financial stability perspective. Therefore, it is 
more important for authorities and policy-makers to mitigate and withstand these 
kinds of risk rather than avoiding them by reducing exposure to cross-border 
banking. From our empirical analysis, since many domestic factors have predictive 
power on the risk of sudden stop, national authorities in East Asia should prioritise 
the strengthening of domestic economy resilience by improving institutions, 
deepening financial markets, implementing rapid progress in structural reforms49, 
and enhancing macroeconomic and macroprudential bases. One of the most 
important borrower-specific risks that matters cross-border banking flows is 
foreign exchange rate risk. It is suggested from the literature that flexible exchange 
rate system should be encouraged as greater exchange rate flexibility can not only 
help resolve tension between various policy targets faced by countries in 
liberalising capital account and integrating with the global capital market, but also 
discourage short-term speculative capital inflows (Mihaljek, 2008).  
As the common lender effect appears to be dominant factor for cross-border 
contagion, countries should consider diversifying funding sources and avoiding 
borrowing too much from any one creditor. Moreover, establishing foreign 
operations through subsidiaries, rather than relying on direct cross-border lending 
can help to reduce the volatility of foreign-based financial source. Another 
important policy implication worth mentioning is to do with currency and 
                                                          
49 In Asia, structural reform and improvement has been gradual, compared to the rather more rapid 
process in CEE as a result of harmonisation with EU legislation during EU accession.   
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maturity mismatches. This can be done by fostering a shift from foreign exchange 
financing to local currency financing50, encouraging foreign affiliates to depend on 
domestic deposits, and allowing banks to treat a proportion of sight and saving 
deposits to obtain an alternative source to fund medium and long-term loans. One 
proposal suggested by Mihaljek (2008) is to replace tight limits on maturity and 
currency mismatches with a capital charge for risks arising from such mismatches. 
Tight limits indeed contribute to more external vulnerability because they force 
commercial banks to hold substantial excess reserves and deposits abroad (to be 
highly liquid), and hence they rely more on foreign funding of credit. Application of 
a capital charge provides banks with a buffer against the risks of currency and 
maturity mismatches, and gives foreign banks more opportunities to access local 
funding.  
Finally, the study’s empirical results indicate the significant role of global and 
contagion factors, suggesting an important implication for cross-country banking 
supervision and cooperation to reduce the volatility of global capital flows.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
50 This process started earlier in LA and emerging Europe (Hohl, Mcguire and Remolona, 2006).   
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5. CHAPTER FIVE – THE SECOND-ROUND EFFECTS OF THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON EAST ASIA: EVIDENCE FROM 
MACRO-FINANCIAL VARIABILITY AND BANK BEHAVIOUR  
 
5.1. Introduction 
Problems in banking sectors have been at the epicentre of the historical economic 
and financial crises in both EMEs and AEs during the past decades. Experiencing an 
expensive lesson from the financial distress of 1997-1998, East Asia has focused on 
building a resilient banking system to withstand negative shocks and stimulate 
macro-financial stability. Therefore, East Asian banks entered the global financial 
crisis in a relatively sound condition thanks to the remarkable reforms and 
conservative regulatory regime developed in the 2000s. As discussed in chapter 2 
of this thesis, during the period before the global financial crisis, banks in East 
Asian countries had good asset quality with low NPL ratios, a relatively profitable 
record comparable to that of AEs, a well-capitalised position with regulatory 
capital exceeding 10% of total risk-weighted assets, high liquidity and low reliance 
on the international wholesale funding market. Beyond balance sheet 
restructuring, the prudential framework for bank supervision has also been 
strengthened. It seems that the prospects of a reappearance of the banking crisis of 
1997-1998 are unlikely.  
Despite the healthy pre-crisis condition and limited direct exposure to the US 
subprime mortgage credit products, following the mounting pressures of the 
global financial markets, the short-term outlook of the Asian banking sector 
assessed by leading credit agencies was negative (Pomerleano, 2009). Table 5.1 
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summarises Moody’s average bank financial strength ratings, which reflects 
several downgrades and downward changes in outlook for major banking systems 
in 2008 and 2009. Some countries, such as Hong Kong and Indonesia, were 
considered to have a stable outlook. However, according to a report from Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority in 2008, the outlook of banks in Hong Kong was 
uncertain and less promising. Similarly, despite their stable outlook, Indonesian 
banks were assessed to be very vulnerable to credit risk, especially mid-sized and 
large banks, according to the stress tests by the IMF in 201051.  
Table 5.1 - Moody’s Average Bank Financial Strength Ratings 
Country Date Average 
Strength 
Ratings 
Outlook changes 
Japan Dec.2008 C- Negative 
Singapore May.2008 B Negative 
HongKong Dec.2007 B Stable. (But according to HKMA 
publication in 2008, the outlook is 
less promising and uncertain) 
Korea Oct.2008 C- Negative, primary due to its 
dependence on international capital 
and money markets for funding. 
Thailand Sep.2008 D Negative 
Indonesia Dec.2008 D Stable  
Philippines Feb.2008 D Stable 
Malaysia 2009 C-D  Stable 
Source: Pomerleano (2009) 
Pressure in the banking sector works through feedback loops from a slump in 
economic activities, along with a tailspin in asset prices, which may cause bank 
performance to deteriorate. Rating agencies expected the biggest threat to be the 
substantial pressure on loan quality and the potential rising NPL. This would 
                                                          
51 See IMF Country Report No.10/288. Indonesia: Financial System Stability Assessment. 
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therefore lead to higher provisions, lower profitability and considerable erosion in 
bank capital, which may have negative implications for further lending.  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine empirically how the variability in macro-
financial conditions can influence banks’ financial soundness and behaviour, which 
justifies the second-round effects of the global financial crisis of 2007-2011 on East 
Asian economies. The analysis is based on a panel of 174 commercial and 
investment banks and bank-owned companies from eight East Asian countries 
over a time period of 2003 to 2011 with an annual frequency. This chapter 
contributes to the existing literature by stressing the simultaneous adjustments in 
four dimensions of bank behaviour: asset quality (loan portfolio quality), 
profitability, capital buffer, and lending behaviour. The assumption is that any 
change in bank behaviour is caused by either endogenous bank-specific factors or 
exogenous factors of macro-financial variables. Therefore, a multi-equation instead 
of a single-equation framework is employed, taking into account partial 
adjustment models and the dynamic interactions between instruments of bank 
performance. This research also differentiates itself from previous studies by 
allowing the global financial stress factors, amongst the main drivers of bank 
adjustment, to control for the contagion effect from external shocks to East Asia. 
Additionally, in response to the contagion effect, central banks in Asia announced 
numerous policy interventions during the period 2008 to 2009. Although the scale 
of interventions and their impacts varied across markets, they contributed in 
various ways to stabilise the regional financial system in conditions of stress 52. 
The effectiveness of these measures will be revised by using proxy variables for 
                                                          
52 See BIS paper No.52: “The international financial crisis: timeline, impact and policy responses in 
Asia and the Pacific” by the staff at The BIS Asian Programme. 
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central bank policy interventions in the empirical tests. The findings should have 
several implications for bank managers, regulators and policy makers for 
forecasting and stress testing purposes to detect problems arising in the banking 
system.  
Combining both the narrative from the financial crisis and the theoretical 
background to understand better the effect of the global financial crisis on the 
behavioural response of the financial sector, this chapter will attempt to answer 
the following research questions:  
RQ3a - How did domestic banks react to changes in macro-financial conditions 
during the global financial crisis and how can their reactions to those risks be 
modelled?  
RQ3b - Do bank behaviour adjustments magnify the impact of global shocks?  
RQ3c - How do empirical estimates of bank reactions relate to the behavioural 
assumptions generally used in the theoretical literature? 
The outline of this chapter is presented as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the 
theoretical framework and empirical evidence of macro-financial linkages and 
bank behaviour. Section 5.3 describes the empirical models, methodologies and 
data sample. The analysis of the empirical results will be discussed in section 5.4. 
Section 5.5 provides conclusions.  
5.2. Literature Review of Macro-Financial Linkages and Bank Behaviour  
5.2.1. Theoretical Framework  
The theoretical literature explaining the response of banks to shocks is linked to 
the framework of macro-financial linkages, the business cycle theory and monetary 
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transmission mechanism. An overview of Mishkin (1996) on the channels of 
monetary policy distinguishes between the interest rate channel (money channel), 
exchange rate channel, asset price channel and credit channel. This research’s 
approach is based on the credit channel, stressing the role of borrower balance 
sheet and bank balance sheet effects. The credit channel is not only the most 
important mechanism to propagate and amplify real shocks in the form of the 
feedback loop, but is also highly relevant for the largely bank-dominated financial 
system in Asia. The balance sheet channels can arise as a result of credit market 
imperfections such as asymmetric information, problems in contract enforcement 
and agency cost. In addition, the bank balance sheet effect may be also a 
consequence of regulatory requirements on bank capital (BIS, 2011). In the study 
of Bernanke (1983) on the non-monetary effects of financial crises, the banking 
system channel and borrowers’ credit worthiness are emphasised as the main 
factors which worsened the Great Depression. First, a financial shock causes a 
reduction in the quality of certain financial services, primarily credit 
intermediation. This leads to the disruption of bank credit and in turn inhibits 
consumer spending and capital investment, worsening the contraction. Second, the 
declining output and falling prices from the downturn will increase the real debt 
burdens and impair borrowers’ cash flows and liquidities. This may generate 
widespread financial distress among borrowers, which likewise increases the risks 
to lenders. Therefore, there are likely to be interactions between borrower and 
bank balance sheets.  
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5.2.1.1. Borrower Balance Sheet Channel 
The borrower balance sheet channel relates to borrowers’ equity position (or net 
worth), which influences their access to credit. This is also known as the financial 
accelerator effect, which explains the behaviour of bank credit (loan extension to 
private agents) and its relationship with the cyclical fluctuations in the economy. 
The channel works through a so called external finance premium (EFP), associated 
with the work of Bernanke and Gertler (1994), Bernanke et al. (1999) and Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997). Due to credit market imperfections, external financing is more 
expensive than internal financing, and the EFP is the wedge reflecting the 
difference in the cost of externally and internally raised funds. Bernanke and 
Gertler (1994) argue for an inverse relationship between the borrowers’ net worth 
and EFP in an economy in which firms are financed by Townsend’s (1979) costly 
state verification (CSV) framework. In the CSV model, the verification of 
entrepreneur performance is costly, therefore banks have to incur an auditing cost, 
which is interpretable as the cost of bankruptcy (including auditing, accounting, 
legal costs, as well as loss associated with asset liquidation and interruption of 
business). The inverse relationship arises because the borrowers’ net worth is 
likely to be pro-cyclical; during business upturn, it is improved and the greater the 
net worth of borrowers, the more likely they are to use self-financing as a means to 
fund investment and/or have more collateral to put up against the funds they need 
to borrow. As a result, lenders assume less risk when lending to high net worth 
agents, and EFP is lower. An adverse productivity shock that lowers borrowers’ 
current cash flows (weakening firm profits and household income) leads to a 
decline in their net worth and raises EFP. The increase in borrowers’ cost of 
financing will discourage their desires to undertake more investment projects and 
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consequently affect the demand for credit, propagating and amplifying the effect of 
the initial shocks.   
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) develop a dynamic equilibrium model to demonstrate 
that borrowers’ net worth is not only sensitive to the variation in cash flow, but 
also the changes in the valuation of the real and financial assets they hold. In this 
model, assets play a dual role in an economy: (i) to produce goods and services and 
(ii) to provide collateral for loans53. When asset values are hit by a temporary 
shock, a direct effect occurs because the changes in collateral values cause changes 
in obtained credit, which in turn affect firm investment. In addition, the reduction 
in production and spending as a result of the shocks to real economies may also 
depress asset prices further, causing shock propagation over time. The models 
elaborate the interactions between credit limits and asset prices through the spiral 
mechanism, explainable as within-period and inter-temporal multipliers (BIS, 
2011).  
Bernanke et al. (1999) incorporate the financial accelerator theory of Bernanke 
and Gertler (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in a quantitative business cycle 
framework to explain the amplification of shocks to macroeconomy. Basing on 
firm’s demand for capital and the optimal contractual arrangement between 
entrepreneur and financial intermediary, the critical link between capital 
expenditures by the firm and financial condition is expressed as follows:  
(   )    .
  
 
/       ( )      ( )   , equivalent to 
(   )  {  }   (
 
  
)       ( )    
                                                          
53 The need for collateral is due to the fact that lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debts 
unless the debts are secured. 
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where: 
 Rk is aggregate rate of return on capital; 
R is real risk-free interest rate; 
QK are total funds invested by firms with K being the level of a firm’s capital and Q 
the price per unit of capital; 
N is a firm’s net worth 
If a firm is not fully self-financed, in equilibrium the return to capital will be 
equated to the marginal cost of external finance. Equation 5.2 shows the key 
relationship in financial accelerator model, in that EFP or discount return to capital 
(calculated from the ratio of cost of external finance    to the risk free rate )  
depends inversely on the share of a firm’s net worth in the total funds. The model 
is designed to enhance more empirical relevance (heterogeneous firms and asset 
price effects) and permit the standard model to explain a broader class of 
important cyclical phenomena, such as changes in credit extension and spreads 
between safe and risky interest rates. In conclusion, Bernanke et al.’s (1999) 
theoretical model explains a simulated dynamic response of the credit market in 
relation to the evolution of firm’s net worth in stress conditions, which amplifies 
various shocks to the economy in a quantitatively significant way.  
5.2.1.2. Bank Balance Sheet Channel 
The bank balance sheet channel refers to the effect of an adverse shock on various 
components of both sides of banks’ balance sheets and thus the supply of bank 
loans. This can be divided into two separate components: the traditional bank 
lending channel and bank capital channel.  
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Traditional bank lending channel 
The traditional bank lending channel focuses on the reserve-deposit constraints on 
the supply of bank loans. In particular, any shock on the economies or any policy 
action to increase interest rates and reserve requirement rates will lead to a fall in 
deposits. Due to the imperfect information between banks and their providers of 
funds, banks cannot costlessly compensate for the reduction in deposits; therefore, 
they opt to readjust their portfolio by reducing their assets. Given that securities 
and bank loans are imperfect substitutes as sources of funds54 because loans are 
riskier and less liquid, a reduction in deposits as a result of monetary policy 
tightening will lead to a reduction in bank loan supply. This inward shift in the 
supply of bank loans will have an impact on the real activities of firms given the 
absence of a close substitute for bank loans. The importance of the traditional bank 
lending channel depends on the extent to which banks rely on deposit financing 
and adjust their loan supply schedules following changes in bank reserves 
(Alcoforado Farinha and Robalo Marques, 2001). The standard model explaining 
the channel was developed by Bernanke and Blinder (1989) by extending the well-
known IS-LM model (investment saving-liquidity preference money supply). While 
LS-LM model comprises three markets of bonds, money and goods; Bernanke and 
Blinder consider bank lending as additional market and assume that both 
borrowers and lenders choose between loans and bonds according to the interest 
rates of these two credit instruments. The balance sheet equation of banks is then: 
(   )         (   )  
                                                          
54 See Kashyap and Stein (1994) and Peeak and Rosengren (1995) for further discussion of the 
conditions for the bank lending channel to operate. 
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where Bb denotes bonds held by banks, Ls is the supply of bank loans, E is excess 
reserves,  is the required reserve rate, and D are deposits of non-banks. In 
equilibrium, the credit market can be characterised as: 
(   ) (      )(   )   (         ) 
The left-hand side of equation (5.4) represents the supply of loans which depends 
negatively on the interest rate of bonds R, and positively on the interest rate of 
loans Rl, and the amount of deposits not needed to fulfil the reserve 
requirement        (      ) is considered as a function comparable to the 
money multiplier.  
The right-hand side of equation shows the demand for loans which is negatively 
affected by interest rate on loans and positively on interest rates on bonds and the 
scaling variable income Y. Furthermore, the interest rate on loans is depends 
positively on the interest rate on bonds and income, but is a negative function of 
money supply Ms such that: 
(   )     (         ) 
As Ms is considered as exogenous policy variable, the restrictive monetary policy 
has an impact on both interest rate on loans and output, in that interest rate will 
increases and income decreases.  
The theories have been applied and extended by a number of studies (for example, 
Kashyap et al., 1992; Bardsen and Klovland, 2000) to emphasise the effect of the 
shock on bank behaviour through different monetary mechanisms such as interest 
rates, policy rates and reserve requirements; and the amplification of the real 
effect on economies.  
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Bank capital channel 
The traditional bank lending model has largely ignored the role of bank capital and 
endogenous credit risk shocks by assuming that all loans are paid back. However, 
more and more theoretical studies have explored the cyclical behaviour of bank 
capital and its influence on lending behaviour. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) point 
out the important role of bank capital to finance bank lending because this will 
provide the incentives for banks to monitor borrowers and overcome the moral 
hazard problem that is present in borrowers’ investment decisions. Therefore, a 
shrinkage in bank capital due to a fall in loan pay-offs following a shock that 
weakens firms’ net worth will reduce the volume of loan supply. Another 
theoretical explanation of the bank capital channel relates to regulatory capital 
requirements. Blumm and Hellwig (1995), Lowe (2002), Borio et al (2001) and 
Goodhart et al (2004) study the macro implications of the Basel capital 
requirements. Increases in credit risk during recession cause a deterioration in 
bank capital ratio and hence banks face much higher capital needs to fulfil 
regulatory requirements. However, raising fresh capital is more difficult and costly 
because banks’ profit and capacity to build up reserves diminishes, and they are 
likely to de-lever their assets and reduce certain types of them. In this sense, the 
amount of credit extended to firms and households will fall, which in turn will 
restrain borrowers’ expenditure and lower aggregate demand. Markovic (2006) 
Reserve 
requirement 
 
Interest rate 
 
Policy interest rate 
Deposit Loan 
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models three separate components in the bank capital channel: the default risk 
channel, adjustment cost channel and capital loss channel. All these channels cause 
a variation in the expected return and thus a variation in the cost of bank capital. 
The model is extended from Bernanke et al’s. (1999) corporate balance sheet 
channel to explain the interactions between the demand and supply sides of the 
credit market and has the following form: 
 (   ) 
  
 
   (
 
  
)   
(   )     
    
 
 
   
 
   
where   is the cost of bank capital, Pz denotes the price of bank share and Z the 
volume of bank shares, L is the volumes of loans extended to firms. 
The additional variable,   that affects the EFP encompasses the shock to the cost 
and value of bank capital.    depends positively on the ratio of a bank’s capital to 
loan 
   
 
   and the wedge between the cost of bank capital and the cost of deposits, 
       The change in equity risk premium in the banking sector     , which is 
then transferred to borrowers via increasing EFP arises due to the default risk, 
adjustment cost or capital loss channels, such that:   
(   )   (  ̂   )    (  ̂      ̂ )    ̂    ( ̂     ̂ )  
  
  
  ( ̂     ̂   )  
   
      
 ̂   55  
where: 
  (  ̂   ) is expected gross dividend rate; 
                                                          
55 See Markovic (2006) for further explanation of the equation 5.9, which is derived based on 
household optimisation problem. In this equation, ^ denotes deviations from the steady-state 
values and subscript 0 denotes the steady-state value. 
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 (    
     
 ) denotes expected capital gain; 
Thus,   (  ̂   )    (  ̂      ̂ ) implies the expected required return on bank 
capital.  
The right-hand side of equation 5.8 have the three important factors: 
 Rt is the risk free rate or the return on the alternative asset;  
 The term   ( ̂     ̂ )  
  
  
  ( ̂     ̂   ) represents the adjustment cost, 
which depends on loading factor   and the expected change in volume of 
bank shares;  
 γ2 is the probability of the bank defaulting on its capital.  
In summary, equation 5.8 describes specific channels through which bank capital 
facilitates the transmission of shocks to real economy. The capital loss channel 
arises from the expectation of a capital gain or loss from the holding bank shares 
( 
    
 
  
   )  In a contraction, a bank which is in need of acquiring fresh capital 
would send a bad signal about its financial situation to the market. Potential 
investors may anticipate a future fall in the price of bank shares and therefore 
require a higher dividend. In such a case, a bank is able to acquire more capital if it 
sells new shares at a discount. The adjustment cost channel arises when there is a 
change in the current or expected level of bank capital and the potential new 
shareholders have to check the health of a bank before investing in its shares and 
thus suffer an adjustment cost. Finally, the default risk channel causes an increase 
in the cost of bank capital because during the period of financial crises, the 
probability of default on bank capital γ2 is higher than in normal times; hence, 
222 | P a g e  
 
shareholders may require higher dividend rates to prevent them from selling bank 
shares.  
By incorporating the bank capital channel in the borrowers’ balance sheet channel 
of Bernanke et al. (1999), Markovic (2006) explains the interactions between the 
supply side and demand side of the credit market, which is illustrated in Figure 5.1.   
Figure 5-1  – The behavioural response of the credit market 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Markovic (2006) 
As can be seen from the graph, firms finance their investments using internal funds 
N with its opportunity cost R (or the risk free-rate) and external funds L with the 
loan interest rate Rl. The EFP, the difference between Rl and R, depends positively 
on the shares of external funds in total funds (i.e. negatively to firm’s net worth as 
collateralised part of the debt). The slope of loan supply line   
  depends not only 
on bank’s perception of risk to economy and the auditing cost (as explained in 
R 
LS2 
LS1 
LS0 
LD 
EFP 
LS, LD 
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Internal funds: N External funds: L 
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borrower balance sheet channel with equations 5.1 and 5.2 but also on the cost of 
bank capital and its share in total liabilities in equation 5.8). For example, the 
requirements or desires of bank to raise capital will produce the shift of the loan 
supply from   
  to   
 . Because the cost of bank capital is higher than the cost of 
deposit, bank opts to increase the loan interest rate to cover the higher average 
cost of bank liabilities or to maintain the profit margin. This increase in cost of 
funds that firm finances its investments will lead to a temporary decline in firm’s 
profit and thus its net worth. Therefore, unexpected increase in bank capital ratio 
produces shock to the loan supply side and a temporary effect on the demand side 
of the credit market. The demand reaction leads to further increase in loan interest 
rate and EFP and consequently affects the level of investments and real output. 
This actually corresponds with the loan supply shifts to   
 .  
The theoretical review delivers an interesting implication that there is likely a 
continual interaction between the bank capital channel (or bank balance sheet 
channel) and borrower balance sheet channel. Therefore, it is important to 
empirically model bank behaviour in response to macro-financial variability in a 
dynamic structure allowing for the endogenous effects of each component in bank 
balance sheets and considering heterogeneity issue.  
5.2.2. Empirical Evidence for Banks Behaviour 
There is a general consensus in the empirical literature that bank behaviour is 
likely to vary according to the stage of the business cycle and the bank’s specific 
characteristics. 
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5.2.2.1. Economic Condition and Pro-cyclical Bank Behaviour 
Extensive research has linked bank credit risk, profitability, capital buffer and 
credit supply to the overall condition of the economy. In terms of credit risk, a 
large amount of work conducting macro stress testing identifies significant 
relationships between real economic variables and the credit risk factors of 
corporations or banks. Credit risk is usually captured by NPL, LLP (loan loss 
provision), PDs (probability of defaults) and LGDs (loss given defaults). Kalirai and 
Scheicher (2000) perform preliminary stress testing on the Australian banking 
system and explain that a rise in short-term interest rates, a fall in business 
confidence and industrial production, and a decline in the stock market have 
significant effects on bank’s LLP. The study of Jacobson et al. (2005) uses the VAR 
approach to study the interactions between the evolution of the Swedish economy 
and firms’ balance sheets and finds that macro variables are important for 
explaining the time-varying default frequency. Using the same methodology, Alves 
(2005) and Sommar and Shahnazarian (2009) identify cointegrating relationships 
between macro variables (interest rates, GDP and inflation) and Moody’s KMV 
EDFs. Castren et al. (2008) analyse the impact of a wide range of global macro-
financial shock scenarios on corporate sector credit quality in the euro area with a 
Global VAR model. Their empirical results suggest that median EDFs react mostly 
to the shocks to GDP, exchange rates, oil prices and equity prices. Within the non-
linear threshold VAR framework, Drehmann et al. (2006) explore the non-linear 
transmission of macroeconomic shocks to aggregate corporate PDs in the UK. By 
presenting a model combining macro stress scenarios and credit risk at portfolio 
level, the study of Padilla and Segoviano (2006) shows that credit risk could 
materialise quickly if boom-burst in real estate prices and credit occurs. Dullmann 
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and Erdelmeier (2008) do a stress test on credit portfolios of German banks, 
assuming an economic downturn in the automobile industry. The results confirm 
that the expected loss conditional on the stress event increases substantially when 
accounting for the inter-sector correlations. Another strand of literature using 
panel data (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Fofack, 2005; Vallcorba and Delgado, 2007; 
Louzis et al., 2011) also suggest the importance of GDP growth alongside other 
macroeconomic factors in determining the variation in NPL and LLP. 
In the empirical findings, the effect of macro-financial variables on bank 
profitability is mixed. On one hand, the work of Bourke (1989), Molyneux and 
Thornton (1992), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Athanasoglou et al. 
(2008) show a statistically significant positive relationship between macro 
variables (GDP growth, inflation rate and central bank policy rate) and bank 
profitability. On the other hand, some studies find little direct significant 
relationship. However, credit quality is one of the key drivers of a bank’s profits, 
hence when macro-financial conditions weaken a bank’s credit quality by 
increasing NPL and LLP, this also indirectly affect the bank’s profits (Pangestu, 
2009; Vong and Chan, 2009; Davydenko, 2010). Another conflict in the empirical 
evidence relates to the effect of market concentration on bank profitability. Some 
studies such as Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992) show a 
statistically significant positive relationship between bank concentration ratios 
and bank profitability, supporting the traditional structure-conduct-performance 
hypothesis. However, Berger (1995), Mamatzakis and Remoundos (2003) and 
Staikouras and Wood (2011) do not find evidence to support this hypothesis, 
instead arguing for the presence of oligopolistic profits.  
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On behavioural bank capital, the empirical studies focus on the procyclical feature 
of capital requirements in partial adjustment models. Ayuso et al. (2004), 
Lindquist (2004), Stolz and Wedow(2005) and Jokipii and Milne (2008) examine 
the relationship between the choice of capital buffers or capital ratios and various 
measures of the business cycle such as real GDP growth and the real output gap. 
Their findings show that this relationship is statistically significant and negative, 
which suggests that banks’ capital buffers increase during downturns and decrease 
during upturns. However, the main concern of cyclical influences is the banks’ 
inability to raise capital during economic contractions. Therefore, banks may 
reduce lending rather than raise additional capital to meet regulatory 
requirements. This behaviour tends to increase the duration and magnitude of the 
economic cycles, making it potentially more difficult for policy-makers to maintain 
economic stability (Francis and Osborne, 2009). 
Credit supply response is also sensitive to business cycle phases because the state 
of the economy affects the ability of bank managers to predict returns from lending 
opportunities. If banks perceive a stable macro environment, they may expect a 
higher probability that borrowers will pay back loans. Therefore, banks adjust 
their lending behaviour in response to the signals of these expectations, both in 
terms of stability and level of economic performance (Somoye and Ilo, 2009). 
Baum et al. (2002) investigate bank lending behaviour during macroeconomic 
uncertainty using US data and find a significant negative relationship between the 
loan to assets ratio and the variability of industrial production and consumer price 
index (CPI). In a study of Ukraine banks, Talavera et al. (2012) also mention that 
banks decrease their supply of credit when the volatility of macroeconomic 
variables increases. Macroeconomic volatility is captured by the conditional 
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variance of monetary aggregates, CPI and the production price index. A related 
strand of empirical literature on bank lending to EMEs during global financial 
crises confirms the hypothesis of contraction in bank credit expansion in recession 
and general economic uncertainty following external financial shock (Ivashina and 
Scharfstrin, 2010; Aisen  and Franken, 2010; Guo and Stepanyan, 2011). Moreover, 
these studies also identify other external factors which affect bank lending, such as 
international capital flows, external financing position, and currency mismatches.  
5.2.2.2. Bank-Specific Characteristics 
While macroeconomic factors are considered as exogenous forces driving bank 
performance, the distinctive features of each particular bank are expected to exert 
a decisive influence of bank behaviour. The empirical papers have provided 
considerable evidence to support the following hypotheses relating to bank-
specific characteristics: 
a – Asset size effect hypothesis 
 Bank size may affect bank behaviour for a variety of reasons such as economies of 
scale, diversification benefits, accessibility to capital and systematic effect (too big 
to fail). In the presence of economies of scale, larger banks benefit from lower costs 
and can undertake more screening and monitoring. This helps banks to reduce 
unexpected losses arising from asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers. Larger banks may also have better investment and diversification 
opportunities, as well as more access to capital markets and are therefore subject 
to a lower probability of negative capital shock. During financial stress, big banks 
may benefit from regulatory protection (for example, be bailed out by 
governments) due to the systematic effects. In general, bank size is shown to yield 
228 | P a g e  
 
a positive effect on asset quality (Louzis et al., 2010) and profitability (Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Goddard  et al., 2004). Some other papers (Alfon et al., 
2005; Stolz and Wedow, 2005; Jokippi and Milne, 2008) find a negative effect of 
bank size on capital management, which means that larger banks hold less capital 
buffer.    
b – Moral hazard hypothesis 
The moral hazard hypothesis shows the relationship between capital and risk-
taking. Accordingly, banks with relatively low capital have more incentives to 
increase the riskiness of their portfolio in the form of excess lending, which results 
in a higher NPL ratio in the future. On the contrary, a higher level of capital reduces 
risk-taking, which in turn reduces the credit risk (Keeton and Morris, 1987; 
Furlong and Keeley, 1989). Berger and DeYoung (1997) study the causality 
between loan quality and capital in US banks and confirm the significant moral 
hazard incentives, suggesting an increase in the level of NPL for poorly-capitalised 
banks. In complete contrast, Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Hellman et al. (2000) and 
Stolz et al. (2004) argue that there is a positive relationship between portfolio risk 
and regulatory capital. Banks raise capital to keep up their capital buffer when 
portfolio risk rises. Although the empirical evidence on the risk-capital 
relationship is inconclusive, these findings generally indicate that assets, asset risk 
and capital are endogenously determined. 
c – Inefficiency hypothesis 
The inefficiency hypothesis refers to the effect of bank cost management on asset 
quality and profitability. Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Louzis et al. (2010) 
provide convincing proof of a significant positive relationship between the ratio of 
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operating expenses to income (as a measure of cost management) and NPL ratio, 
which confirms that bad management goes hand in hand with poor skills in 
screening and monitoring borrowers. William (2004) and Louzis et al. (2011) who 
study the link between loan quality and cost efficiency in European banks also find 
evidence to support this hypothesis. In terms of profitability, there is consistent 
evidence from the literature (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Athanasoglou, 2008) 
to confirm that cost inefficiency has a negative effect on bank profitability, since 
banks pass a part of the increased costs on to customers and the remaining part 
reduces profits.   
d – Credit risk effect hypothesis 
Credit risk is the main source of risk in bank operation and may simultaneously 
affect many aspects of bank performance and hence their decisions. The effect of 
credit risk on bank profitability is equivocal from the empirical analysis. For 
example, Athanasoglou et al. (2008) mention that this relationship is negative due 
to the fact that poor quality of loans reduces interest revenue and reduces bank 
profitability. However, Flamini et al. (2009) find a positive and significant effect of 
credit risk on profitability, which may suggest that risk-averse shareholders target 
risk-adjusted returns and seek larger earnings to compensate for higher credit risk. 
Paroush and Schreiber (2008) examine the relationship between credit risk, 
profitability and capital in US commercial and saving/mortgage banks, taking into 
account the simultaneous effect of the three variables. They argue that banks 
usually price loans and simultaneously set aside capital against unexpected losses. 
Their findings imply that the relationship between profitability and credit risk is 
more positive in commercial banks (with larger size loans and lower cost of 
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monitoring borrowers), while the relationship between capital and credit risk is 
more positive in saving/mortgage banks (with smaller loans and higher 
monitoring costs).  
Credit risk may also either directly affect lending behaviour or indirectly impact 
loan supply by its influence on profitability and capital. Berger and Udell (2004) 
show that banks tend to tighten credit standards in response to rising loan loss 
reserves or deterioration in credit quality. Dumicic and Ridzak (2012) add more 
evidence for the negative relationship between loan quality and earnings, 
capitalisation and loan supply in their study of Croatian banks during the global 
financial crisis. Their findings indicate that a rise in NPL will increase the future 
costs of banks. Through its influence on capitalisation, a rising NPL ratio would 
diminish credit supply to the non-bank sector. Nevertheless, Peek and Rosengren 
(2003) find the contradict behaviour from Japanese banks who have incentives to 
roll over loans for severely impaired firms to limit the growth of bad loans, despite 
the fact that this loan extension behaviour may create additional losses for the 
bank.  
e - Earning effect hypothesis 
As one of the key components representing financial soundness in the CAMEL 
system, earnings play an important role in all financial decisions of the banking 
sector. First, the theoretical and empirical literature suggests that changes in profit 
have a positive effect on bank capital. Since raising capital through capital markets 
is costly, retained earnings are frequently used to increase capital buffers (Myers, 
1984; Barton et al., 1989; Rime, 2001; Schaeck and Cihak, 2007; Jokipii and Milne, 
2009). However, the negative effect of ROA on bank capital buffers is also 
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significant according to the study of Stolz and Wedow (2005). These authors 
suggest that highly profitable banks are able to permanently generate high profits 
and retain earnings to increase capital; they therefore need to hold a lower level of 
capital buffers as insurance against a probable violation of the regulatory 
minimum.   
5.2.3. Critique of Existing Literature and Suggestion for Empirical Strategy 
The existing literature focuses on investigating each aspect of bank behaviour (i.e. 
asset quality, profitability, capital buffer or lending behaviour) separately. The 
study on the simultaneous adjustment of these all four dimensions of bank 
performance appears to be very limited. Furthermore, although the empirical 
evidence mostly shows the relationships between bank-specific characteristics in 
pairs, our literature survey suggests that specific performance and behavioural 
factors are endogenously determined.  
Secondly, empirical research measures bank behaviour which is mostly 
determined by internal variables of bank management decisions and external 
macroeconomic environment. They seem to ignore the common global shocks, 
which may impact domestic bank performance via the first-round effects on 
macro-financial condition. Regarding to the studies of global shock transmission 
across countries, the main focus is the asset price and capital flow channels with 
less attention has been paid to microeconomic condition and institutional factors.   
Lastly, in accordance with the study on one specific dimension of bank 
performance, current research tend to apply single-equation framework and the 
most common econometric technique is VAR model or fixed effects model in panel 
data. However, the fixed effects model may encounter the dynamic panel bias and 
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fail to capture the reverse causality of bank behaviour. The problem of endogenous 
nature of variables has been addressed in some empirical works using 
instrumental variables estimation (e.g. 2SLS), but 2SLS is efficient under 
homoscedasticity (Roodman, 2009).  
These literature gaps motivate the development of our empirical strategy. 
Specifically, this chapter examines the simultaneous adjustment in asset quality, 
profitability, capital buffer and lending behaviour in reaction to the changes in 
macro-financial environment and shocks in the global financial markets. It, 
therefore takes into account the effects of international contagion as well as 
monetary transmission mechanism. Moreover, the adjustment in one dimension of 
behaviour is endogenously determined by other bank-specific characteristics. In 
terms of econometrics, the partial adjustment model and system GMM estimation 
is applied to deal with dynamic panel data, fixed effects, endogeneity, omitted 
variables and persistent series. The following research hypotheses are developed 
from the theoretical framework of macro-financial linkages and empirical evidence 
of bank behaviour:  
Hypothesis 1: The deterioration of bank asset quality and profitability (because of the 
fall in borrowers’ loan-payoff probability) is linked to macro-financial shocks. 
Hypothesis 2: The shrinking in bank capitalisation is linked either directly to macro-
financial shocks or the deterioration in asset quality and profitability.  
Hypothesis 3: The reduction in bank loan supply is jointly determined by borrower 
balance sheet channel and bank capital channel, while the former is captured by the 
deterioration of loan portfolio quality and profitability because of the fall in 
borrowers’ loan-payoff probability.  
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Hypothesis 4: The adjustment in banks’ asset quality, profitability, capital and 
lending behaviour has been jointly determined by the macro-financial shocks and 
central banks’ policy interventions  
5.3. Empirical Models and Data Sample  
5.3.1. Empirical Models and Methodologies 
Partial Adjustment Model  
The empirical analysis is based on partial adjustment model to explore bank 
behaviour in interactions with balance sheet adjustment under macro-financial 
variability and shocks from the global financial markets. The simple specifications 
of the model are given by:  
(   )           (  
      ) 
(    )   
  ∑     
 
   
    
where: 
   represents the proxy variables for bank performance at time t;  
  
  is an optimal target level, hence, in the long run    will tend to converge toward 
  
   The optimal target level  is not readily observable, but it depends on a set of K 
internal and external factors, denoted by Xkt;  
  reflects the rate at which such convergence occurs.   measures the speed of 
adjustment  and lies between 0 and 1. The closer it approaches to 1, the faster the 
speed of adjustment; 
   is error term.  
234 | P a g e  
 
Combining (5.9) and (5.10) give the following model: 
(    )   (   )         
  (   )     ∑      
 
   
     
Equation 5.11 implies that the bank behaviour is a function of dynamic partial 
adjustment process and the desired target level, which may depend on the state of 
the economy and bank’s financial situation. We proxy four dimensions of bank 
behaviour with the following variables: (i) the ratio of NPL over gross loan 
(denoted by NPL) to measure asset quality (also credit risk), (ii) return on total 
asset ratio (ROA) to represent bank profitability, (iii) capital buffer (CAP), which is 
the excess capital ratio above the minimum required level in BASEL III (10%)56, 
and (iv) lending behaviour is measured by the percentage difference in total gross 
loan to non-bank customers (LOAN). Following the theoretical and empirical 
literature, the vector of explanatory variables, Xkt includes macroeconomic factors 
(ME), financial market variables (FM), global stress indices (GF) and bank-specific 
variables (Z). Applying partial adjustment model for each dimension of bank 
performance and behaviour, the four equations are set up as follows:   
(    )                                                
(    )                                                 
(    )                                                 
(    )                                                    
where:  
                                                          
56 In this study, capital buffer is preferable to the capital-to-asset ratio as generally used in the 
existing literature because capital buffer represents the cushion that controls for the level of bank 
risk and the probability of bank default. Furthermore, capital buffer is a direct measure of banks’ 
capacity to extend credit as it takes into account prudential regulation constraints.  
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  *       + refers to individual bank i; 
           with    the unobservable bank-specific effects and     the 
idiosyncratic error, given      (    
 ) and        (    
 ), independent of each 
other and among themselves. 
The estimated parameter   helps identify the adjustment factor   in partial 
adjustment model as             . All explanatory variables enter the 
estimation of equations 5.12-5.15 with the current lags basing on the assumption 
that banks revise their targets during estimation period.  
Difference and System GMM estimation and Model Specifications 
We run the specified equations 5.12 – 5.15 using dynamic panel data techniques 
with system GMM as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998). GMM is more relevant for this study for the following reasons. The 
first reason arises from the structure of the data panel, with a limited number of 
years (t = 9) and a substantial number of cross-sectional observations (n = 174) 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). Second, bank-specific characteristic variables are likely 
to be potentially endogenous (Athanasoglou et al., 2008) and some other 
independent variables are not strictly exogenous, which make the application of 
other econometric methodologies (OLS, fixed effects, 2SLS) inappropriate. GMM 
estimation allows for instrumenting of the endogenous variables and provides 
consistent estimates. Moreover, it is robust to the omitted variables problem, 
which often arises in the empirical work on determinants of bank performance. 
Third, this methodology helps avoid Nickell’s (1981) bias, when the presence of 
the lagged dependent variable with fixed effects gives rise to autocorrelation. The 
GMM estimation of Arellano and Bond (1991) is based on the first difference 
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transformation in the initial equation to eliminate the specific-effect component. 
The lags of the right hand side variables in the equations are used as instruments.  
In order to understand more about how GMM estimators accommodate such 
econometric concerns, let us reiterate the data generating process of a dynamic 
model. 
(    )                
      
           
 (  )   (   )   (     )    for i = 1, …, N and t = 2, …, T 
 (      )                     
As the disturbance term in equation 5.16 has fixed effect  , difference-GMM uses 
first-differencing transformation to eliminate the individual effect, such that:  
(    )                   
       
Although fixed effects are removed in equation 5.17, the lagged dependent variable 
and any predetermined variables in   that are not strictly exogenous become 
potentially endogenous because they may be correlated with            . GMM 
estimators use “internal instruments” to control for endogeneity. Specifically, they 
instrument the regressors in the first-differenced equation using levels of the 
second lags or more. Together with the previous assumption that error terms     
are serially uncorrelated, the assumption required on the initial conditions is that 
they are uncorrelated with the subsequent disturbances     for t=2, 3, …, T.  
These assumptions give moment restrictions:  
 (          )                 
237 | P a g e  
 
In general, the moment restrictions can be expressed as: 
 (  
    )                  
where Zi and     can be defined by the following matrices 
    [
         
           
       
              
]       [
    
    
 
    
]  
The GMM estimator for   in differenced-model ( ̂ ) is given by (Arellano and Bond, 
1991):  
 ̂  
    
     
    
   
    
     
    
     
 
where    (   
     
      
 )       (                )
        is the lagged 
version of   ;    (   
     
       
 ) ; and is WN a weight matrix determining the 
efficiency properties of the GMM estimator. 
However, according to Blundell and Bond (1998), the first-differences estimation 
has a large bias and low precision with short sample period and relatively 
persistent data. They show that when explanatory variables are persistent over 
times, lagged levels of dependent variables turn out to be weak instruments 
because they become less correlated with current first-differences. This is clearly a 
concern in the studies of bank behaviour, since some of the variables, such as bank 
assets, display high levels of persistency, even after controlling for time trends. We 
therefore follow Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) in using 
system GMM, derived from the jointly estimated system of two simultaneous 
equations in both levels (with lagged first differences as instruments) and in first 
differences (with lagged levels as instruments).  
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System GMM allows for additional moment conditions from the assumption on the 
initial condition such that:  (      )   . This holds when the process in mean is 
stationary, i.e.     
  
   
    with  (  )   (    )     The full set linear moment 
conditions under assumptions in system GMM is given by: 
 (          )                
 (          )               
or:  (   
   )           
   [
      
      
    
       
]      [
   
  
]  
The GMM estimator based on these moment conditions is 
 ̂  
   
     
    
  
   
     
    
    
; with    (   
    
 ) . 
Using XTABOND2 module for the STATA package (Roodman, 2009), we regress 
equations 5.12-5.15 with system GMM and the following model specifications:  
 Two-step estimation is chosen because is it asymptotically more efficient 
than the one-step estimator in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998) 
 However, the two-step estimator imposes a severe downward bias in 
standard errors. Follow Windmeijer (2005), finite sample correction to two-
step covariance matrix is employed in the estimations (Windmeijer-corrected 
cluster–robust errors). 
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 The validity of instrument sets is checked with the Hansen (1982) J-test. It is 
performed under the null of joint validity of all instruments. The J statistics 
normalises the empirical moments against their own estimated covariance 
matrix and is distributed χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the degree of 
overidentification. 
 To test for autocorrelation, the Arellano–Bond test is applied to check the 
absence of second-order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals.  
 Time dummies are included in all models to make the assumption of no 
correlation across individuals in the idiosyncratic in the autocorrelation test 
more likely to hold. 
5.3.2. Descriptions of Variables and Data Sources 
The empirical analysis is based on an annual panel dataset spanning the period 
from 2003 to 2011 and covering 174 commercial and investment banks and bank-
owned companies in eight East Asian countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan) 57. Banks are selected based on 
country location categories in the Bankscope database and start with all banks that 
have observations available within the time period from 2003 (or 2004) to 2011 
(or 2010). Banks without deposits or information on other bank-specific variables 
are then dropped from the sample. Not all banks enter the sample in every year, so 
the selection process results in an unbalanced panel. The cross-country 
distribution of banks is also uneven. For example, Japan accounts for 25% of total 
observations, while Singapore takes only a 2.3% share. Emerging East Asian 
                                                          
57 In total, we have 16 banks in KR, 23 in ID, 29 in ML, 17 in TL, 24 in PH, 41 in JP, 20 in HK and 4 in 
SG.  
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economies contribute around 63% of bank counts; nearly double the number of 
banks in developed markets (Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore). This caveat needs 
to be borne in mind when interpreting empirical results.   
The set of variables relating to macroeconomic variability, financial market 
perception, global financial stress factors and bank-specific characteristics is 
decided basing on the literature survey and the narrative of the crisis.   
Macroeconomic variables: the macroeconomic variables examined in this study 
consist of the real GDP annual growth rate (GDP), inflation calculated as the 
average change in the CPI (INFL), change in 3-month interbank rate (IR3M) as a 
proxy for the nominal interest rate, and the annual growth rate of export of goods 
and services (EXP). The global financial crisis hit the East Asian real economy 
badly via export and investment channels. Exports were significantly down in the 
fourth quarter of 2008, reflecting the evaporation of import demand in the US and 
Europe, the two biggest export destinations of many East Asian economies. The 
shrinking of exports led to factory closures and rising job losses, negative 
consumer sentiments which discouraged household spending, and negative 
business sentiments which discouraged investment. GDP contracted considerably 
in 2008 and 2009, in line with the global economic downturn. Additionally, under 
the pressure of increasing global commodity prices58, managing inflation remained 
a key policy concern for many central banks in the region in order to maintain 
macroeconomic stability.  
From a theoretical point of view, we develop the hypothesis that banks respond 
significantly to changes in the macro-economic condition. Specifically, adverse 
                                                          
58 In July 2008, the oil price peaked at $150 a barrel and food prices surged on higher global 
demand, standing around 50% higher than a year earlier. 
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economic conditions caused by a decline in GDP and exports (as a consequence of 
the contagion effect from external shock) negatively affect borrowers’ cash flows 
and reduce their loan payoff probabilities. As a result, banks may suffer losses 
because of the increasing problems in outstanding loans, interpretable as rising 
NPL and declining profits. The downward adjustments in loan portfolio quality and 
profitability will weaken bank capital. Associated with borrower balance sheets 
and bank capital effects, banks’ credit supply is expected to fall. At the same time, 
the economic slowdown also directly affects lending behaviour because it makes 
information in the financial markets even more asymmetric and worsens the 
adverse selection problem (Mishkin, 1999), hence discouraging banks’ willingness 
to lend. The effect of inflation and interest rates is challenging. In theory, increases 
in interest rates and unanticipated declines in inflation cause firms’ net worth to 
decrease, which leads to rising problems in the banking sector (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Bernanke and Gertler, 1994; Mishkin, 1999). However, in EMEs inflation is 
usually very high and variable; therefore an unanticipated decline in inflation will 
be more likely to have a favourable effect on firms’ balance sheets. But if variation 
in inflation and interest rates promotes uncertainties and financial volatilities, it 
may lead to asymmetric information with adverse selection and moral hazard 
(Mishkin, 1999), and will weaken a bank’s balance sheets. In short, the signs of the 
macroeconomic coefficients are expected as follows: 
Table 5.2 – Expected signs of the macroeconomic coefficients on bank behaviour 
 GDP EXP INFL IR3M 
NPL - - +/- +/- 
ROA + + +/- +/- 
CAP + + +/- +/- 
LOAN + + +/- +/- 
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Financial market variables: Four variables to represent the market perception of 
the financial health of a country are employed: composite stock price indices, 
which will be used for conversion into stock market returns (SR); conditional 
volatilities of stock returns are extracted from GARCH(1,1) procedure on weekly 
returns; returns on nominal exchange rates (FER); and sovereign CDS spreads 
(CDS). Many empirical studies strongly support the hypothesis that asset prices 
become highly correlated during a crisis. A negative shock in one country leads to a 
deterioration of balance sheets through inter-connected portfolios and causes the 
deleveraging process to take place in other countries as a contagion effect. As 
explained in previous chapters, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008, global investors dramatically reduced their exposures to East 
Asia, resulting in sharp declines in many stock markets. An adverse adjustment in 
stock price could dampen consumer spending through a negative wealth effect. 
Moreover, stock price devaluation promotes financial instability (Mishkin, 1999) 
and increases adverse selection and moral hazard problems because it leads to a 
large decline in the market value of firms’ net worth (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; 
Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990). Since borrowers have more moral hazard 
incentives to make risky investments and lenders are now less protected against 
the consequences of adverse selection, stock market declines and stock return 
volatility lead to a deterioration in banks’ asset quality, profitability and 
capitalisation and to declines in lending.  
Together with the contagion effect in the stock market and the dramatic collapse in 
international risk appetites following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the 
unprecedented increases in sovereign CDS spreads promoted financial volatility in 
East Asian countries. Changes in CDS may affect the default risk of banks because 
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financial institutions often hold a significant share of sovereign debt in total assets 
(Lahmann, 2012). For example, banks in Philippines widely exposed to the country 
sovereign spreads, which was often levered through innovative credit products 
such as Credit Linked Notes (Ree, 2011). The incentives for banks to hold 
sovereign debt is that this is considered as a ‘low-risk’ investment, providing a 
stable source of income, and that it receives favourable regulatory treatment. 
Therefore, a negative effect of CDS variable on banks’ financial soundness is 
expected (i.e. the increase in CDS spreads leads to negative effects on banks’ asset 
quality, profitability, capital and lending).  
Another factor contributing to financial instability is unanticipated exchange rate 
depreciation. Asian currencies59 (except the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan) 
depreciated sharply against the US dollar as a result of capital outflows and the 
sell-off of local currencies. Sudden exchange rate depreciations make domestic 
borrowers unable to roll over foreign currency liabilities, thereby exacerbating 
downward pressures on exchange rates. At the same time as the drying up of 
offshore credit, exports were collapsing, forcing firms who needed to refinance 
dollar-denominated debts and derivative exposures to sell local currency assets 
and/or to seek US dollar borrowing from local markets. This situation raised the 
financing costs faced by borrowers in East Asia, and consequently increased the 
perceived default risk of the banking sectors. Moreover, exchange rate 
depreciation can also produce direct effects on bank balance sheets because it 
causes a mismatch in the value of foreign denominated assets and liabilities 
(Mishkin, 1999). Specifically, currency devaluation leads to substantial rise in the 
                                                          
59 Indonesian rupiah, Korean won, Philippine peso, Indian rupee, Australian and New Zealand 
dollars. 
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domestic value of foreign denominated liabilities, while the value of foreign 
denominated assets typically does not rise because the likelihood of loan pay-off is 
quite low in the face of worsening business conditions.  
Global financial stress variables: In order to investigate the effect from the global 
financial crisis, we are particularly interested in employing two variables, VIX and 
TED that measure the state of the global financial markets. A higher value of VIX 
corresponds to more volatile market expectations, which will have a negative 
effect on bank performance. The higher TED spreads reflect the increase in risk of 
default on interbank loans and global liquidity strain. International banks tend to 
react to global liquidity shortages by withdrawing their exposure from other 
countries, causing a sudden stop in international lending flows. EMEs which are 
strongly reliant on wholesale funding tend to suffer more. This affects the supply 
side of domestic bank lending.  
Micro data of individual banks: From the literature survey, a distinctive feature of 
particular banks is expected to exert a decisive influence on the bank balance 
sheets, with simultaneous effects. The following bank level variables in is involved 
in the estimations: TA (logarithm of a bank’s total assets) to control for the asset 
size effect, NIEA (the ratio between non-interest expenses to total assets) to 
control for the efficiency effect, CAP (capital buffer) to control for the moral hazard 
effect, NPL (the ratio of NPL to gross loans) to control for the credit risk effect, ROA 
(return on total assets) to control for the earning effect, LOAN (growth rate of 
gross loan) to control for risk-taking behaviour, and LTD to capture bank liquidity 
and the relative dependence on wholesale funding. These factors are assumed to 
serve as endogenous variables for others and expected to have either positive or 
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negative coefficient signs. These micro variables are also useful to control for 
cross-sectional heterogeneity.   
Policy variables: In order to control for central bank interventions to sustain 
contagion effect, we extend the model by adding three policy variables: (i) the 
change in policy rates (ΔPR), (ii) adjustment of reserve requirement ratios (ΔRR), 
and (iii) government injection of bank capital (RECAP). RECAP is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 in the subsequent years to the application of a government 
capital injection into a specific bank and zero otherwise. These policy variables will 
capture the effect of the traditional bank lending channel. 
The macro data comes from IMF – IFS and IMF-WEO, financial market and global 
financial stress data are collected in Datastream and bank-level data are extracted 
from BankScope. The description of list of variables entered the empirical models 
is provided in Table 5.3. Table 5.4 is the summary of descriptive statistics of 
variables, which reports the min, max, mean, standard deviation and the number of 
observations. As can be seen from Table 5.4, there exist large performance 
differences of banks in the sample. On average, the NPL ratio between 2003 and 
2011 is 5.3%, which is quite low compared with the peak in the 1997 Asian crisis. 
The minimum NPL ratio is 0 belonging to a bank in Hong Kong, and the maximum 
is 61.85%, for a bank in Malaysia. Banks’ regulatory capital also varies 
considerably. The best capitalised bank in the sample has a total regulatory capital 
ratio of 91.6% (equivalent to a capital buffer of 81.6%), whereas this ratio for the 
least capitalised institution is -39.8%. The negative bank capital ratios may be due 
to the net accumulated losses (retained losses offset earnings) reported in the 
shareholder equity section in the balance sheets. However, on average banks in the 
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sample have high capital ratios, well above the Basel III requirement. In terms of 
profitability, the mean of bank ROA is reported at 0.94%, which is quite small 
because some banks experienced losses with negative ROA and the highest ratio is 
12%. There is also a quite large heterogeneity between banks in terms of their size, 
credit growth and cost efficiency.  
The statistics on macro and financial market variables also show evidence of a 
large dispersion both across countries and over time. Annual real GDP growth is 
3.85% on average, with the highest figure 14.76% in Singapore; the lowest ratio is 
-5.53% in Japan. In general, most of the countries in the sample experience 
negative GDP growth rates as a consequence of the global economic slowdown 
during the 2007-2009 crises. Like GDP growth rate, export growth rate also suffers 
a dramatic fall, to a lowest point of -24.20% from the peak of 27.5%; however, the 
mean value of 6.52% reflects the important role of exports in the economic growth 
of Asian countries. Inflation and interbank rates also show variability due to the 
global crisis and cross-country heterogeneity. The biggest difference in financial 
market variables belongs to CDS spreads, which have a minimum of 3.8 basis 
points (in Japan in 2006) and a maximum of 511.7 (in Philippines in 2004), 
reflecting the different perception of sovereign credit rating between countries in 
the region. This variable also has the highest standard errors of 105.2, indicating a 
high volatility level. The minimum value of stock return and return on exchange 
rates occurred during the global crisis in 2008 and 2009, although some countries 
had a very high returns, with a maximum of 45.56% before the crisis. The variation 
in VIX and TED variables indicates the collapse of the risk appetite of international 
investors and the global liquidity shortage, causing contagion effects to Asia. Table 
5.5 shows the correlation coefficients between variables entered into the 
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estimations. Since most of the correlations between independent variables are 
relatively low, there may be no problem in involving them all in the regressions. 
For variables of high correlations (above 0.6) at conventional confident level, they 
will be regressed separately in different specifications to avoid the problem of 
collinearity. 
Table 5.3 – Summary of explanatory variables 
Categories Variables description 
Mnemonic Definition 
Macro-
economic 
variables 
 
(IMF-IFS, 
IMF- WEO)  
GDP  Real GDP annual growth rate  
INFL Inflation, average consumer price (percent 
change) 
IR3M Change in 3-month interbank rate 
EXP Export of goods and services (real growth rate) 
Financial 
market 
variables 
 
(Datastream) 
SR Stock market return calculated from composite 
stock price indices (PI) with the following 
formula:           (        )⁄   
CVSR Conditional variances of stock returns extracted 
from GARCH(1,1) procedure on weekly returns 
FER Return on nominal foreign exchange rate (local 
currency per US dollar)  
CDS Sovereign credit defaults swaps spreads 
expressed by basis point (in logarithm)  
Global 
variables 
 
(Datastream, 
BIS) 
VIX Change in VIX  Chicago Board Options Exchange 
S&P 100 Volatility Index  
TED Spreads between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month US 
Treasury bill rate 
Bank-level 
variables 
 
(Bankscope) 
 
 
TA Logarithm of bank’s total assets (in billion USD) 
LTD Ratio between loan to deposit 
CR Regulatory capital ratios 
CAP Capital buffer: excess capital ratio above the Basel 
III minimum requirement (10%) 
NPL Non-performing loan to gross loan  
NIEA Non-interest expenses to total assets 
LOAN Percentage change in gross loan provided to non-
bank sectors 
ROA Net income after tax to average assets 
Central bank intervention variables 
ΔPR Changes in central bank policy rates  
ΔRR Adjustment in reserve requirement ratios  
Recap Bank capital support by government injections 
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Table 5.4 – Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Obs 
Bank-specific variables 
NPL 0.000 61.850 5.306 6.594 1466 
ROA -16.640 12.000 0.943 1.191 1497 
CR -29.840 91.600 16.127 7.996 1461 
CAP -39.840 81.600 6.127 7.996 1461 
LOAN -94.460 515.960 11.664 24.551 1483 
TA (level, in bil 
USD) 0.050 2594.496 96.593 273.136 1500 
TA (in 
logarithm) 3.907 14.769 9.610 2.027 1500 
LTD 0.001 6.852 1.162 214.192 1500 
NIEA 0.160 59.720 2.421 3.892 1497 
Macroeconomic variables 
GDP -5.530 14.760 3.859 3.139 1566 
EXP -24.200 27.400 6.530 9.497 1566 
INFL -2.570 13.104 2.928 3.009 1566 
IR3M -4.910 4.120 -0.179 1.332 1566 
Financial market variables 
SR -44.579 45.563 8.443 22.533 1566 
CVSR 1.590 27.910 10.486 5.717 1566 
FER -14.573 20.381 -2.341 6.397 1566 
CDS (in level) 3.800 511.700 97.128 105.199 1175 
CDS (in 
logarithm) 1.335 6.238 3.921 1.269 1175 
Global financial stress 
VIX -17.240 10.210 -0.563 7.668 1566 
TED 0.204 1.743 0.562 0.460 1566 
Policy variables 
ΔPR -5.250 5.320 -0.160 1.381 1566 
ΔRR -2.500 0.000 -0.109 0.454 1566 
RECAP 0.000 1.000   1566 
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Table 5.5-Correlation matrix of variables 
 
NPL ROA CAP LOAN NIEA LTD TA GDP EXP IR3M INFL SR CVSR FER CDS VIX TED 
NPL 1 
                
ROA -0.148* 1 
               
CAP 0.002 0.301* 1 
              
LOAN -0.142* 0.161* 0.001 1 
             
NIEA 0.021 0.086* 0.048 0.087* 1 
            
LTD -0.030 0.007 -0.022 0.006 0.003 1 
           
TA -0.238* -0.188* -0.466* -0.174* -0.151* -0.009 1 
          
GDP 0.048 0.222* 0.210* 0.153* 0.103* 0.002 -0.343* 1 
         
EXP -0.026 0.018 0.013 0.059* 0.018 0.038 -0.029 0.648* 1 
        
IR3M 0.033 -0.071* -0.056* -0.052* -0.046 0.005 0.109* 0.120* 0.084* 1 
       
INFL 0.065* 0.227* 0.232* 0.306* 0.180* 0.004 -0.527* 0.367* 0.118* 0.041 1 
      
SR -0.040 0.217* 0.082* 0.163* 0.078* -0.012 -0.213* 0.597* 0.530* 0.100* 0.345* 1 
     
CVSR -0.170* -0.101* -0.084* 0.004 0.024 0.019 0.102* -0.508* -0.369* -0.214* 0.108* -0.337* 1 
    
FER -0.037 0.088* 0.082* 0.022 0.055* -0.006 -0.158* 0.062* -0.033 -0.118* 0.109* -0.078* 0.135* 1 
   
CDS 0.202* 0.192* 0.266* 0.176* 0.198* 0.005 -0.510* 0.157* -0.062* -0.170* 0.628* -0.071* 0.149* 0.161* 1 
  
VIX -0.016 -0.098* -0.007 -0.037 -0.004 -0.024 0.007 -0.196* -0.217* -0.1626* -0.024 -0.431* 0.421* 0.237* 0.348* 1 
 
TED -0.075* -0.099* -0.052* 0.040 -0.006 -0.030 0.023 -0.264* -0.324* -0.067* 0.248* -0.225* 0.623* 0.017 0.055 0.501* 1 
Note: * denotes the statistical significant at the level of 5% (2-tailed test). 
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5.4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
The estimation results are reported in Tables 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9, each 
representing different dimensions of bank performance. Various specifications of 
equations 5.12-5.15 are examined. We first estimate bank behaviour, which is 
subject to the variability of domestic macroeconomic and financial conditions 
(specification 1 and 2). The global financial stress indicators are then included to 
capture the vulnerability of East Asian banks to external shocks from AEs 
(specification 3). Finally, proxy variables of central bank policy interventions 
during the crisis period are added in the regressions to see whether these 
measures gauge any difference in bank reactions to shocks. In all the estimations, 
the macro-financial variables are treated as strictly exogenous, while bank-specific 
variables are considered as endogenous, in the sense that each behavioural factor 
can simultaneously cause the responses of the others. The estimated models fit the 
panel data reasonably well, as indicated by the F-test statistics, which rejects the 
null hypothesis of jointly insignificant parameters. The Hansen test for over-
identifying restrictions confirms that the structural specifications are well 
modelled. High Hansen test p-values show the evidence that the null hypothesis of 
valid instruments cannot be rejected. Two diagnostics tests, AR(1) and AR(2) were 
used to check for first and second order autocorrelation in the residuals of the 
differenced equations. As Δvit and Δvi,t−1 are mathematically related to each other 
via the term vi,t−1,  negative first-order serial correlation is expected in differences. 
Thus, the test will look for second-order correlation in differences, i.e. to detect 
correlation between the vi,t−1 in Δvit and the vi,t−2 in Δvi,t−2. The p-values associated 
with AR(1) and AR(2) clearly indicate that the moment conditions of the models 
meet the requirements. Specifically, the tests reject the null hypothesis of zero first 
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order serial correlation but cannot reject the absence of second order 
autocorrelated errors.  
In all regressions, the lags of dependent variables are statistically significant at a 
level of 1% (5% for ROA), which confirms the persistent nature of bank 
performance and justifies the selection of dynamic models and system GMM. The 
estimated coefficients of lagged dependent variables give the speed of adjustment 
to a target value which is slow for asset quality (β is around 0.16) and capital 
buffer (β is around 0.25), but relatively faster for lending behaviour (β is around 
0.38). Bank profitability shows a lower level of persistence while it appears to be 
highly volatile. We also find that a substantial part of movements in bank 
performance as well as their target values reflects the changes in banks’ risks and 
earnings associated with the state of the economy and market perception. In all 
models, most of the macro-economic and financial variables have statistically 
significant effects on bank behaviour. However, the bank capital buffer is not very 
sensitive to external factors, but instead depends more on their specific 
characteristics. Generally, the empirical results seem to be fairly robust, although 
the significance and size of a few coefficients may vary in different specifications.  
5.4.1. Adjustment in Asset Quality 
The results in Table 5.6 show that most external factors influence the target level 
of asset quality. NPL is statistically and negatively affected by economic growth, 
export growth and inflation, while it is positively impacted by nominal interest 
rates. The significantly negative coefficients on GDP and EXP variables sharpen the 
cyclical nature of banks’ behaviour, implying that in downturns, higher than 
expected NPL ratios are associated with declines in borrowers’ cash flows and net 
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worth, which lower their debt servicing capacity. In particular, a decrease of 1% in 
the GDP growth rate leads to an increase of around 0.03% in the NPL ratio. 
Inflation shows negative effects but it not consistently significant in all 
specifications. Negative coefficient on INFL variable may suggest that high inflation 
reduce the real value of outstanding loan given fixed lending rates, which make 
debt servicing easier for borrowers. The positive effect of IR3M appears to be 
consistent with the theoretical consensus that rising interest rates increase debt 
burdens for borrowers and reduce debt pay-off probability, consequently 
deteriorating bank loan portfolio quality (Bernanke et al., 1994; Mishkin, 1999).  
The deterioration in financial market perceptions represented by increased CDS 
spreads and local currency depreciation also signals an increase in banks’ NPLs. 
Local currency depreciation lowers the debt-servicing capacity of export-oriented 
firms who borrow in foreign currencies. A small value of FER coefficient implies 
that borrowers may hedge their position from exchange rate risk, therefore the 
potential effect is not so large. Increases in sovereign credit risk signal economic 
uncertainties and financial instability, which have negative implications for banks’ 
risks and expected losses. Stock market return has a positive effect on dependent 
variable at the significant level of 10% but the marginal size of the coefficient is 
very small. The positive coefficient on SR variable suggests that a period of asset 
booms usually coincides with reckless risk taking, and a consequent increase in 
impaired loans.  
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Table 5.6 – System GMM Estimation of Asset Quality 
Dependent variable: NPL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.Y: Lag of  0.833*** 0.837*** 0.838*** 0.842*** 
dependent variable (0.037) (0.040) (0.036) (0.038) 
Adjustment parameters  0.167 0.163 0.162 0.158 
Macro variables 
    GDP  -0.029** 
 
-0.030** -0.027** 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) (0.011) 
INFL  -0.030** -0.041*** -0.030** -0.016 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
IR3M  0.032** 0.018 0.035** 
 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
 EXP 
 
-0.022*** 
  
  
(0.004) 
  Financial market variables 
   SR  0.003* 
 
0.003* 0.003 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
CVSR 
 
0.010* 
  
  
(0.005) 
  FER  0.009*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CDS  0.091*** 0.106*** 0.086*** 0.103*** 
 
(0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.036) 
Global factors 
    VIX 
  
-0.081*** -0.058** 
   
(0.030) (0.035) 
TED 
  
0.159*** 0.165*** 
   
(0.055) (0.055) 
Bank-specific characteristics 
   TA -0.024 -0.004 -0.025 -0.026 
 
(0.027) (0.022) (0.028) (0.028) 
LOAN -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.007) (0.0007) 
ROA -0.087** -0.088*** 0.084** -0.082** 
 
(0.034) (0.031) (0.003) (0.036) 
CAP -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
LTD 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.006 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) 
Policy interventions 
    ΔPR 
   
0.017 
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(0.023) 
ΔRR 
   
0.097** 
    
(0.030) 
RECAP 
   
0.099* 
    
(0.054) 
No. of Obs. 967 967 967 967 
Banks (cross sections) 174 174 174 174 
Instrument counts 168 168 170 172 
F-test 137.92*** 131.17*** 138.73*** 126.77*** 
Hansen test χ2 164.04 157.89 163.84 162.47 
 
[0.205] [0.313] [0.242] [0.266] 
AR(1) -4.71*** -4.68*** -4.60*** -4.81*** 
AR(2) -0.15 -0.23 -0.05 0.12 
Notes:  
(1) ***, ** and * represent statistical significant at levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively 
(2) Standard errors in parentheses 
(3) p-values for the Hansen test are reported in brackets 
 
Turning to global factors, the TED variable demonstrated a significant and positive 
influence on domestic banks’ asset quality, which indicates the transfer of credit 
risk. However, it is interesting to find that coefficient on VIX is negative and 
significant. This result can be interpreted as an option of Asian banks to await a 
decision to declare NPL and dilution through new lending when facing with the 
uncertainty in the global financial conditions.   
Among the bank-specific characteristic factors, there is a significant connection 
between NPL and banks’ loan growth and profitability. The negative coefficient of 
ROA on NPL supports the cost efficiency hypothesis. Better managed banks tend to 
have better quality of assets, on the contrary, deterioration in asset quality is more 
likely to increase in banks with lower profitability, meaning lower cost 
management skills. The change in gross loans also affects NPL at 1% significance 
level; however, the coefficient has a very small value. The negative impact of credit 
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growth and loan to deposit ratio on NPL implies the instantaneous effect of 
increases in gross loans, which lowers the ratio of NPL (provisionally) within that 
period. There is no evidence to support the size effect and moral hazard 
hypotheses, verified by insignificant coefficients on TA and CAP variables. A 
possible explanation for this is that East Asian banks are all well-capitalised; 
therefore the moral hazard incentive is minimised. 
5.4.2. Adjustment in Profitability 
Bank profitability shows a low level of persistence and a fast speed of adjustment, 
implying that its convergence toward equilibrium level is relatively rapid. One of 
the reasons can be the increasing intensity of competition in banking industry as a 
result of financial integration in East Asia. Banks profits and its optimal target level 
appear to be very sensitive to the state of the economy and financial market 
perception. Growth and export factors are the main macroeconomic drivers of 
bank profitability adjustment, but the coefficient signs seem intuitive. The business 
cycle significantly affects bank profits, even after controlling for other 
determinants. The positive effects of GDP on bank profitability are consistent with 
much of the previous empirical literature, confirming that bank profits improved in 
good economic conditions because there is higher demand for credit, as well as 
non-credit services and less credit risk. One of the most surprising results comes 
from the effect of the EXP variable on ROA. It is expected that this relationship 
should be positive, since high export growth implies good economic conditions60 
and high loan supply. However, the negative coefficient on EXP variable may reflect 
the attitude of banks toward risk. Subject to the increase in export growth which 
                                                          
60 Asian countries are exported-oriented economies and export plays an important role in economic 
growth. 
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consequently leads to more loan demand and supply, banks may assume a higher 
level of credit risk and hence increase loan loss provision. Such a high level of 
provisions in fact depresses bank income. There is also significant impact of 
inflation on profitability. The interpretation for its negative effect is that high and 
variable inflation rates may cause difficulties in negotiating loans and bring about 
an increase in bank costs (Hoggarth et al., 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
1999). The effect of change in interest rates on banks’ earnings turns to be 
insignificant, which is inconsistent with other studies. The reason may be due to 
the offset between the increase in bank costs (via increasing deposit rates) and 
bank revenue (via rising lending rates).  
Financial market performance has conflicting effects on ROA. The positive and 
significant influence of stock market returns on bank earnings is in line with 
expectations. The asset booms increase corporations’ borrowing capacities and 
bank credit as the main profit contributor also increases. The rise in stock returns 
also promises greater profit opportunities for borrowers, contributes to a 
reduction in credit risk and improves bank profitability. However, the coefficient 
on FER variable is positive and significant which seems to contradict to the 
research hypothesis that local currency depreciation signals financial instability 
that may increase credit risk and deteriorate bank income. One possible 
explanation for this result is that a small depreciation may improve the cash flows 
of export-oriented firms with a positive implication for bank profitability. The 
variable controlling for global liquidity shock, TED, has a significant and negative 
impact on ROA, demonstrating that funding shortages together with the corruption 
of international investors’ risk appetite, may lead to the contraction of cross-
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border banking flows and increase tension in the interbank market. This will lead 
to impaired access to funding and a drop in trading volumes.  
Table 5.7 – System GMM Estimation of Bank Profitability 
Dependent variable: ROA (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.Y: Lag of  0.142** 0.144** 0.143** 0.140*** 
dependent variable (0.056) (0.059) (0.058) (0.065) 
Adjustment parameters  0.858 0.856 0.857 0.860 
Macro variables 
    GDP  0.073** 
   
 
(0.028) 
   INFL  -0.033** -0.029** -0.027** -0.036** 
 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
IR3M  -0.012 0.050 0.052* 
 
 
(0.025) (0.031) (0.030) 
 EXP 
 
-0.025*** -0.024*** -0.030*** 
  
(0.007) (0.027) (0.010) 
Financial market variables 
SR  
 
0.004** 0.005** 0.005** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CVSR -0.007 
   
 
(0.009) 
   FER  0.007 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
CDS  0.038 -0.008 -0.008 0.050 
 
(0.062) (0.057) (0.057) (0.065) 
Global factors 
    VIX 
  
-0.012 -0.021 
   
(0.015) (0.014) 
TED 
  
-1.637*** -2.115*** 
   
(0.529) (0.775) 
Bank-specific characteristics 
TA -0.126* -0.140* -0.131* -0.186** 
 
(0.071) (0.073) (0.070) (0.080) 
LOAN -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
NPL -0.302** -0.336*** -0.332*** -0.369*** 
 
(0.102) (0.110) (0.110) (0.101) 
CAP -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.007 
 
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.020) 
LTD -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.005** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
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NIEA 0.031 0.026 0.026 0.031 
 
(0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) 
Policy interventions 
    ΔPR  
   
0.006 
    
(0.021) 
ΔRR  
   
-0.068 
    
(0.064) 
RECAP 
   
0.227 
    
(0.270) 
No. of Obs. 1113 1113 1113 1113 
Banks (cross sections) 174 174 174 174 
Instrument counts 175 175 177 206 
F-test 12.64*** 9.15*** 9.07*** 11.26*** 
Hansen test χ2 170.75 169.02 169.72 169.12 
 
[0.183] [0.209] [0.203] [0.777] 
AR(1) -2.76*** -2.7*** -2.7*** -2.64*** 
AR(2) -0.78 -0.57 -0.56 -0.70 
Notes:  
(1) ***, ** and * represent statistical significant at levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively 
(2) Standard errors in parentheses 
(3) p-values for the Hansen test are reported in brackets 
 
Turning to bank-specific characteristics, we find evidence to support the credit risk 
effect. As expected, rising NPL is negatively and significantly related to bank 
profitability, which means a poor quality of loans reduces interest revenue and 
increases provisioning cost, which lowers bank profitability. This suggests the 
important implication that in order to maximise profits, East Asian banks should 
improve the screening and monitoring of the risk of loan default. The negative and 
significant of coefficients on TA and LTD indicates that variability in bank earnings 
performance arises from different operating strategies. Specifically, bank 
profitability is more likely to improve in banks with smaller size and traditional 
business model. This lends the support to the economies of scope, which trade-offs 
the benefits of diversifications. For example, in order to maximise operating 
efficiency, banks tend to focus on the market share and product range that they 
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have comparative advantages rather than expanding and diversifying their 
operation. Moreover, banks that are less dependent on wholesale funding will tend 
to have higher profits. In all specifications, the effect of other bank-level factors is 
not statistically important. 
5.4.3. Adjustment in Capital Buffer 
The estimated parameters reported in Table 5.8 suggest a dynamic structure for 
bank capital buffer in which today’s buffer adjusts to the previous period level. 
However, the speed of adjustment toward the desired capital buffer is fairly slow 
(around 25% per annum), possibly due to market frictions and adjustment costs. 
The high cost of capital adjustment is also one of the important factors that explain 
why East Asian banks prefer to hold such high regulatory capital ratios. 
Surprisingly, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that changes in 
macroeconomic and financial conditions has a significant impact on bank capital 
buffer, which is contradictory to that of other studies. The empirical literature on 
the pro-cyclical bank behaviour has found that banks regularly change their capital 
holdings to accommodate fluctuations in risk arising from variations in the 
economic environment (Ayuso et al., 2004; Lindquist, 2004; Nier and Baumman, 
2006; Brown and Davis, 2009; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Stolz and Wedow, 2009; 
Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2009). However, the insignificance of the coefficients on 
most of the exogenous macro-financial variables appears to be consistent with 
Vennet et al’s. (2004) arguments that highly capitalised banks are better able to 
alleviate adverse changes in the business cycle, and consequently are less sensitive 
to shifts in business cycle conditions. Moreover, this result may suggest that, given 
the fluctuation in the economic environment and financial markets, the change in 
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banks’ capital base and the change in risk-weighted assets are at the same rate. 
This is because bank assessment of how much capital should be increased to 
provide a buffer against elevated risk is parallel to that implied by the associated 
change in risk-weighted assets (Wong et al., 2005).  
Among all external factors, only nominal interest rates, export and VIX index affect 
the target capital at a conventional significant level. The positive coefficient on 
IR3M variable indicates that increasing interest rates will lead to a reduction in 
bank lending and the consequent risk-weighted assets. This has simultaneous 
effect to lower bank regulatory capital ratio. The impacts of export and VIX on 
capital buffer reflect the fact that banks seek to adjust their buffers basing on 
perception about risks. Specifically, a rising export growth rate is going to be 
associated with rising loan demand. Subject to the increase in loans, banks may 
perceive that their asset portfolio has become more risky. Furthermore, an 
increasing VIX index signals financial uncertainties and risks are more likely to 
materialise. Therefore, banks tend to increase their capital buffers as an insurance 
against risk. 
However, it is interesting to find that while bank capital is not very sensitive to 
macro-financial conditions; it is highly dependent on banks’ own characteristics. 
Coefficients on LOAN, ROA and NPL are all significant at the level of either 1% or 
5%. The findings support the results from Alfon et al. (2004), in that banks decide 
the level of capital according to internal risk assessment. First, the negative 
coefficients of LOAN indicate that the increase in risky assets will have a 
contemporaneous effect on weakening bank capital ratios. ROA also shows a 
statistically significant and positive effect, implying that profitable banks prefer to 
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retain their earnings to improve their capitalisation. Lastly, the negative and 
significant coefficient of NPL indicates that default risk or credit risk weakens the 
bank capital position. Combining the continuous effects from NPL on ROA, ROA on 
CAP and NPL on CAP, we can conclude that credit losses remain key drivers of 
capital shocks.  
Table 5.8 – System GMM Estimation of Capital Buffer 
Dependent variable: CAP (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.Y: Lag of  0.757*** 0.751*** 0.748*** 0.749*** 
dependent variable (0.061) (0.062) (0.060) (0.061) 
Adjustment parameters  0.243 0.249 0.252 0.251 
Macro variables 
    GDP  -0.006 
   
 
(0.128) 
   INFL  -0.029 0.041 0.042 0.091 
 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.094) 
IR3M  0.256* 0.332*** 0.298** 
 
 
(0.136) (0.148) (0.145) 
 EXP 
 
0.060* 0.058* 0.090*** 
  
(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) 
Financial market variables 
   SR  -0.025* 
   
 
(0.014) 
   CVSR 
 
-0.005 -0.003 -0.030 
  
(0.035) (0.005) (0.048) 
FER  0.014 -0.028 -0.026 -0.030 
 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) 
CDS  -0.087 -0.136 -0.095 -0.076 
 
(0.195) (0.216) (0.220) (0.222) 
Global factors 
    VIX 
  
0.068** 1.026*** 
   
(0.320) (0.353) 
TED 
  
-0.337 -0.068 
   
(0.414) (0.536) 
Bank-specific characteristics 
   TA -0.302 -0.198 -0.190 -0.194 
 
(0.283) (0.201) (0.198) (0.216) 
LOAN -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
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ROA 0.906*** 0.806*** 0.744*** 0.780*** 
 
(0.189) (0.192) (0.192) (0.194) 
NPL -0.104** -0.116*** -0.112** -0.114** 
 
(0.047) (0.044) (0.004) (0.044) 
LTD -0.015 -0.004 -0.011 -0.015 
 
(0.053) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062) 
Policy interventions 
    ΔPR 
   
0.244 
    
(0.155) 
ΔRR 
   
0.425 
    
(0.588) 
RECAP 
   
-0.993 
    
(0.634) 
No. of Obs. 961 961 961 961 
Banks (cross sections) 174 174 174 174 
Instrument counts 168 168 170 172 
F-test 65.24*** 80.17*** 79.78*** 72.98*** 
Hansen test χ2 167.26 162.28 161.78 159.64 
 
[0.159] [0.233] [0.278] [0.319] 
AR(1) -5.02*** -5.08*** -5.14*** -4.98*** 
AR(2) -0.15 -0.12 -0.21 -0.24 
Notes:  
(4) ***, ** and * represent statistical significant at levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively 
(5) Standard errors in parentheses 
(6) p-values for the Hansen test are reported in brackets 
 
5.4.4. Adjustment in Lending Behaviour 
The empirical results in Table 5.9 show that the lagged dependent variable has a 
positive sign and statistically significant in all specifications, giving the adjustment 
parameter of around 0.37. This implies that banks tend to adjust their loan 
portfolios toward the desired level of around 37% per annum. Although the speed 
of adjustment in credit growth is relatively slow, it is somehow faster than those of 
asset quality and capital buffer.  The possible explanations for the slower speed of 
asset quality adjustment is due to the delayed effects of recognizing NPLs, while 
the delay in the closure of capital gap may indicate that the cost of adjusting capital 
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is higher than the cost associated with loan portfolio adjustment. Overall, the rate 
at which banks adjusts their lending behaviour depends significantly on GDP 
growth, inflation, changes in nominal interest rates, foreign exchange rates, global 
financial stress and changes in their specific performance characteristics. First, a 
positive coefficient of GDP affirms the procyclical nature of lending behaviour in 
banks’ response to crisis. Specifically, during an economic upturn, firms’ cash flows 
are improved and banks have an incentive to extend credit to borrowers. On the 
contrary, a recessionary period not only increases the risk of loan default but also 
lowers loan demand, especially in large exporting corporate clients, as a result of 
global demand dry-ups. Therefore, banks may react to these combined effects of 
the downturn by rationing credit. Subject to the effect of inflation, it suggests that 
higher inflation significantly increases the quantity of loans extended to the private 
sector. This result appears to contradict the theoretical literature which 
investigates the connection between inflation, financial intermediaries and 
economic growth (Barro, 1995; Huybens and Smith, 1998). The key insight of these 
theories suggests that inflation might adversely affect economic growth through 
credit rationing in the banking sector. In particular, higher inflation decreases the 
real rate of return on assets, contributing to lower credit quality because 
borrowers entering the credit markets in that condition are more likely to default 
on their loans. Moreover, in the presence of information asymmetries, higher 
inflation exacerbates credit market frictions, with negative repercussions for 
financial sector performance. Banks may react to these effects by reducing the 
overall amount of credit available to business. However, further theoretical and 
empirical predictions stress the nonlinear relationship between inflation and 
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finance (Azariadis and Smith, 1996; Boyd and Smith, 1997; Boyd et al., 2000)61. 
Several inflation thresholds have been considered in the literature, suggesting that 
once inflation exceeds a certain critical level, credit rationing occurs. For example, 
Boyd et al. (2001) find evidence of a threshold of 15%, which means that 
economies with annual inflation rates above 15% may experience a large drop in 
financial sector development. In other words, beneath a certain threshold, higher 
inflation might actually lead to increased credit growth. This argument can be a 
good explanation to support the significant positive coefficient on INFL variable in 
our estimation, as during the analysed period inflation in East Asian countries was 
well-behaved and under control62. The negative significant effect of IR3M on LOAN 
is consistent with the credit rationing theory (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), 
demonstrating that a higher interest rates lead to greater adverse selection and 
increases the likelihood that banks are lending to a bad credit risk. Moreover, in 
Bernanke and Gertler’s (1994) survey of the credit view of monetary transmission, 
a rise in interest rates causes a debt burden for households and firms and 
decreases firms’ cash flows. Theoretically, even a small rise in risk free rate may 
lead to a huge decline in lending and the possible collapse of the loan market 
(Mishkin, 1997).  
Turning to financial variables, currency devaluation is associated with raising the 
perceived level of uncertainty about firms’ future cash flows and profitability. This 
discourages bank from extending credit. At the same time, global financial 
                                                          
61 For example, Azariadis and Smith (1996) and Boyd et al. (1997) argue that when inflation is very 
low, credit market frictions may be “non-binding”, so that inflation does not distort the flow of 
information or interfere with resource allocation for growth. When inflation exceeds a certain 
threshold level, credit market friction becomes binding, which intensifies credit rationing.  
62 Most countries had relatively low and stable inflation during the period (moderate single-digit 
inflation). Central banks always pay attention to manage inflation pressures. For example, when 
inflation peaked at 12% in Indonesia in September 2008, the policy rate was raised by 175 basis 
points to help maintain the real rate of return.  
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uncertainties are signalled by increasing VIX and TED indices. Changes in investors’ 
expectations can be self-fulfilling and have negative aggregate effect of bank 
lending. Moreover, TED spreads is also a measure of global funding shock. 
Although East Asian countries were considered to be less reliant on wholesale 
funding (except Korea) because domestic deposits were large enough to meet 
private credit needs, the estimation results suggest that liquidity shortage in 
international credit market has deterred commercial banks’ private credit growth. 
For example, facing with global liquidity shortage, international banks tend to stop 
rolling over their lending to the region. In the presence of informational 
asymmetry, domestic banks cannot perfectly substitute wholesale funding with 
domestic deposits. Therefore, a sudden stop in cross-border funding will 
propagate shock through the same transmission mechanism as stated in the 
literature on bank lending channels (Bernanke and Blinder, 1989; Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995; Kashyap and Stein, 2000). This finding once again cautions East 
Asian bank vulnerabilities to international liquidity and capital flow cycles.  
In all specifications, we find that credit growth is driven by bank soundness, as 
sounder banks have more capacity to manage risks and to expand faster than 
others. First, improved asset quality has a statistically significant impact on the 
issuance of more private credit to businesses. On the contrary, increasing NPL in a 
downturn, coupled with a decline in the value of collaterals, engenders greater 
caution among banks and leads to a tightening of credit extension. Moreover, high 
NPL also has negative implication on banks’ capital position and limit their access 
to financing as mentioned in bank capital channel. This in turn contributes to lower 
banks’ credit growth. Generally speaking, there would be a strong, albeit adverse 
feedback effect from losses in banks’ balance sheets on economic activities. Second, 
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credit tends to grow faster in highly profitable banks, as verified by the 
significantly positive coefficient on ROA. This may be because more profitable 
banks are less constraints and less risk averse, they are therefore more likely to 
expand their loan portfolios. There is also evidence to confirm that bank 
capitalisation significantly influences the reaction of credit supply to macro-
financial shocks; however, this result is likely to support banks’ attitude toward 
risk rather than the bank capital channel. A negative effect of the CAP variable on 
LOAN indicates that well-capitalised banks are more risk-averse because they 
want to limit the probability of not meeting capital requirements (Dewatripont and 
Tirole, 1994). Moreover, the implicit subsidy derived from deposit insurance is a 
decreasing function of capital (Flannery, 1989; Gennotte and Pyle, 1991), so well-
capitalised banks tend to reduce their lending supply in poor economic conditions 
to avoid risk. Lastly, the sensitivity of credit growth to the bank liquidity buffer 
(LTD) turns out to be insignificant, suggesting that decelerating loan growth is 
diluted by a drop in deposit growth. 
Table 5.9 – System GMM Estimation of Credit Growth 
Dependent variable: LOAN (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.Y: Lag of  0.625*** 0.613*** 0.625*** 0.617*** 
dependent variable (0.212) (0.218) (0.212) (0.213) 
Adjustment parameters  0.375 0.377 0.375 0.373 
Macro variables 
    GDP  0.020*** 
 
0.021*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
INFL  0.021** 0.006* 0.021** 0.021** 
 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) 
IR3M  -0.010** -0.011** -0.010** 
 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
 EXP 
 
-0.001 
  
  
(0.185) 
  Financial market variables 
    SR  -0.001 
 
-0.001 -0.003 
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(0.009) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
CVSR 
 
0.009** 
  
  
(0.003) 
  FER  -0.008** -0.006** -0.008** -0.007** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
CDS  0.006 0.029 0.007 0.006 
 
(0.019) (0.030) (0.019) (0.020) 
Global factors 
    VIX 
  
-0.681* -0.633* 
   
(0.387) (0.301) 
TED 
  
-6.944* -6.448* 
   
(3.937) (2.974) 
Bank-specific 
characteristics 
    TA 0.375* 0.347* 0.376* 0.378* 
 
(0.198) (0.210) (0.200) (0.196) 
NPL -0.010** -0.011*** -0.010** -0.011** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ROA 2.704*** 2.765** 2.300** 2.403* 
 
(0.871) (1.165) (1.007) (1.570) 
CAP -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
LTD -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Policy interventions 
    ΔPR 
   
-0.011** 
    
(0.005) 
ΔRR 
   
0.038 
    
(0.025) 
RECAP 
   
0.097 
    
(0.074) 
No. of Obs. 1116 1116 1116 1116 
Banks (cross sections) 174 174 174 174 
Instrument counts 183 183 185 187 
F-test 1744*** 1818*** 1904*** 1683*** 
Hansen test χ2 169.84 170.05 169.09 168.21 
 
[0.361] [0.357] [0.419] [0.437] 
AR(1) -1.98** -1.97** -1.96** -2.07** 
AR(2) -0.50 -0.24 -0.50 -0.48 
Notes:  
(1) ***, ** and * represent statistical significant at levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively 
(2) Standard errors in parentheses 
(3) p-values for the Hansen test are reported in brackets 
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5.4.5. Behavioural Response to Policy Interventions 
In response to the crisis, especially to boost economies, stabilise financial markets 
and shore up the banking system, central banks introduced time-line policy 
interventions across the region. Complemented by fiscal stimulus packages, 
monetary policy measures were taken, including policy rates cuts, reserve 
requirement reduction and government injections of bank capital. Specifically, the 
accumulated changes (in basis point) in policy rates for the period from September 
2008 to 2009 are as follows: Indonesia (-225), Japan (-40), Korea (-325), Malaysia 
(-150), Philippines (-200), Thailand (-250) and Hong Kong (-300). A reserve 
requirement adjustment was applied in Indonesia (-4.1%), Malaysia (-3%) and 
Philippines (-2%) (Filardo et al., 2010). Government injections of bank capital 
were announced in Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand and Korea for state-owned banks 
to boost bank lending in late 2008 and 2009. We test the impact of these policy 
responses on bank behaviour by including policy intervention variables in all 
regressions. The estimation results in specification 4 of Table 5.9 provide evidence 
to support the bank lending channel theory. The significant and negative 
coefficient of ΔPR implies that easing monetary policy helps to boost bank lending 
to overcome continuous recession. This also evidences the pass-through of policy 
rate cuts to borrowing cost (See Appendix 5.1), which contributed to minimising 
the financial accelerator effects as the East Asian economies recovered quickly in 
2010. The insignificance of the ΔRR and RECAP variables may be due to statistical 
problems, i.e. limited observations relative to the full sample63. Although monetary 
policy variables do not yield any direct significant effects on other dimensions of 
                                                          
63 The cross-country study by Laeven and Valencia (2011) shows that the recapitalisations of banks 
conducted in 50 different countries had a significant positive effect on the growth performance of 
credit dependent firms.  
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bank performance, such as asset quality, bank profitability or capital buffer, they 
may have indirect effects in terms of mitigating macro-financial variability. 
Moreover, although these measures do not generate significant effects individually, 
they may have a joint significantly positive effect with other measures such as 
guarantees, asset purchases and liquidity supports on preserving the 
intermediation function of the financial sector, as verified by the quick economic 
recovery and financial stability of the region.  
5.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated the interlinkages between macro-financial variability 
and bank behaviour, which justifies the second round effects of the 2007-2011 
global financial crisis on East Asia. Applying the partial adjustment models and 
dynamic panel data techniques with System GMM estimation, the empirical 
analysis provides some evidence to confirm the hypothesis of balance sheet 
adjustments in interactions with shocks in the financial system and the economy. 
However, banks will react differently depending on their financial strength and 
attitude toward risks. The main finding is that volatility in the global financial 
markets and changes in domestic macro-financial conditions negatively affects 
bank asset quality, profitability and lending behaviour. Although there is no robust 
evidence to support the direct effect of macro-financial variation on bank capital 
adjustment, there is an indirect effect that occurs from its impact on bank financial 
soundness, which tends to change capital buffers. For example, deterioration in 
asset quality may reduce profitability and directly or indirectly weaken capital for 
banks that raise capital via retained earnings. In other words, the main source of 
capital shock is credit losses, which potentially arises under macro-financial 
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unfavourable conditions resulted from international financial contagion. This may 
suggest an important implication for bank managers and authorities in terms of 
managing default and credit risk, and strictly adhering to regulatory capital 
requirements as a cushion to absorb negative shocks. Additionally, the empirical 
results also show evidence about the effectiveness of conventional monetary 
easing measures. Specifically, aggressive interest rate cuts help to boost domestic 
credit and to mitigate the impact of the global crisis on East Asian economies. This 
experience may draw an interesting lesson for central banks in manipulating 
monetary policy that explicit inflation targeting is not always easier than non-
inflation targeting in terms of boosting confidence, stimulating economic activity 
and controlling inflation. 
Our results are robust but they are still subject to some limitations. First, the data 
are not timely, so may not fully capture the procyclical nature of bank behaviour. 
Second, the low frequency of the data (annually) may also cause some bias, as we 
expect the effect and adjustment to occur quarterly. Third, the data sample does 
not involve all financial institutions, and not all financial institutions report 
comprehensive data. Last, the differences in national regulatory and accounting 
and tax regimes may reduce the effectiveness of cross-country comparison.  
In general, the adverse effects of global economic and financial market turmoil on 
the East Asian banking system are not insignificant, but limited and manageable. 
The effects also occurred in a short period of time. East Asia has showed a very 
quick recovery since 2010; in fact, the region has actually experienced a V-shaped 
business cycle. This stylised fact has two implications. First, the financial 
accelerator effect is negligible with external shock, although it is proved to be 
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amplified by an internal shock. Second, the quick recovery is due to timely policy 
interventions to boost the economies. This may suggest that although good 
fundamentals do not guarantee a full decoupling from crisis contagion, they have 
provided scope for strong and effective policy responses.   
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6. CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION 
 
6.1. Main findings and contribution of the thesis 
History is strewn with financial crisis episodes and their frequency has been 
double that of the Bretton Woods Period (1945-1971) and the Gold Standard Era 
(1880-1993) (Bordo et al., 2001). Nevertheless, the global financial crisis was 
unpredicted by the international financial community in terms of its suddenness, 
financial scale, and especially its cross-border contagion (See Appendix 6.1). Unlike 
the series of financial turbulent episodes in the 1990s, when EMEs were at the 
epicentre of the crises, the global financial crisis started from the problems in AEs 
in North America and Europe. However, the unprecedented spike in financial 
stress in AEs heightened this stress across EMEs to the levels above those 
witnessed during the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis. Improved and resilient 
macro-financial fundamentals, especially higher current account and fiscal 
balances, did little to insulate those EMEs from crisis contagion. The turbulence in 
the global financial markets in the past five years has implied that those who 
believe in the decoupling myths surrounding EMEs have underestimated the 
potential costs of cross-border financial linkages, while over-estimating the 
cushion from economic fundamentals. It seems that in the new global economy, 
sound fundamentals may not be enough to prevent financial crises. The extent of 
pass-through of financial stress varies across countries, depending not only on the 
depth of their financial linkages with AEs, but also on country-specific risks and 
their historical experiences.  
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This thesis has attempted to provide an econometric assessment of cross-border 
financial linkages and international financial contagion. The fundamental question 
is to identify the financial mechanisms that propagate and amplify shocks from AEs 
to EMEs in East Asia. Three channels have been investigated: (i) asset price 
volatility linkages, (ii) sudden stop in cross-border funding, and (iii) the second-
round effects on banking sectors prompted by macro-financial linkages. 
The first transmission mechanism was investigated in chapter three. The literature 
survey reveals that methodologies in testing contagion via asset prices are 
subjective to some econometric problems, making empirical evidence rather 
inconclusive. This study applied the MS-VAR framework to model asset prices’ 
volatility linkages and their dynamic behaviour during financial stress, and the 
multivariate unconditional correlation tests to assess whether the volatility shock 
transmission is simply “interdependence” or a consequence of “shift-contagion”. 
The contribution of this chapter is the testing technique, which has taken into 
account the endogeneity of the variables, non-linear linkages, heteroscedasticity, 
simultaneous equations and allowed for endogenous identification between 
normal and crisis periods instead of an a priori breakdown of the sample data.  
The empirical results show the structural change in variances is common to all 
countries and coincides with major events of the global financial crisis of 2007-
2011. This kind of asset price interaction has been strongly linked to the 
globalisation of financial markets in East Asia, which allows international investors 
to increase their exposure in those markets to search for high yielding investments, 
as well as allowing domestic investors to extend their investments in more 
complicated financial products in AEs. The linkage is as strong in normal periods 
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as crisis periods, except for the case of Thailand, whose stock return volatility 
linkages with those of the US significantly strengthened during the time of financial 
stress. This has the important implication that global investors are especially 
sensitive to countries which have suffered a severe financial crisis in the past.   
One of the interesting results is the intensified intra-regional linkages in the event 
of an external shock and there may be a transfer in directional interactions. The 
fact that financial markets in East Asian countries are closely linked to each other 
is not a new discovery. A number of studies have shown that the interaction of East 
Asian financial markets caused financial contagion during the regional financial 
crisis of 1997-1998. However, the level of integration within regional markets has 
also been significantly enhanced by the external financial shock, causing crisis 
contagion to be considered as severe as internal shock. For example, the stock 
return volatility in the US and EU did not have direct contemporaneous effects on 
all East Asian countries at the same time, but it may have exported its volatility 
first to Hong Kong via direct financial linkages, and then Hong Kong volatility 
shock may have caused shift-contagion in Singapore and Indonesia. The linkages in 
foreign exchange and sovereign debt markets also experienced a significant 
improvement. Exchange market integration can be explained by the increasing 
inter- and intra-regional trade which leads East Asian members to monitor and 
follow the behaviour of currencies in neighbouring countries in order to maintain 
their competitive advantages. On the other hand, the intra-regional equity and 
sovereign markets reflects the fact that markets have the same assessment of 
country credit risk in the region, making those countries more vulnerable to the 
wake-up call effect. In general, these findings confirm that contagion tends to be 
regional rather than global. 
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In addition to affecting asset prices, foreign exchange rates and changes in 
sovereign default, the financial crisis also affected investors’ willingness to extend 
credit to EMEs. Therefore, an exclusive focus on asset price channel may not be 
sufficient. Chapter four tested the probability of the sudden stop in cross-border 
funding and the links between the sudden stop to the interbank market tensions in 
host countries. While empirical literature has strongly focused on the gravity 
models and base regression to measure the waves in cross-border funding flows 
associated with various pull and push factors; this chapter appears to be the first to 
use the univariate and recursive bivariate probit models to quantify the marginal 
effects of several global and country-specific risk factors on the sudden stop 
probability and its simultaneous effects on East Asian interbank markets. This 
econometric approach fits the nature of the panel data and the research objectives.  
We find that cross-border banking and high reliance on external funding expose 
East Asian countries to the risk of a sudden stop in international lending flows 
caused by the common lender and wake up-call effects. In the context of the 2007-
2011 global financial crisis, the sudden stop was also associated with a liquidity 
shock in international credit markets, which affected the supply of bank loans and 
host country aggregate productivity shock, which reduced the demand for bank 
loans. This caused the transmission of money market tensions from AEs to the 
seven East Asian countries. However, interbank stress was mitigated by the “flight-
home effect” caused by the active repatriation of funds invested abroad by 
domestic investors and the serial liquidity support introduced by central banks in 
those countries. A sudden stop is more likely to occur in countries with lower 
financial openness but higher financial risks, such as local currency depreciation 
and stock market volatility. The results also show that international lending flows 
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to the banking sector are more sensitive to shocks and hence suffer a higher level 
of volatility than the flows to the non-bank private sectors. This is because lending 
to banking sector is commonly in the form of direct cross-border lending, 
denominated in foreign currencies, and relies on wholesale funding. On the other 
hand, the latter is usually in the form of local lending by foreign subsidiaries and 
branches, mostly denominated in local currencies and partly funded by local 
deposits. This suggests important policy implications for East Asian authorities in 
stabilising cross-border banking flows in particular, and in managing international 
capital flows in general. 
The last potential crisis transmission channel to be tested in this thesis was the 
second-round effects on banking sectors prompted by macro-financial linkages. 
This enhances the contribution of this thesis because it fills the gap in the financial 
literature. Most of the studies which investigate the transmission of global shock 
between economies focus on real effects via trade links or financial effects via the 
co-movement of asset prices and international capital flows. They ignore the 
potential of the second round effects, defined as adverse feedback loops from 
changes in macro-financial conditions on the performance of banking sectors via 
the rise in NPL and deterioration of bank profitability and capital with negative 
implications for bank lending. In the studies of bank behaviour, a notable gap 
arises from the separate examination of adjustment in one specific dimension of 
performance, with limited attention paid to simultaneous adjustment in overall 
performance. Moreover, the application of partial adjustment model and system 
GMM estimations to examine the adjustment in bank asset quality, profitability, 
capital adequacy and loan supply overcomes the drawbacks from other 
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econometric approaches in dealing with dynamic panel bias, persistent series, 
endogeneity, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  
The empirical results provide some evidence to confirm the hypothesis of bank 
balance sheet adjustments in interactions with shocks in the financial system and 
the economy. This therefore, justifies the second-round effects of the global 
financial crisis on East Asian economies. Specifically, we find that global financial 
stress and variation in domestic macro-financial conditions negatively affect bank 
asset quality, profitability and either directly impact or feedback on bank lending. 
Bank capital appears to stay resilient as relatively high regulatory capital ratios 
provide banks with a cushion to absorb negative shocks. However, if adjustment in 
asset quality and bank profitability is large enough, it will activate an adjustment in 
bank capital, causing capital shocks. There is also some evidence to support the 
effectiveness of monetary easing policy. By aggressively cutting policy rates, 
central banks were successful in boosting bank lending and mitigating the 
contagion effect. In particular, this experience may suggest a very important lesson 
in manipulating monetary policy, that explicit inflation targeting is not always 
easier than non-inflation targeting in stimulating economic activity and controlling 
inflation. Although the second-round effects are inevitable in the context of macro-
financial interaction, these effects were relatively limited and manageable in East 
Asian countries. The quick recovery in those economies implies that financial 
accelerators may be not very strong for external shock compared to internal shock. 
But the most important reason is that central banks in the region have had active 
and time-line policy interventions to control this effect.  
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6.2. Policy implications 
6.2.1. Trade-offs of financial liberalisation  
The thesis has provided some empirical evidence of potential costs associated with 
cross-border financial linkages, especially the increased vulnerability and 
susceptibility of a country to external shocks despite its sound fundamentals. This 
brings about an important implication for the trade-offs associated with financial 
liberalisation. 
Financial liberalisation strategies and proper diversification: the findings in 
chapter 3 and 4 imply that volatility transmission, shift-contagion effect and the 
sudden stop in international funding occurred not only in developed markets of 
Hong Kong and Singapore but also in emerging Asia. Nevertheless, the stories from 
the Asian financial centres suggest that while financial openness exposed them to 
large withdrawals of foreign capital in stress conditions, the repatriation of 
domestic investors more than offset capital outflows and mitigated the pressures 
in the financial markets. On the contrary, EMEs with less interconnectedness and 
lower flexibility are more likely to be subject to higher one-way risk of 
deleveraging. Therefore, reducing a country’s exposure to international trade and 
finance does not necessarily help to avoid risks and enhance stability. Instead, it is 
crucial to balance this trade-off with an appropriate strategy of liberalisation and 
diversification supported by well-functioning financial markets and sound 
fundamentals. According to the IMF (2012), countries may achieve the largest 
benefits of liberalisation when they attain a certain level of financial and 
institutional development. Moreover, a larger number of cross-border links (i.e. 
increased interconnectedness) provides better risk diversification and make the 
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network more robust (Allen and Gale, 2005). The concentration of exposures to a 
few sources could create severe deleveraging, especially when a shock hits this 
single source country. Diversification in cross-border capital transactions should 
be considered from both inward and outward dimensions, as each direction can 
deliver diversification benefits.64   
Developed and well-functioning financial markets: as financial markets was an 
important propagator of shocks across borders, a well-functioning markets 
associated with sound financial regulation, risk management, prudential buffers 
and transparency could help to strengthen markets’ resilience and capacity to 
absorb shocks. Developed and well-functioning capital markets should create a 
diverse menu of savings and investment options and allow for fully financial 
interaction between households, corporations, banks and governments. The 
economic theory suggests that the corporate bond market is an important 
ingredient for a well-functioning capital market because it offers a more efficient 
form of market-disciplines for channelling funds from savers to investors (Burger 
et al., 2008). Moreover, local currency bond market development will help to 
reduce reliance on foreign currency borrowing, and reduce the potential risks of 
currency mismatches. Given the limited size of bond markets (especially corporate 
bond ones) in East Asia, fostering their development should be a high priority. 
Empirical literature (Burger and Warnock, 2007; Burger et al., 2010) suggests that 
the growth in EME local bond markets was stronger for those with investor-
friendly macroeconomic policies and institutional arrangements (See Appendix 
6.2). Specifically, high inflation volatility can impede private bond insurance 
because volatile inflation raises the uncertainties of real returns on long-term fixed 
                                                          
64 See Schoenmaker and Wagner (2011). 
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rate bonds and makes them unattractive to investors. This suggests the importance 
of an anti-inflationary monetary policy. Additionally, the expansion of local bond 
market development is more likely to be associated with greater market liquidity 
and efficiency, stronger regulatory quality and creditor rights, better market 
infrastructure, fewer capital controls, lower taxation and larger local institutional 
investor base (Burger et al., 2010). A potential avenue for improving market 
liquidity and broadening the investor base would be to accommodate value-
relevant information about the creditworthiness of issuers, market conventions 
governing trading, settlement, distribution, pricing and issuance, and to enforce 
better legal rights among market players. A heterogeneous investor base with 
various views and risks can also add diversity, increase trading activities and 
hence market liquidity. In order to attract foreign participation in local bond 
markets, currency risk is a big concern65. From the foreign investors’ perspective, 
investing in EME local currency bonds seems like a currency game with some 
yields. The potential for attracting global investors would depend on countries’ 
abilities to differentiate bond investment from currency exposure.  
Another essential strategy is the development and functioning of OTC markets, 
especially credit derivatives markets. OTC markets can offer a wide range of 
products tailored to individual customer needs, therefore generating benefits in 
terms of flexibility and innovation. However, the counterparty risk is greater in 
OTC markets than organised ones because their decentralised nature causes 
difficulties in collecting market-wide information about trading activities, trading 
and exposures. In order to improve market transparency and mitigate 
                                                          
65 Global investors prefer to invest in foreign currency denominated bonds rather than local 
currency bonds. However, issuing bonds in a foreign currency to attract foreign investors may lead 
to excessive reliance on foreign currency debts, increased currency mismatches and high 
susceptibility to currency crisis, as experienced in 1997-1998. 
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counterparty and operational risks, the Financial Stability Forum (2008) urged 
market participants to apply a central counterparty for clearing OTC credit 
derivatives.  
The role of fundamentals in the trade-offs: although good fundamentals have not 
guaranteed a full decoupling from the contagion of financial crises, they have 
helped to buffer those economies against vulnerabilities and have provided scope 
for strong policy responses. For example, the two financial centres of Hong Kong 
and Singapore suffered a severe reversal in cross-border banking flows. However, 
persistent current account surpluses, high sovereign ratings and expanded deposit 
insurance supported the repatriation of capital, thus providing a substitute for 
external lending. The story of Korea is a good example of successful use of foreign 
reserves to stabilise financial markets when global risk aversion rises. More than 
other countries in the region, Korea was strongly affected by capital outflows. By 
the end of 2008, equity outflows reached over US$ 70 billion, accounting for 7.7% 
of GDP. Cross-border contagion from global foreign currency liquidity pressures 
was extremely serious, as the country depended greatly on wholesale funding. 
Korea had to recourse to its substantial foreign reserves to smooth foreign 
exchange market volatility and more importantly to provide currency liquidity to 
domestic banks and exporters. Swap facilities with Federal Reserve, Japan and 
China were introduced to provide US dollars against local currency. All of this 
explained the sharp bounce back of East Asian economies compared to other 
countries and regions. 
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6.2.2. Managing country-specific risks 
Foreign exchange rate risks: the key source of country-specific risk is foreign 
exchange rate risk, which tends to increase a country’s vulnerabilities to crisis 
contagion. The study of Friedman (1953) suggests that exchange rate flexibility can 
help country to respond easily and quickly to negative external demand shocks. 
Empirical evidence also confirms the benefit of floating exchange rate as a key 
buffer to alleviate the effects of falling external demand (Berkmen et al., 2009). 
More flexible rates can help resolve tension between various policy targets (i.e. 
inflation and exchange rate targets) faced by countries in liberalising capital 
accounts and integrating with global capital markets, by letting the appreciation 
absorb the impact of the inflows. Moreover, greater exchange rate flexibility may 
discourage short-term speculative inflows because it exposes market players to 
two-way exchange rate risks (Mihaljek, 2008). The floating exchange rate regime 
eliminates the need for inefficient additional foreign reserve build-up. However, 
countries should bear in mind the potential costs associated with excessive 
exchange rate volatility, such as inflationary pressure, the adverse effect on 
economic structure and economic growth. In general, in managing foreign 
exchange rates and mitigating external vulnerabilities, it is more important to 
smooth out excessive volatility and avoid currency misalignment, rather than to 
keep exchange rates artificially weak for trade competitiveness enhancement 
purposes.  
Foreign exchange reserves: the global financial crisis has stressed the importance 
and value of an ample foreign reserve for the orderly functioning foreign exchange 
markets in East Asian countries. However, excessive additional build-up is 
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inefficient as it tends to, ceteris paribus, increase the monetary base and ease 
monetary conditions, which cause the side effect of exchange appreciation and 
weakening of a country’s trade competitiveness. The question of the appropriate 
level of reserves is a challenging issue for consideration. In fact, in some Asia-
Pacific countries with internationalised currencies and well developed financial 
markets, such as Australia and New Zealand, the absence of large reserves is not an 
obstacle. The use of financial derivatives to manage short-run foreign currency 
exposures has proved to be a useful strategy. Therefore, enhanced swap lines may 
be an ideal solution to reduce the incentive for increasing foreign reserves. In fact, 
East Asian countries’ endeavours to employ this strategy have been reflected in the 
setting up of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and subsequent upgrading to the 
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) for regional liquidity support. 
CMIM allows member countries (ASEAN+3)66 to draw from 50% (for larger 
countries) to 500% (for smaller countries) of their contribution to a $120 billion 
multilateral reserves pooling arrangement.  
6.2.3. Monetary policy manipulation during the crisis   
First, the successful policy responses of East Asian countries to mitigate the 
contagion effect suggest that monetary policy during a crisis may require a 
fundamentally different tactical approach. In normal times, central banks should 
react to changing economic conditions gradually, in small steps and in a forward-
looking fashion. For example, under inflationary pressures, keeping policy rates 
rising is the optimal target. However, in stress conditions the tail risks can develop 
very quickly and the macro-economic outlook is threatened, so large and 
                                                          
66 Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Brunei, plus three others: China, Japan and Korea.  
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aggressive policy rate cuts are necessary to boost confidence and stimulate 
economic activity. Explicit inflation targeting is not always easier than non-
inflation targeting in monetary policy manipulation. The key challenge for central 
banks is how to maintain a primary focus on inflation while concerns about the 
vulnerability of economic growth, financial instability and the potential volatility of 
capital flows are also rising. Should central banks compartmentalise their policy 
priorities or smoothly trade off output and inflation stabilisation? What should be 
appropriate monetary policy frameworks? The answers to those questions are not 
straightforward, instead depending on the nature of the economic environment 
and how well-functioning the financial system is. Strategies need to be tailored to 
each country, taking into account several factors such as the extent to which a 
country is exposed to commodity price shocks, financial openness and exposure to 
capital flow volatilities, the country’s capacity to absorb such shocks, and the role 
of exchange rates in the inflation process. However, these factors are time-variant, 
implying that the monetary framework cannot be static.  
Moreover, there is a risk that monetary policy measures to cope with crises may 
produce some distortionary effects that bring about inefficiencies and possible 
imbalance in the long run. For example, too much liquidity support and blanket 
guarantees may lead to excessive risk taking and a potential moral hazard problem. 
Extended liquidity supply by central banks and low interest rates may also 
discourage lending and borrowing activities in interbank money markets and put 
banks’ business models under pressure. The effectiveness of monetary policy 
strategies may need revisiting, particularly in terms of countercyclical effects. 
When economic activities start to rebound and financial headwinds abate, central 
banks need to exit from their very accommodating policy stances and crisis 
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measures should be phased out. However, it is important to calibrate the speed 
and timing of exit strategies and communicate these to the public.  
Second, the countercyclical fiscal response has been impressive and effective, 
suggesting the desirability and high importance of monetary-fiscal coordination in 
East Asia. The macroeconomic objectives to achieve non-inflationary stable growth 
have usually been taken by two major groups of policy instruments67: monetary 
instruments employed by central banks and fiscal instruments employed by 
ministries of finance. However, they usually conflict with each other.  Before 2008, 
East Asian countries were characterised by high growth rates and moderate 
inflation. However, the world commodity price shocks during the first half of 2008 
and the global financial crisis in late 2008 to 2009 have posed serious challenges 
for policy makers. While both crises call for expansionary fiscal policy, they require 
different monetary responses for different crisis episodes. Tightening monetary 
stance is essential for the price shock to reduce domestic inflationary pressure. 
However, on the spread of global economic and financial market turmoil, which 
caused severe economic contraction associated with rising unemployment and 
price falling, easing monetary policy in support of the fiscal response was highly 
preferable. The implementation of monetary and fiscal policy coordination should 
depend on the following factors (Hasaon and Isgut, 2009): 
 The stage of development of the domestic financial market and institutions: 
models of monetary-fiscal coordination (Laurens and de la Piedra, 1998) 
vary across four stages of development: (i) the early stage of development, (ii) 
government starts to auction short-term marketable securities, (ii) domestic 
                                                          
67 According to Hasan and Isgut (2009), the theory of economic policy initiated by Jan Tinbergen 
and Henri Theil suggests that the achievement of more than one policy target (i.e. growth rate and 
inflation rate) requires more than one policy instruments.  
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financial markets start to develop and (iv) fully developed financial markets. 
Accordingly, the East Asia case belongs to the third stage, where the role of 
interest rate increases and monitoring of the financial market become critical. 
Therefore, coordination aims at reducing rising interest rates, which could 
threaten economic growth. Central banks also need to switch from broad 
money programming to reserve money programming and to market-based 
instruments.   
 The level of capital account openness: monetary-fiscal policy coordination 
becomes more complex in an economy which is more open to international 
capital flows. In this case, the current account balance should be an additional 
policy target and exchange rate control should become an additional policy 
instrument. However, it is challenging to simultaneously control the level of 
exchange rate and monetary policy instruments68. According to the Mundell-
Fleming model, policy instruments depend on exchange rate regimes. Under 
a pure floating exchange rate regime, a country retains the use of an 
independent monetary policy but gives up the use of exchange rate as an 
additional instrument to target the balance of payments. If a country pegs its 
currency, government forsakes both monetary policy instruments and 
control of the inflation target. As shown in Figure 6.1, there is cross-country 
variation in the level of capital account openness. While developed Asia (JP, 
HK and SG) is fully open to financial capital flows, emerging East Asia is less 
financially open. Therefore, those countries retain the use of monetary policy 
instruments even when they target the value of exchange rates.  
                                                          
68 See Obstfeld et al. (2005) for the monetary policy trilema or “impossible trinity”. 
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Figure 6.1 - Capital account openness in Asia 
 
Source: Chinn and Ito (2010)  
 Fiscal space69 and debt management: the use of fiscal instruments to achieve 
macroeconomic goals depends on budgetary balances and public debts. Large 
budget deficits will restrict the fiscal space to finance additional expenditure. 
Even if additional expenditure is financed, countries may face the upward 
pressure of the domestic cost of credit, which creates obstacles not only for 
future expansion of government expenditure but also for the implementation 
of policy instruments to boost the economy (Appendix 6.3 provides more 
information on budget balances in East Asia before the global financial crisis). 
Moreover, a large share of public debt (denominated in foreign currencies) 
and a large concentration of maturities (at a particular point in time) may 
also have an adverse impact on the cost of servicing public debt. Therefore, 
                                                          
69 Fiscal space is defined as the availability of budgetary room that allows a government to provide 
resources for a desired purpose without prejudicing the sustainability of a government’s financial 
position (Heller, 2005). 
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management of public debt should be coordinated with monetary and fiscal 
policies. 
6.2.4. Regional financial cooperation  
Since the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, regional cooperation for better 
macroeconomic and financial management has been a central concern for national 
authorities. ASEAN+3 and EMEAP (Executives’ Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central 
Banks) have played an important role in regional cooperation. Their endeavours 
focus on three dimensions of financial cooperation: (i) strengthening crisis 
management regimes, (ii) developing regional bond markets and (iii) fostering 
regional exchange rate cooperation and monetary integration.  
Strengthening crisis management regimes: two measures have been established 
to strengthen crisis management regimes: the setting up of regional emergency 
liquidity support with swap arrangements under CMI and CMIM, and the 
reinforcement of surveillance and monitoring frameworks. CMIM was developed 
from bilateral swap arrangements to multilateral arrangements associated with 
expansion in volumes and enhancement in collective decision-making processes. 
There is a need for continuous upgrading to an advanced CMIM framework as a 
foundation for the creation of an Asian monetary fund in the near future. Countries 
in the region have also made efforts to build surveillance and monitoring systems 
to strengthen their policy cooperation. The ASEAN Surveillance Process is an 
example; it draws up monitoring reports of members’ economic development and 
policy recommendations concerning further regional development. Accordingly, 
the Monetary and Financial Stability Committee was launched in 2007 to perform 
risk and crisis management and resolution network. The network is composed of a 
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high-level team and technical level crisis management team to provide advice in 
dealing with crisis and the execution of business community plans.  
Developing regional bond markets: concerning backward financial markets, the 
EMEAP created the ABF and fostered the insurance of bonds through the ABMI. 
The member countries have endeavoured to build common structures, such as 
credit guarantees, credit rating and a settlement system to facilitate regional bond 
market development. Further discussions to foster development have been in 
progress. For example, the Working Group on New Securitised Debt Instruments is 
devoted to finding ways to provide tax incentives for regional currency-
denominated bond insurance and to coordinate a response to withholding taxation. 
The Technical Assistant Coordination Team for the Focal Group has studied ways 
to globalise members’ bond markets and improve the human resource quality in 
these markets. There are also Working Groups in various fields such as Credit 
Guarantee and Investment Mechanisms, Foreign Exchange Transactions and 
Settlement Issues, Rating Systems and Information Dissemination on Asian Bond 
Markets. 
Regional exchange rate cooperation and monetary integration: the experience 
of the 1997-1998 financial crisis sparked the need for regional exchange rate 
cooperation to prevent competitive devaluations of currencies. Many studies have 
been conducted by ADB and major research institutes on the development of an 
Asian Currency Unit (ACU) since 2005. ACU would be a good indicator to monitor 
the movements of regional currencies as a whole against currencies outside the 
region and against the currencies of individual regional countries. Meanwhile, 
ASEAN+3 has been studying the development of a single regional monetary unit 
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since 2006, based on the model of the European Union’s adoption of the EMU. 
However, unifying member countries’ currencies is challenging as it requires tight 
harmonisation in monetary, trade and political policies. Therefore, the region 
should enhance information sharing, promote more open discussion of national 
and regional policy interventions, facilitate the development of an Asian 
investment infrastructure, harmonise prudential indicators, and increase 
coordination on early warning system analysis.  
6.2.5. International supervisory cooperation 
The historical financial crises have revealed numerous weaknesses in international 
legal frameworks and supervisory systems, especially in supervising cross-border 
banking flows. Mihaljek (2008) addresses the fundamental problem from the 
mismatch between home and host countries’ financial stability concerns, as well as 
banking supervision and risk management. For example, host countries may be 
concerned about domestic asset price boom-bust, rapid credit growth and external 
balance pressure, while they may find it difficult to address these concerns given 
their uncertainties about the foreign banks’ financial soundness. On the contrary, 
foreign-owned branches and subsidiaries have incentives to boost bank lending, 
while underestimating the credit risk associated with credit boom. Although these 
foreign-owned institutions are usually well equipped with risk measurement and 
management skills, these skills may be irrelevant for application in EMEs, where 
there are inadequate accounting, auditing, financial reporting and disclosure 
structures and insufficient credit risk data. The Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision has set out the Basel Concordat to provide principles and standards 
for effective prudential supervision of cross-border banking since 1975. In 2001, 
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the Basel Committee elaborated Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) to facilitate 
bilateral relationships in cooperation with banking supervisors for effective Basel 
accord implementation. However, both the Concordat and MoUs have proved to be 
of little practical help in the cross-border coordination of intervention to respond 
to bank distress because of the barriers to information sharing arising from 
political, legal or tax-related issues. Cooperation between supervisors is strongly in 
need of reinforcement. Home - host authorities need to establish information and 
burden sharing regimes across jurisdictions. EMEs, by reporting and analysing the 
Financial Stability Assessment Programme of the IMF and the World Bank, could 
upgrade their knowledge and skills of supervision and acquire information on the 
use of complex financial products by foreign and domestic banks. 
6.3. Limitations and further research 
Our endeavours to provide a thorough econometric analysis of different 
transmission mechanisms which propagate shock across borders are subject to 
some limitations. First, this thesis tends to investigate “common” patterns across 
EMEs in their responses to shocks, rather than cross-sectional heterogeneity. For 
example, we do not control for the influence of fundamentals in testing the 
existence of contagion in chapter three. The reason is that data for fundamental 
variables are available only at relatively low frequency, while the literature 
suggests that contagion is a short-lived feature which is better captured in high-
frequency observations (Dungey et al., 2005). The same problem is observed in 
chapter 5 where annual data is used to analyse bank behaviour in response to 
macro-financial variation, but we actually expect that bank adjustment may occur 
quarterly. Moreover, the differences in national regulations and supervisions and 
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accounting and tax regimes make the data deviate from being totally consistent 
across countries. The data samples also do not involve all financial institutions and 
the uneven distribution of the number of cross sections within the sample place 
limits on a strict cross-country heterogeneity analysis.  
Second, this thesis attempts to argue for and provide some evidence of investor-
based contagion. However, it did not conduct a detailed investigation of different 
groups of investors and financial intermediaries. Neither did it empirically test the 
particular behaviour that may cause volatility spillovers. Some of the questions 
remaining unanswered are: (i) what is the role of hedge funds, mutual funds and 
foreign exchange traders? (ii) how do they behave during a period of financial 
turmoil? And (iii) is investors’ behaviour rational or irrational? In general, our 
analysis is based on the general assumption that investors’ behaviour is rational. 
However, investors’ behaviour is not always entirely discerning. Especially in 
stress conditions, investors sometimes behave irrationally, as they falsely assume 
the interdependence of fundamentals or overestimate the extent of 
interdependence. This may adversely affect asset prices and volatility linkages; and 
propagation become excessive, causing substantial disruption to global financial 
markets. There is a need for further research to differentiate between rational and 
irrational behaviour in creating the asset price transmission channel of shock 
propagation across countries.  
Third, the empirical results show that the cross-border contagion effects on East 
Asian economies were significant during the 2007-2011 global financial crisis. 
However, the magnitude of the effects has not been totally quantified, as there may 
be some distortionary effects arising from aggressive policy interventions; for 
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example, restriction on the short sales of equities, buybacks of government bonds, 
regional liquidity support and fiscal stimulus packages. Due to multicollinearity 
problems, we could not include all policy measures to control for their effects.  
Lastly, we find some evidence for the potential costs associated with cross-border 
financial links, especially capital flow volatility and international financial 
contagion during financial market turmoil. However, we could not identify to what 
extent the costs may outweigh the benefits and the desirable cross-border financial 
exposures. This raises the question about the optimal form of financial integration 
and linkages within East Asian economies and between East Asian economies and 
the rest of the world. A further question that concerns the financial community is 
what the new global financial architecture will be after decades of financial crises 
and contagion. We suggest further research on this issue.   
 
294 | P a g e  
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1.1 – Transmission channels of the global financial crisis to EMEs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gallego et al. (2010) 
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Appendix 2.1 – Some comparisons between East Asian crisis and global crisis 
  
Changes in GDP 
growth Stock price declines 
Exchange rate 
changes 
  
Asian 
crisis 
Global 
crisis 
Asian 
crisis 
Global 
crisis 
Asian 
crisis 
Global 
crisis 
TL -13.3 -13.1 -68 -56 -53 -12 
ID -23.5 -2.2 -62 -55 -83 -24 
KR -14.1 -9.9 -60 -49 -47 -37 
ML -19.6 -13.6 -72 -40 -43 -14 
PH -8.4 -7.9 -58 -51 -40 -17 
SG -13.6 -19.6 -56 -58 -19 -11 
HK -15.3 -15.1 -56 -59 -1 1 
JP -4.6 -11 -35 -58 -21 36 
China 0 12 -12 -71 -3.5 -6.5 
India -1.3 -3.5 -35 -56 -20 -23 
Australia -2 -3.8 -11 -51 -23 -32 
NewZealand -4.4 -6.2 -34 -41 -32 -36 
 Source: Filardo et al.(2010) 
Notes: Crisis period is defined over June 1997 - June 2000 for East Asian crisis and 
over June 2007 – March 2009 for global crisis. Change in GDP growth is calculated 
by the largest differences in year-on-year GDP growth rates. Stock price decline is 
the peak-to-trough change in the benchmark stock market index. Exchange rate 
change implies the maximum depreciation (-) or appreciation (+) against the US 
dollar.   
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Appendix 2.2 – Financial stress indices 2007-2011 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated by authors basing on data from Datastream and IMF-IFS 
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Notes: Emerging market financial stress index (EM-FSI) was constructed following 
the method introduced by Balakrishnan et al. (2009). The EM-FSI comprises of five 
variables: banking sector beta (β), stock market returns (SR), time-varying stock 
market return volatility (Volatility), Sovereign debt spreads (EMBI), and an 
exchange market pressure index (EMPI), such that: 
                                  
(i) The banking-sector beta is the standard CAPM beta and is defined as 
     
   (    
      
  ) 
   
 , where     
           
  represent quarterly market return 
and bank return. Beta is computed based on weekly data. The series 
takes positive value exceeding a threshold of one, and zero otherwise as 
beta greater than 1 indicates banking stocks move more than 
proportionately with the overall stock market, suggesting the banking 
sector is relatively risky. 
(ii) Stock market return is computed as      .
  
    
/ where Pt is quarterly 
composite stock price index. This variable is inverted, implying that a 
decline in stock return corresponds to increased securities market 
related stress.  
(iii) Stock market volatility is a time-varying measure of market volatility 
obtained from GARCH(1,1) specification, using weekly real returns and 
modelled as an autoregressive process with 5 lags. 
(iv) Sovereign debt spreads obtained from JPMorgan EMBI-Global spreads 
over the benchmark 10-year US Treasuries bond yield. 
(v) The EMPI captures exchange rate depreciations and declines in 
international reserves and is defined for country i as follow: 
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           )
     
 
               
       
 
where     and       denote the percent changes in the exchange rate and total 
reserves, respectively. µ and σ denote the mean and the standard deviation of the 
relevant series.  
Observations are standardized based on the long-term average and the standard 
deviation of the series. The aggregation of five sub-indices into EM-FSI is based on 
a variance-equal weighting.  
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Appendix 3.1 – Covariances of stock returns for stable and crisis regimes (derived from MS-VAR estimation) 
Regime 1  (Stable period) 
 
TL ID PH ML KR SG HK US EU 
TL 8.7280 
        ID 5.0109 9.9497 
       PL 4.0000 5.3606 9.8891 
      ML 2.4688 3.3413 3.3083 3.4093 
     KR 4.3043 4.5912 4.6473 2.9736 7.9196 
    SG 3.2742 4.3492 4.1202 2.8992 4.1321 4.5725 
   HK 3.1799 3.6814 3.9483 2.7522 4.3396 3.8839 5.4914 
  US 1.6893 1.9291 2.3883 1.4435 2.6618 2.0485 2.2213 2.5778 
 EU 3.2633 3.7780 3.9576 2.5483 4.3356 3.7500 3.7585 3.0641 6.3725 
Regime 2 (Crisis period) 
 
TL ID PH ML KR SG HK US EU 
TL 30.5500 
        ID 32.1877 53.6778 
       PL 19.3950 26.3839 20.4626 
      ML 14.9512 19.6651 12.3379 12.7179 
     KR 36.7613 46.9336 24.4875 19.4699 67.2323 
    SG 24.3640 32.5499 17.6608 15.0230 35.4388 31.0428 
   HK 24.5829 34.6124 17.4767 14.5075 35.8713 28.7219 33.8674 
  US 12.5080 15.6411 8.5012 8.3811 16.0054 17.0932 15.5946 19.3555 
 EU 20.2399 26.1432 15.4576 14.7532 31.4827 27.1863 24.4208 21.7302 36.1277 
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Appendix 3.2 – Covariances of bank stock returns for stable and crisis regimes (derived from MS-VAR estimation) 
Regime 1  (Stable period) 
 
TL ID PH ML KR SG HK US EU 
TL 13.9591 
        ID 6.2248 20.4193 
       PL 3.2751 5.1447 7.6390 
      ML 2.2422 2.9803 2.1010 3.9618 
     KR 5.5527 6.9542 4.2936 3.3840 15.2290 
    SG 2.6081 3.6910 2.4784 2.4276 3.8434 4.0779 
   HK 2.1922 2.6858 1.8361 1.7404 3.2248 2.3067 3.3828 
  US 0.8356 1.6544 1.6515 1.1005 1.4821 1.4555 1.6180 4.6211 
 EU 2.8512 3.7775 2.5953 2.2993 4.3638 3.0842 2.7383 3.3937 8.0742 
Regime 2 (Crisis period) 
 
TL ID PH ML KR SG HK US EU 
TL 30.8767 
        ID 23.1868 37.9906 
       PL 17.8841 20.5265 22.5010 
      ML 14.1347 15.5306 11.9759 12.7473 
     KR 30.6159 35.4244 25.3420 18.5466 79.7848 
    SG 22.0549 24.2476 18.9905 14.4536 34.8661 27.8447 
   HK 22.5100 24.0913 18.3935 14.4708 35.6134 25.4079 32.5702 
  US 18.8636 20.0078 17.1388 14.6683 34.5952 24.5065 25.9131 64.8651 
 EU 27.0631 31.7839 24.3354 19.4926 46.1292 32.3037 32.0404 43.3439 64.0802 
 
301 | P a g e  
 
Appendix 3.3 – Covariances of FOREX for stable and crisis regimes (derived from MS-VAR estimation) 
Regime 1 (Stable period) 
 
TL ID PH ML KR SG 
TL 0.3388 
     ID 0.1269 0.5668 
    PH 0.0914 0.2173 0.5465 
   ML 0.1128 0.2828 0.2025 0.4103 
  KR 0.1510 0.3011 0.2999 0.3015 0.8543 
 SG 0.1515 0.1805 0.1201 0.2196 0.2098 0.3299 
Regime 2 (Crisis period) 
 
TL ID PH ML KR SG 
TL 0.5928 
     ID 0.8235 6.5301 
    PH 0.3265 1.1108 1.1287 
   ML 0.4533 1.2905 0.5162 0.9911 
  KR 0.7601 2.4289 2.1646 1.5586 12.0589 
 SG 0.4863 1.4676 0.4725 0.9859 2.0319 1.8840 
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Appendix 3.4 – Covariances of CDS for stable and crisis regimes (derived from MS-VAR estimation) 
Regime 1 (Stable period) 
 TL ID PH ML KR HK US GR 
TL 0.0084        
ID 0.0054 0.0054       
PH 0.0054 0.0048 0.0049      
ML 0.0080 0.0057 0.0056 0.0092     
KR 0.0080 0.0056 0.0056 0.0086     
HK 0.0039 0.0032 0.0031 0.0043 0.0047 0.0095   
US 0.0036 0.0028 0.0030 0.0043 0.0045 0.0027 0.0091  
GR 0.0047 0.0034 0.0034 0.0047 0.0050 0.0029 0.0052 0.0119 
Regime 2 (Crisis period) 
 TL ID PH ML KR HK US GR 
TL 0.0704        
ID 0.0332 0.0466       
PH 0.0363 0.0406 0.0409      
ML 0.0624 0.0460 0.0484 0.0715     
KR 0.0274 0.0401 0.0367 0.0458 0.0460    
HK 0.0068 0.0144 0.0113 0.0116 0.0125 0.1608   
US 0.0072 -0.0049 -0.0029 -0.0018 -0.0129 -0.0179 0.7463  
GR 0.0313 0.0237 0.0221 0.0319 0.0166 0.0190 0.0021 0.0427 
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Appendix 3.5 – Unconditional correlation tests (Dungey et al., 2004) for stock 
returns 
  TL ID PH ML KR SG HK 
Constant -0.056 0.081* 0.033 0.036 0.065 0.025 -0.030 
 
(0.048) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.055) (0.035) (0.042) 
α1 0.226** 0.011 -0.183* -0.116 -0.302** 0.004 -0.032 
 
(0.109) (0.107) (0.100) (0.099) (0.125) (0.081) (0.096) 
βTL 
 
0.224*** 0.065 -0.008 0.161** 0.035 0.032 
 
 
(0.054) (0.053) (0.051) (0.064) (0.041) (0.049) 
βID 0.275*** 
 
0.199*** 0.124** 0.065 0.150*** -0.037 
 (0.062) 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.072) (0.045) (0.055) 
βPH 0.076 0.189*** 
 
0.143*** 0.064 0.056 0.061 
 (0.062) (0.059) 
 
(0.055) (0.070) (0.044) (0.053) 
βML -0.012 0.149** 0.180*** 
 
0.051 0.232*** 0.113* 
 (0.070) (0.067) (0.063) 
 
(0.079) (0.048) (0.060) 
βKR 0.225*** 0.074 0.077 0.048 
 
0.093* 0.212*** 
 (0.067) (0.065) (0.062) (0.061) 
 
(0.048) (0.057) 
βSG 0.094 0.326*** 0.128 0.418*** 0.178* 
 
0.467*** 
 
(0.092) (0.089) (0.085) (0.080) (0.105) 
 
(0.075) 
βHK 0.056 -0.052 0.091 0.133** 0.262*** 0.304*** 
 
 (0.076) (0.073) (0.069) (0.067) (0.083) (0.050) 
 βUS -0.082 -0.097 0.101 0.013 0.161** 0.001 0.061 
 (0.070) (0.067) (0.062) (0.062) (0.078) (0.050) (0.060) 
βEU 0.106 0.028 -0.005 0.011 0.052 0.198*** 0.042 
 
(0.078) (0.075) (0.071) (0.070) (0.088) (0.055) (0.067) 
θTL 
 
-0.055 0.081 0.259** 0.424*** 0.013 0.029 
 
 
(0.109) (0.103) (0.100) (0.124) (0.082) (0.099) 
θID -0.140 
 
0.080 0.044 0.194 -0.078 0.315*** 
 (0.107) 
 
(0.094) (0.096) (0.122) (0.078) (0.091) 
θPH 0.125 0.295** 
 
0.262** -0.121 0.023 -0.228** 
 (0.130) (0.120) 
 
(0.113) (0.149) (0.095) (0.113) 
θML 0.229** 0.034 0.073 
 
-0.186 -0.132 -0.159 
 (0.114) (0.110) (0.101) 
 
(0.131) (0.081) (0.099) 
θKR -0.027 0.036 -0.091 -0.101 
 
-0.010 -0.112 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.081) (0.080) 
 
(0.064) (0.075) 
θSG -0.042 -0.229* -0.067 -0.296** 0.084 
 
0.153 
 (0.139) (0.132) (0.126) (0.121) (0.156) 
 
(0.105) 
θHK -0.006 0.335*** -0.189* -0.176* -0.026 0.167**  
 (0.117) (0.110) (0.106) (0.104) (0.130) (0.074)  
θUS 0.199** 0.114 -0.190** -0.083 -0.476*** 0.095 0.008 
 (0.095) (0.092) (0.086) (0.085) (0.099) (0.068) (0.082) 
θEU -0.244** -0.210 0.111 0.189* 0.304** 0.029 -0.098 
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 (0.115) (0.111) (0.105) (0.103) (0.126) (0.081) (0.100) 
R2 0.571 0.690 0.580 0.674 0.701 0.848 0.774 
F-Statistic 31.295 52.471 32.494 48.583 55.122 131.673 80.498 
p-value [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
DW Stat 2.13 2.14 2.16 1.83 2.31 2.28 1.98 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 3.6 – Unconditional correlation tests (Dungey et al., 2004) for bank 
stock returns 
  TL ID PH ML KR SG HK 
Constant -0.014 0.036 0.089 0.076 -0.016 0.104** -0.031 
 
(0.059) (0.056) (0.059) (0.056) (0.071) (0.052) (0.070) 
α1 0.030 0.039 -0.112 -0.078 0.014 -0.186** 0.073 
 
(0.098) (0.093) (0.100) (0.095) (0.120) (0.088) (0.118) 
βTL 
 
0.156*** 0.063 0.035 0.150** 0.056 0.032 
 
 
(0.058) (0.063) (0.060) (0.074) (0.056) (0.074) 
βID 0.164*** 
 
0.231*** 0.029 0.123 0.055 0.027 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.062) (0.061) (0.076) (0.057) (0.076) 
βPH 0.071 0.248*** 
 
0.101 0.129* 0.082 0.023 
 
(0.066) (0.061) 
 
(0.063) (0.079) (0.059) (0.079) 
βML 0.047 0.037 0.120* 
 
0.111 0.296*** 0.091 
 
(0.072) (0.068) (0.072) 
 
(0.087) (0.061) (0.085) 
βKR 0.183*** 0.142** 0.140** 0.100 
 
0.068 0.138* 
 
(0.067) (0.064) (0.069) (0.066) 
 
(0.062) (0.081) 
βSG 0.102 0.095 0.132 0.399*** 0.101 
 
0.342*** 
 
(0.083) (0.079) (0.084) (0.075) (0.101) 
 
(0.095) 
βHK 0.045 0.037 0.028 0.095 0.160* 0.267*** 
 
 
(0.074) (0.070) (0.075) (0.071) (0.089) (0.063) 
 βUS -0.038 -0.001 0.116* 0.027 -0.117 -0.017 0.145* 
 
(0.068) (0.064) (0.068) (0.065) (0.082) (0.061) (0.080) 
βEU 0.055 0.033 -0.033 0.042 0.141 0.201*** 0.149* 
 
(0.077) (0.073) (0.078) (0.074) (0.093) (0.068) (0.091) 
θTL 
 
-0.044 0.045 0.165* -0.040 0.084 0.239* 
 
 
(0.098) (0.105) (0.099) (0.126) (0.093) (0.123) 
θID -0.027 
 
0.011 0.235** 0.124 0.088 0.126 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.111) (0.106) (0.135) (0.101) (0.134) 
θPH 0.014 -0.093 
 
0.118 -0.111 0.151* -0.037 
 
(0.099) (0.092) 
 
(0.094) (0.120) (0.088) (0.118) 
θML 0.111 0.133 0.101 
 
-0.217* -0.128 0.015 
 (0.103) (0.097) (0.103) 
 
(0.125) (0.090) (0.123) 
θKR -0.141* -0.066 -0.131 -0.151* 
 
0.081 0.029 
 (0.085) (0.080) (0.086) (0.082) 
 
(0.076) (0.101) 
θSG 0.006 -0.004 0.097 -0.235** 0.206 
 
0.254** 
 (0.111) (0.105) (0.111) (0.103) (0.134) 
 
(0.124) 
θHK 0.054 0.008 -0.035 -0.046 0.003 0.015 
 
 (0.089) (0.085) (0.091) (0.086) (0.107) (0.076) 
 θUS 0.026 -0.062 -0.146** -0.013 0.131 0.051 -0.069 
 (0.073) (0.069) (0.074) (0.071) (0.089) (0.066) (0.087) 
θEU -0.042 0.024 0.095 0.002 -0.028 -0.088 -0.133 
 (0.091) (0.086) (0.923) (0.087) (0.109) (0.081) (0.108) 
R2 0.432 0.468 0.527 0.562 0.535 0.778 0.706 
F-Statistic 17.889 20.698 26.19 32.482 27.019 82.655 56.552 
p-value [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
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DW Stat 2.17 2.39 2.27 1.88 2.34 2.22 1.97 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Appendix 3.7 – Unconditional correlation tests (Dungey et al., 2004) for 
FOREX 
  TL ID PH ML KR SG 
Constant -0.436 -0.357 -0.375 0.033 -0.550 0.368 
 
(0.406) (0.612) (0.380) (0.327) (0.703) (0.450) 
α1 -0.120 -0.503** 0.432*** 0.236* -0.482* 0.113 
 
(0.163) (0.247) (0.151) (0.131) (0.283) (0.182) 
βTL 
 
0.055 0.053 0.023 0.155 0.229*** 
 
 
(0.093) (0.057) (0.049) (0.104) (0.065) 
βID 0.065 
 
0.168*** 0.242*** 0.091 0.120** 
 (0.063) 
 
(0.059) (0.048) (0.109) (0.070) 
βPH 0.063 0.202** 
 
0.134** 0.272** -0.029 
 (0.066) (0.099) 
 
(0.052) (0.111) (0.073) 
βML 0.040 0.385 0.197 
 
0.375*** 0.405*** 
 (0.079) (0.115) (0.074) 
 
(0.131) (0.082) 
βKR 0.176*** 0.067 0.262*** 0.262*** 
 
-0.036 
 (0.064) (0.099) (0.059) (0.050) 
 
(0.072) 
βSG 0.300*** 0.154 -0.034*** 0.309*** -0.038 
 
 
(0.067) (0.105) (0.065) (0.052) (0.121) 
 θTL 
 
0.435** 0.069 0.224** -0.247 -0.049 
 
 
(0.186) (0.116) (0.097) (0.214) (0.136) 
θID 0.011 
 
-0.103 -0.160*** -0.103 -0.123 
 (0.076) 
 
(0.071) (0.059) (0.132) (0.084) 
θPH 0.058 0.185 
 
0.115 1.268*** -0.290** 
 (0.126) (0.189) 
 
(0.098) (0.197) (0.138) 
θML 0.257* 0.255 0.093 
 
-0.137 0.596*** 
 (0.139) (0.209) (0.130) 
 
(0.243) (0.136) 
θKR -0.184** -0.067 -0.102 -0.242*** 
 
0.092 
 (0.073) (0.112) (0.065) (0.057) 
 
(0.082) 
θSG -0.235** -0.171 -0.081 0.002 0.239 
 
 (0.094) (0.145) (0.089) (0.068) (0.166) 
 VIX(-1) 0.139 0.086 0.136 -0.011 0.136 -0.169 
 
(0.144) (0.217) (0.135) (0.116) (0.249) (0.159) 
TED(-1) -0.011 0.369** -0.288*** -0.086 0.389** 0.051 
 (0.105) (0.158) (0.097) (0.084) (0.181) (0.116) 
R2 0.292 0.363 0.412 0.600 0.415 0.446 
F-Statistic 11.167 15.387 18.950 40.633 19.150 21.820 
p-value [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
DW Stat 1.89 1.98 2.18 2.17 2.64 2.62 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Appendix 3.8 – Unconditional correlation tests (Dungey et al., 2004) for CDS 
  TL ID PH ML KR HK 
Constant 0.011 -0.011 -0.020 0.004 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.038) (0.034) (0.030) (0.026) (0.032) (0.137) 
α1 0.227* -0.241** 0.113 -0.129* 0.335*** 0.302 
 
(0.116) (0.104) (0.094) (0.080) (0.094) (0.425) 
βTL 
 
-0.024 0.117 0.384*** 0.177** 
 
 
 
(0.084) (0.073) (0.056) (0.078) 
 βID -0.032 
 
0.734*** 0.118 -0.029 -0.236 
 (0.107) 
 
(0.051) (0.072) (0.091) (0.330) 
βPH 0.182 0.868*** 
 
0.006 0.116 0.016 
 (0.115) (0.063) 
 
(0.080) (0.099) (0.381) 
βML 0.617*** 0.145 0.006 
 
0.623*** 0.124 
 (0.103) (0.105) (0.094) 
 
(0.084) (0.414) 
βKR 0.218** -0.027 0.092 0.479*** 
 
0.077 
 (0.102) (0.093) (0.082) (0.059) 
 
(0.421) 
βHK -0.043 0.002 0.014 0.008 0.069** 0.466 
 
(0.039) (0.036) (0.031) (0.027) (0.033) (0.363) 
βUS -0.065 -0.045 0.039 0.051* 0.051 0.029 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.036) (0.031) (0.038) (0.162) 
βGR 0.058 0.018 0.012 -0.030 0.014 0.064 
 
(0.043) (0.039) (0.035) (0.030) (0.037) (0.157) 
θTL 
 
0.513*** -0.563*** 0.088 -0.738*** 0.354 
  
(0.119) (0.102) (0.063) (0.102) (0.513) 
θID 0.581*** 
 
-0.066 -0.443*** 0.597*** -0.001 
 (0.146) 
 
(0.075) (0.097) (0.117) (0.564) 
θPH -0.908*** 0.098 
 
0.478*** -0.567*** 0.098 
 (0.163) (0.098) 
 
(0.103) (0.146) (0.650) 
θML 1.154*** -1.229*** 1.108*** 
 
0.529*** -0.779 
 (0.134) (0.187) (0.148) 
 
(0.147) (0.867) 
θKR -1.117*** 0.836*** -0.536*** 0.012 
 
-0.148 
 (0.141) (0.131) (0.128) (0.087) 
 
(0.166) 
θHK 0.048 -0.002 -0.008 -0.017 -0.061 
 
 (0.046) (0.041) (0.036) (0.031) (0.039) 
 θUS 0.059 0.051 -0.042 -0.047 -0.059 -0.059 
 (0.046) (0.042) (0.037) (0.031) (0.039) (0.166) 
θGR -0.113 0.137** -0.108* 0.103** -0.121* 0.597** 
 (0.077) (0.068) (0.060) (0.052) (0.065) (0.270) 
R2 0.892 0.914 0.931 0.994 0.895 0.139325 
F-Statistic 109.38 140.79 176.80 222.728 112.08 2.126 
p-value [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
DW Stat 1.87 1.99 2.01 1.78 1.62 2.20 
Notes:  *, ** and *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Appendix 4.1 – The reversals in foreign banks’ lending to East Asia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BIS Locational banking statistics 
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Appendix 4.2 – Interbank market tensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Datastream 
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Appendix 5.1 – Pass-through from policy rate cut to borrowing cost in East 
Asia 
 
 
 
Pass-through from policy rate cut to borrowing cost  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Filardo et al. (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy rates (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pass-through from policy rates to borrowing cost 
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Appendix 6.1 – Systematic weighted and Equal-weighted Global Systematic 
Crisis Indicators 
 
Source: IMF (2011). 
Notes: Systematic crisis indicator is constructed by combining and aggregating 
financial and real indicators at the country level. The country-level crisis indicator 
is a simple average of the Financial Stress Index –FSI (for AEs) or Exchange Market 
Pressure Index – EMPI (for EMEs) and real GDP growth. Both are normalized to 
ensure that both financial and real indicators carry the same weight in composite 
indicator. A country is considered to affect by crisis if its composite indicator is one 
standard deviation above mean.  
Weighting for systematic crisis indicator is applied either by “systematic 
importance” or by equal weights. Systematic importance focuses on countries or 
financial systems important for global stability70. The notion of “systemic” was 
                                                          
70 See Integrating Assessment Under the Financial Sector Assessment Program into Article IV 
Surveillance, IMF Paper, August 2010 and Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of  Financial 
Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initiative Considerations, IMF/BIS/FSB, 2009 
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applied to construct the global economic and financial stress indices, weighting 
economic stress by PPP-based GDP, and financial stress by financial openness.  
Conversely, equal weighting countries allow the possibility that even a small 
country could be a centre of a systematic crisis because a shock could be rapidly 
transmitted from a core node of financial network from which country may be 
linked, as well as lead international investors to reappraise risks in similarly-
situated, but not directly connected to  other core nodes.  
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Appendix 6.2 – Determinant of Local Bond Market Development 
 
Source: Burger et al. (2010) 
315 | P a g e  
 
Appendix 6.3 - Budget balances in East Asia  
 
Source: ADB, Statistics for Dynamic Policy Making 
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